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This section contains the latest news and information related to tax law. This information includes individual lawyers as well as law firms and legal teams who are actively engaged in representing clients in tax case proceedings. Locate the latest updates from prominent law firms, private practice attorneys, and plaintiffs who have pending litigation in process.

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Top ten ways to annoy an IRS Agent
  
Top ten ways to annoy an IRS Agent.

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Home Foreclosure debt cancellation income exclusion
From: The LA Times: "Debt cancellation exclusion. Before last year, if you lost your house in foreclosure or were forced to sell it for less than the loan amount, you'd typically be subject to "debt cancellation income." The short version: The IRS assessed income tax on the money you didn't have to pay back.

Let's say you had a home with a $500,000 mortgage and a market value of $450,000. Before Congress passed a three-year exception to help people cope with the sub-prime crisis, if the lender took the home in foreclosure and you walked away owing nothing, the $50,000 difference was taxable income to you.

For 2007 through 2009, debt cancellation on your primary residence, whether as the result of a so-called "short sale" or a foreclosure, is not taxable. (Taxpayers are likely to get a 1099C showing the phantom income, however, so you must fill out a Form 982 to exclude that income from tax, Perlman said.)"   Debt income

My advice here is to not automatically assume you have taxable income to report. Another aspect of the situation is that the Exclusion on the sale of your home can apply and cancel out the difference between what you paid for it (plus additions), and what it was worth when it was foreclosed upon.

At this next link, there is guidance on other ways to exclude canceled debt from income. Of note is the general rule that, "The cancellation takes place when you are insolvent...    ...and the amount excluded is not more than the amount by which you are insolvent."  Canceled  So, it would seem that canceled credit card debt, may in some cases be excluded from income.

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Online Sales - Here comes the IRS

From CNET News: "The U.S. Treasury Department wants Congress to force auction sites like eBay, Amazon.com and uBid.com to turn over the identities and Social Security numbers of a large portion of their users to the IRS--so tax collectors know how much each person made through online selling.

The effort is part of a larger plan, which enjoys enthusiastic support from both Democrats and Republicans, to close what's known as the "tax gap." It's a broad term that covers Americans who don't file tax returns or those who underreport their income, and the IRS believes it to total around $345 billion for the 2001 tax year."   More

My comments: This type of income should be reported when there is a material amount of it. There may be some arguments for not reporting it in limited situations. If you sell your old boat on eBay, mostly like you'll have a non-reportable personal loss. If you are buying boats to resell them on eBay, then I'd say you have a business, and you need to be reporting it on your 1040. Material omissions of income from your 1040 tax return is a serious matter. Whether or not Congress acts to require auction sites to report these sales doesn't matter. If someone fails to report to you taxable income that you earned, the law (and this CPA) says you still have to report it.



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Babysitters and Newspaper Carriers under the age of 18
From kiplinger.com: "...teenage babysitters are normally considered employees, so they are exempt from paying self-employment tax. There's also a specific exemption for newspaper carriers under age 18.

If a child under 18 is working part-time as a household worker (this means babysitters, gardeners, people who do housecleaning or repair work, or anyone who is employed in or around someone else's home), he or she is also exempt from the Social Security tax."
http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/drt/archive/2007/dt070703.html

It's been my general advice that if your child is in a similar situation, they don't have to pay the Self Employment Tax. The income is reported on line 21 of form 1040. I code it "Child's non SE earned income", so that my tax preparation software knows its relevant attributes and treats it in the correct way. Line 21 is used for almost everything that doesn't fit someplace else on the return. In the case of a child with earned income from babysitting entered on line 21, their standard deduction should be tied to this line 21. As their line 21 increases, their standard deduction generally also increases, up to the 2007 maximum of $5350.



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Don't Mess With Taxes
The award for funniest name for a tax related website goes to: Don't Mess With Taxes, a site that covers: "money news, notices, tips, commentary, insight and humor". The site appears to be Texas journalist Kay Bell's.  Taxes
Sale of an Inherited House
When you've inherited a house and later sell it, you could be looking at a taxable gain or loss. At the time of sale, you will generally compare the house's Fair Market Value on the date of death to what you get for it, less selling costs. During the time you hold the house, you can deduct property taxes. Here's a rather aggressive opinion from TaxMama, about what to do with some of the other costs related to maintaining the house: Inherited House
Child and Dependent Care Credit and Single Parent Students
For the Child and Dependent Care Credit, married couples generally need compensation for the credit to be taken. If only one spouse works, the credit in not allowed. There is an exception to this rule if the spouse is a full time student. Being a full time student counts as having compensation for the credit.   2441 instructions

What is unclear is what to do when there is a single parent that is a student? We could conclude that even though the IRS doesn't say that the credit is allowed in the situation, it is.  We might argue that what the IRS writes about married couples, would apply to single parents.

My current position is that an informed client of mine can decide to claim the credit. What I'd like see is more discussion about this issue, and for the IRS to clarify its position.
Reporting Sales of Covered Calls
Selling Covered Calls is when you own a stock and sell the right for someone else to "Call" it away from you and make it theirs, at an agreed upon price. If your stock is trading for $100/share, you might sell a call for sometime to buy it at $105/share. So, if the stock rises above $105 before the call expires, this other person will most likely buy it. If the stock prices rises to $110, they can buy it from you for $105 and turn around and sell it for $110, making a quick profit. So what would sell such an option for? The market will determine this. I'd say all calls have an expiration date.

It to me is similar to selling an option on land. You can sell an option for someone to buy your land at an agreed upon price for a certain amount of time. The question de jour is, how to report the money from covered call sales on your 1040?

If the Call expires worthless, that means it isn't exercised, you report the income as capital gain. If the stock is called away from you, you add it to your Gross Proceeds when you report the sale of the stock, you just had to sell, because it was called away from you.

Most Covered Calls are written for less than a year. So the next question is, is the income from an expired call Long or Short term gain? It has some attributes of both long and short term. If the stock is called, this money is treated the same as the underlying stock, so it would be long term if the stock has been held for more than a year. But in the case of an expired call, it seems a short term bet was made that the stock wouldn't rise much. That's a question this CPA wishes to look into another day, and I'd appreciated your comments hopefully with links that support your position.

Brokers are getting good about providing Realized Gain and Loss Summaries. If you receive one of these from your Broker to help you with your income taxes, and you have Covered Call Sales, ask the broker if they correctly treated the Sales by adding them to any stock that was Called? And then ask them to prove it to you, by showing how they came up with the basis numbers related to covered calls sales?

Thanks to: slcg.com

Unrecovered costs at death in annuities and retirement plans
There's a question of what to do with the remaining basis of an annuity upon the death of its owner? In Minnesota many people receive Public Employee Retirement Association (PERA) when they retire. I expect to see on their 1099-Rs a slightly larger Gross distribution than Taxable distribution. The difference represents a part of their unrecovered basis in the plan (of their after tax money). Where does this untaxed money go upon their death? I think it goes to their beneficiary when there is one.

I noticed a surviving spouse taking over the payments recently. The spouses 1099-R didn't show basis because the Gross distribution equaled the Taxable distribution. It seems we should either convince PERA to change how it does things, or find out what the remaining basis is and figure the basis recovered each your ourselves.

In looking into this issue if found this clear as mud support for my position:   Basis    Cornell who has this information is thanked. The problem with trying to understand it is with the IRS, who wrote what Cornall reproduces, who often fails to write in simple terms for normal people. I can also write that carrying forward and using this uncovered basis makes sense to an accountant because it balances the books. Because the money that was once taxed, is not taxed again.

"the deduction...   ...shall be allowed to the person entitled to such payments for the taxable year in which such payments are received." - The IRS
Lease with Option to Buy Real Estate
I have a client who is renting out their former residence and giving the renter a $1000 credit per month towards the purchase of the house at the end of a 2 year lease. The question is, did my client really sell his house or is he leasing it out? There doesn't seem to be a hybrid answer where the $1000/month is treated differently from the rent payment. The IRS has I think in this case said that you have one or the other and that the total monthly payments are either all rent or all payments on the sale of the house. We ended up here, treating all the payments as rent income, based on the circumstances. I good description of the rules is available from CIRE Magazine:   Lease Option
Stimulus Rebate and Dependents
People claimed on another's return do not qualify for the Stimulus Rebate. When deciding if parents should claim their child for one last year, the Stimulus Rebate should be considered. There are no age limits on the Rebate that I am aware of. We often compare the total tax a family would pay two ways. With them claiming their child and without them claiming the child. This often occurs when children are of college age. The potential $600 that they could get, if they have enough income, should be considered when figuring who should claim the child, MAYBE.

Part of my uncertainty here is caused by what I call the 2008 Make Up filing. I expect that those who missed out on this May's payment will still have chance at getting it later. According to the IRS, "If you're not eligible this year but you become eligible next year, you can claim the economic stimulus payment next year on your 2008 tax return."

So, if a child aged 18 is claimed by their parents for 2007, can they next year when filing their 2008 return, in effect claim that they are entitled to their $600, because they actually claimed themselves on their 2008 return, the period to which the Stimulus Rebate is tied to? If this is allowed, the parents can benefit from claiming them for one more year, and they can get the rebate. This is different than the rule that says, dependents can't get the rebate. I am not offering an opinion about whether this will be possible? I am asking for my readers comments on it.
Required Minimum Distributions
The required minimum distributions rules for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) rely on IRS provided tables that use standardized life expectancies based upon your age. When using their tables (IRS tables) you use your age as of the end of the year to which the distribution applies, and the Fair Market Value of all your IRAs as of the beginning of the year.

CCH has an easy to use calculator here:  RMD   When using their calculator, you should enter your beneficiaries age if you have one. Because of the distribution rules that cover what to do when you don't have beneficiary, I recommend that you do have a beneficiary.
Last year's natural disasters may affect this year's renditions of business personal property

Susan Combs, the Comptroller of Public Accounts, issued a press release last Friday reminding business owners that, absent an extension, mandatory business personal property (BPP) renditions must be filed with Texas’ county appraisal districts by this coming April 15th. The types of BPP that must be rendered for purposes of assessing local ad valorem (property) taxes are taxable inventory, furniture and fixtures, machinery and equipment and other property a business owned or managed as of January 1, 2009.

The Comptroller’s press release also mentioned a development that’s especially important to this year’s BPP property tax rendition process, namely, the effects of the significant number of natural disasters that occurred in Texas during 2008. One example was discussed in the context of sales tax in the previous post on this site captioned “Sales tax breaks in the aftermath of Hurricane Ike”. Because those natural disasters may have reduced the value of BPP at January 1st of this year, “Combs also reminded owners whose property was damaged by a storm, flood or fire last year that they may file a special decreased value report that could lower their final tax bills.” Those decreased value reports are also due by April 15th.

The Comptroller’s versions of the required rendition forms are available at the “Texas Property Tax Renditions Forms” page on the Comptroller’s web site, the Window on State Government. The Comptroller’s version of the special decreased value report (Form 50-127) is available on the “Texas Property Tax Special Appraisal Forms” page on the agency’s web site. In addition, local appraisal districts should have their own forms for these purposes.


Today's revised franchise tax webinar is sold out, but the Comptroller has added another one

Today is the first of the Comptroller of Public Accounts’ free 2009 webinars on the revised franchise tax, or “Margin Tax,” and, as expected, it’s full. Fortunately, the Comptroller’s staff has added another webinar, with a capacity of 1,000 participants, to be held on Friday, April 17th, starting at 10:00 a.m. As recommended in the previous post on this site captioned “The Comptroller has scheduled this year’s revised franchise tax webinars,” readers involved in this year’s franchise tax reporting process should register as soon as possible for the April 17th webinar or for the previously-announced session to be held on Tuesday, April 28th, beginning at 10:00 a.m.

Further information and registration instructions can be found on the “Revised Texas Franchise Tax Webinars March/April 2009” page on the Comptroller’s web site, the Window on State Government. At the moment, that page also contains a link to the webinar material for today’s sold-out session, although the link may change for the later programs.
 


Upcoming franchise tax desk audits and more in the March issue of the Tax Policy News

In the March 2009 issue of the Tax Policy News, the Comptroller of Public Accounts’ monthly electronic tax policy newsletter, the Comptroller announced that the agency will review approximately 29,000 revised franchise tax, or “Margin Tax,” reports that were filed in 2008. The March issue, which recently appeared on the Comptroller’s web site, the Window on State Government, also provided some helpful guidance for preparing 2009 franchise tax reports that must be filed or extended by this coming May 15th. Still, most readers will be interested primarily in the upcoming audits – and whether their client’s or company’s reports will chosen for scrutiny by the Comptroller. To avoid any confusion, here’s the full text of the Tax Policy News item captioned “Desk Audit Program:”

The Comptroller’s office plans to review approximately 29,000 franchise tax reports that were filed in 2008. The review will focus on the following three areas:

1. Taxpayers that reported a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code in the service industry and computed margin using the cost of goods sold computation;

2. Taxpayers that reported No Tax Due for 2008, but reported greater than $300,000 in gross receipts everywhere on their 2007 franchise tax report; and

3. Taxpayers that used the 0.5 percent tax rate. We will review SIC code information previously reported by the taxpayer and the taxpayer's Web site (if applicable) to determine if the taxpayer is indeed a wholesaler or retailer that might have qualified for the 0.5 percent tax rate.

Taxable entities whose 2008 reports do not appear to meet the statutory requirements for using the cost of goods sold computation, no tax due provisions and the criteria for the 0.5 percent tax rate will be contacted. This contact may be in the form of a deficiency determination which may be contested by the taxable entity.

Any taxable entities that find they had a reporting error related to one of the above mentioned issues in their 2008 report, and then amend their report to correct the error, will be granted a waiver of penalty.

Please note that this review process will not preclude an audit of the 2008 report year for other issues.

Businesses and their tax advisors should note three points in particular:

  • Taxable entities that made certain errors may learn about those errors for the first time when they receive deficiency determinations; i.e., they won’t get a warning citation for a “first offense.”
     
  • Passing a desk audit won’t preclude a future audit of the 2008 report year for other issues.
     
  • In a bit of good news, the Comptroller said that the agency will waive penalty (but apparently not interest) for an entity that amends a tax report to correct one or more of the designated desk audit program errors.
  • Finally, here are summaries of the Comptroller’s additional guidance for preparing 2009 franchise tax reports:

     

  • Clarification on Sales Commissions Paid to Corporations.” This item clarifies (or corrects) an earlier Comptroller statement regarding sales commissions paid to corporations. In general, sales commissions – and, indeed, any form of compensation – paid to an otherwise qualified real estate broker or salesperson that happens to be incorporated can be excluded from total revenue. Follow the link above for the Comptroller’s complete explanation of when compensation paid to corporations can and cannot be excluded from total revenue.
  • Faxing Franchise Tax Reports.” The Comptroller’s advice regarding submitting franchise tax reports by FAX: don’t do it. Follow the link for details.
  • Filing Form 05-169 E-Z Computation.” Apparently many taxpayers that used the alternative E-Z calculation in preparing their 2008 franchise tax reports erroneously deducted compensation or cost of goods sold from gross revenue. In this item, the Comptroller reminds readers that the E-Z tax computation does not allow such deductions, although Subsections (d) and (e) of Rule 3.587 list items that may be subtracted or excluded from total revenue when using the alternative calculation.

  • Here are some tips from the Comptroller about extending 2009 franchise tax reports

    The Comptroller of Public Accounts has just posted an article on the agency’s web site, the Window on State Government, with some suggestions for requesting extensions of time to file 2009 franchise tax reports. The article is captioned “Tips on Requesting an Extension of Time to File Your 2009 Franchise Tax Report” and contains several pointers grouped under the following headings:

  • Tips for single entities requesting an extension
  • Tips for combined groups requesting an extension
  • Tips for completing the Affiliate List
  • When Filing the Franchise Tax Report
  • Businesses that will need to extend their 2009 reports beyond the deadline of this coming May 15th should review these tips in detail, as should their in-house or outside return preparers.


    The lease of a city-owned hangar is taxable when the hangar is used to store aircraft

    Downtown Georgetown, TexasIs an entire aircraft an item of “aircraft equipment?” For ad valorem (property) tax purposes, the answer is “no,” at least in the area within the jurisdiction of the Third Court of Appeals, as explained in the Court’s recent opinion in ICAN Enterprise, Inc., et al,. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, et al. That answer, in turn, was central to resolving a dispute over the taxability of a hangar lease at a municipal airport. What’s more, in order to reach that answer, the Court had to apply several statutory construction principles to the applicable provisions of the Texas Tax Code.

    Image: Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain 

    The facts and controlling Tax Code provisions were clear. During the years in issue, ICAN Enterprise leased hangars at the City of Georgetown’s municipal airport for the purpose of storing several aircraft (the lessee’s business was flight instruction and aircraft storage). Subsection (a) of Tax Code Section 25.07 as it then existed provided that a private party’s leasehold interest in property owned by the state or by one of its political subdivisions, such as a city, is subject to property tax. However, subsection (b) of that same code section provided such leasehold interests weren’t taxable if “…the property is part of a public transportation facility owned by an incorporated city or town and . . . is . . . a building used primarily for . . . aircraft equipment storage.”

    There was no question that Georgetown’s municipal airport was “part of a public transportation facility.” So, since the lessee, ICAN Enterprise, stored aircraft in the leased hangars at the airport, the issue was whether or not each stored aircraft, as a complete item, qualified as “aircraft equipment” for purposes of Section 25.07(b). If so, then the leasehold interests would have been exempt from property tax. Unfortunately for ICAN Enterprise, the Court of Appeals concluded that, even though Section 25.07 does not define “aircraft equipment,” the Legislature considers such equipment to be different from an entire aircraft. Consequently, the Court held that the hangar leases weren’t exempt from property tax.

    ICAN Enterprise may not be the final word on the central question in the case. For one thing, ICAN Enterprise may seek further review in the Texas Supreme Court, and that court might read the term “aircraft equipment” broadly enough so as to include an entire aircraft. For another, ICAN Enterprise is technically controlling authority only within the region covered by the Third Court of Appeals. Other, co-equal, Courts of Appeal may interpret “aircraft equipment” differently for property tax purposes within their areas of the state. In any event, businesses that lease hangars at city-owned airports – and store aircraft in those hangars – should watch for future developments in ICAN Enterprise and any similar cases involving the taxability of such leasehold interests.


    Barge operators should be careful not to lose their sales and use tax exemptions

    Barges on the Houston Ship ChannelBarges are an important mode of transportation on Texas waterways, as can be seen in the photo of the Houston Ship Channel to the right. It’s therefore not surprising that Texas Tax Code Section 151.329 (“Certain Ships and Ship Equipment”) provides exemptions from sales and use taxes for otherwise taxable items used on certain barges (and on other qualifying vessels). In a recent letter ruling, indexed as Document No. 200903297L in the Comptroller of Public Accounts’ STAR database, a member of the Comptroller’s Tax Policy Division explained that the way in which a barge is used will determine how the exemptions will apply to those items.

    Image: Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain

    These were the facts presented in the letter ruling:

    Company X is in the process of self-constructing a new barge of eight or more tons displacement. The barge will be operated by Company X in its business operations to transport material from customers and suppliers located in Texas and in other states to Company X’s facilities in Texas as well as to Company X’s locations in other states. Company X plans to use the barge exclusively for commercial purposes nationwide and potentially in international waters.

    By way of background, Tax Code Section 151.329 exempts, among other things, (a) materials, equipment and machinery that become component parts of a barge of eight or more tons displacement used exclusively and directly in a commercial enterprise; and (b) materials and supplies – that is, “ship’s stores” and “sea stores” – purchased for maintenance and operation of a barge operating exclusively in foreign or interstate coastal commerce. Company X’s tax advisor asked the Comptroller’s office for a ruling regarding the taxability of component parts if the barge would occasionally be used for non-commercial purposes, and of ship’s stores and sea stores if the barge was used in intrastate rather than in foreign or interstate coastal commerce.   

     

    The Comptroller’s Tax Policy representative said that the exemption would be lost for both types of items, but there would be a difference in calculating the resulting tax depending on the items involved. For component parts, the non-commercial use of the barge would be considered a “divergent use” requiring the owner to pay tax on those components purchased tax free with an exemption certificate. The barge owner could use the formula in Subsection (a)(5) of Sales Tax Rule 3.297 (“Carriers”) to calculate the tax resulting from the owner’s occasional non-commercial use; that is the sales tax would be based on fair market rental value for the period of time used in that manner. By contrast, that formula could not be used to calculate the tax on ship’s stores and sea stores when the barge was operated in intrastate waters. Instead, the Tax Policy representative relied on Subsection (b)(3)(B) of Rule 3.297 and ruled that the exemption would be lost for the entire quarter in which the nonexempt operation occurred.

     

    So, barge operators and their tax advisors should carefully review this recent letter ruling to understand how the beneficial sales and use tax exemptions in Tax Code Section 151.329 could be lost simply by an occasional lapse in the manner of operation.


    Offer-In-Compromise Down Payment Requirement Could be Repealed

    Last week, two Congressmen introduced tax debts by submitting OIC application. A mandatory non-refundable fee, combined with a very low chance of acceptance (the IRS rejects more than 75% of all OIC program much less alluring to taxpayers who are searching for ways to settle unpaid OICs received by the IRS fell by 21% from 2006 to 2007 when this down payment requirement took effect.

    Should Congress pass OIC would be a much more attractive option to the countless taxpayers who are struggling to settle their testimonials and tax attorneys have filed many successful tax problem and need a tax attorneys, at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C.


    When delivery is delayed after selling an aircraft to an out-of-state or foreign buyer

    As has been widely reported, many major U.S. corporations have been selling off part or all of their business aircraft fleets. When those aircraft are sold in Texas for registration and use in another state or country, a question arises as to whether the sale is exempt from Texas sales and use tax if there’s a delay between the sale date and the delivery to the buyer. In a letter ruling issued last February and recently added to the Comptroller of Public Accounts’ STAR database as document no. 200902318L, a representative of the Comptroller’s Tax Policy Division said that such sales can be exempt under Subsection (a)(4) of Texas Tax Code Section 151.328 (“Aircraft”) despite the delay. Here were the circumstances and Tax Policy’s response in the ruling: 

    The sale and delivery of an aircraft will take place in Texas. Then, for the next few weeks (approximately 4 weeks) the buyer’s pilots will train in **************, while at the same time, the aircraft will go through some inspections required for the FAA to issue an Export Certificate of Airworthiness (ECofA). Within a few days, the buyer should receive the FAA ECofA, and then the buyer will export the aircraft to Mexico where it will be registered and based.

    Response: Section 151.328(a)(4) of the Texas Tax Code exempts the sale of an aircraft in Texas to a person for use and registration in another state or nation before any use in Texas. Flight training in the aircraft in Texas and flying the aircraft out of Texas does not constitute a use of the aircraft in Texas. In addition, any time spent in Texas for FAA inspections required for an Export Certificate of Airworthiness, including any necessary repairs or maintenance performed on the aircraft and any necessary test or maintenance flights taken while the aircraft is in Texas will not cause the loss of the above exemption, provided the aircraft is flown out of Texas immediately after the Export Certificate of Airworthiness is issued.

    In order to claim the exemption, the purchaser must give the seller a properly completed Texas Aircraft Exemption Certification Out-of-State Registration and Use (Form 01-907) signed by both the seller and the purchaser at the time of the sale. The seller must retain the completed certificate in its records to show why no sales tax was collected on the sale of the aircraft and provide a copy to the purchaser and to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Business Activity Research Team, P. O. Box 13003, Austin, Texas, 78711-3003.

    So, businesses planning to sell their aircraft to buyers for registration and use out-of-state or outside of the country should review this recent letter ruling for guidance if delivery is expected to be delayed following the sale.


    If software works right out of the box, it's a taxable computer program

    A “computer program” is one type of tangible personal property that’s subject to Texas sales and use tax. Under Section 151.0031 of the Texas Tax Code, a “computer program” is “…a series of instructions that are coded for acceptance or use by a computer system and that are designed to permit the computer system to process data and provide results and information.” In its opinion in Verizon North Inc. v. Combs, et al., released last Friday, the Third Court of Appeals (with one Justice concurring only in the judgment) affirmed a lower court’s decision that certain software was a “computer program” and thus taxable when purchased even though it had to be extensively modified after installation in order to perform as the buyer had intended.

    In that case, Verizon North had purchased “SAP R/3” computer software licenses (“Software”) for use by one of its subsidiaries and paid approximately $1.6 million in Texas use tax on the purchase price. After the purchase, the subsidiary spent many times the original cost – approximately $100 million – to “…configure, modify, and customize the Software so that it would perform the business functions for which it was purchased.” After losing its administrative refund claim filed with the Comptroller of Public Accounts to recover part of the tax paid on the Software purchase (probably the claim described in Contention No. 3 in the Comptroller’s Decision in Hearing No. 43,240 (2005)), Verizon North brought a de novo refund lawsuit in District Court and contended that the Software wasn’t taxable because it didn’t meet all of the requirements of a taxable “computer program.” Specifically, Verizon North contended that Subsection (b)(1) of the Comptroller’s Rule 3.308 added an additional requirement to the Tax Code definition, namely that software must be “sold as a completed program” in order to be taxable as tangible personal property. According to Verizon North, the Software didn’t satisfy that additional requirement because it wasn’t completely ready for the intended use by Verizon North’s subsidiary at the time of purchase (hence the need for roughly $100 million in post-purchase modifications).

    After extensively analyzing the District Court’s fact findings, the Court of Appeals rejected Verizon North’s argument and agreed with the District Court that the Software was indeed capable at the time of purchase, and without modification, “…to process data and provide results and information…” as required under the definition of a “computer program” in both the Tax Code and in Rule 3.308. The Software was therefore “…a completed program as sold, regardless what modifications, extensions, and customizations that the purchaser deems necessary for its intended use of the program.”

    Verizon North is an important judicial interpretation of when software is or isn’t a “computer program” and taxable at the time of purchase. That interpretation is especially important to so-called “enterprise software” that often requires extensive – and expensive – post-purchase customization before it can be used as intended. For that reason, Texas businesses should carefully review the Verizon North opinion with their state tax counsel before attempting to claim that the software that they’re planning to buy – or that they’ve purchased in the past – isn’t subject to Texas sales and use tax.


    Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBAR) and Voluntary Disclosure

    I have been and will be speaking to several CPA firms as well as various California CPA Society groups regarding the Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs), TD 90-22.1, and a possible solution through the Internal Revenue Service?s ?FBARs and Voluntary Disclosure?, which is now available on my website. In addition to some of the topics that I have discussed in my tax attorneys face when their clients disclose the existence of tax lawyer can be forced to disclose these client confidences to the IRS.

    If your clients have undisclosed tax problems call the

    The Legislature has raised the minimum revenue required for franchise tax liability

    UPDATE: Governor Perry signed House Bill 4765 on June 16th. Here's the press release from the Governor's office.

    The 2009 Texas Legislature adjourns today after making only one significant change to the revised franchise tax, the so-called “Margin Tax.” Specifically, House Bill 4765 raises the current $300,000.00 revenue threshold that a business must meet before it becomes liable to pay the franchise tax. Assuming that the Governor signs the enrolled bill as passed by both houses of the Legislature, the threshold amount increases to $1,000.000 for tax reports filed in 2010 and 2011 and then reverts to a permanent minimum of $600,000 starting in 2012. The tax discount under current law for businesses with total revenue less than $1,000,000 won’t apply until the lower revenue threshold takes effect, and then it will apply as follows:

  • A taxpayer with total revenue greater than $600,000 but less than $700,000 is entitled to a 40% tax discount; and
  • A taxpayer with total revenue equal to or greater than $700,000 but less than $900,000 is entitled to a 20% tax discount.
  • It’s been widely reported that this change will eliminate the franchise tax liability for 40,000 small businesses.


    Tax Fraud Results in 22 Years and $181 Million

    Frank L. Amodeo has serious tax fraud cases in Internal Revenue Service (IRS) history. The penalties for these payroll tax companies, and then knowingly neglected to forward this tax money to the IRS. Consequently, he was charged and convicted with five felonies: willfulpayroll tax); and conspiring to commit wire fraud, to obstruct an agency investigation, and to impede the IRS. Amodeo was forced to surrender more than $1 million cash, three homes, several luxury automobiles, commercial real estate, a Lear Jet, and his corporations in attempt to fulfill his outstanding tax fraud cases on record, people have gone to jail for tax problems, including potential payroll tax problems, contact the

    New Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) FAQs for Tax Amnesty Expected Shortly

    In conversations with the IRS first FBAR FAQ which was issued by the IRS only last month. As readers of this blog know, the IRS Tax Amnesty program for unreported offshore tax problem contact the

    IRS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) Issues Penalty Guidelines

    In May, the IRS penalties on tax preparers, and others who are tax attorneys, or enrolled agent is considered a violation of OPR first point out that sanctions are determined on a fact specific basis, and the penalty grid is not intended to establish a rigid standard. The guidelines including the actual penalty grid made be found at the OPR contacts the tax lawyer, or enrolled agent who has not filed his tax returns you have a serious tax controversy attorneys at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C.


    LA Estate Planning Revisited

    Estate planning for those of us in Los Angeles and throughout California where property values have been significantly impacted as a result of the recent economic slump can use this link to a great article from Money magazine on rethinking your estate planning options, given the uncertainty of future tax rates and exemptions.

    Discuss your will, living trust and other estate planning needs with a qualified tax attorney. Call Mitchell A. Port at (310) 559-5259.


    International Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion Top IRS Priority List

    In an address to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) on June 2, 2009, IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman announced renewed IRS efforts to combat international tax evasion.

    Shulman promised to create an inhospitable climate for tax havens that impede legitimate tax enforcement. He hopes to enhance information reporting on foreign bank accounts in countries deemed "tax havens," double FBARs, and allow the IRS more time for investigation by increasing the statute of limitations from three years to six years.

    The IRS? effort to eliminate tax evasion is supported by the expansion of President Obama?s 2010 budget. The budget provides funds for increased reporting on cross-border wire transfers, which would allow the IRS to gather information and target individuals who transfer money to and from offshore bank account and have not filed antax attorney at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C. to understand whether or not you have a

    Property Tax And California's Domestic Partners

    Domestic partners in California whose property was reassessed between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2006 because of a change in ownership or the death of the owner can apply for an exclusion. Go to the Los Angeles county tax assessor's website and apply for help before June 30, 2009.

    The Los Angeles Times ran a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" good article discussing this in more detail.


    Texas' community banks will pay less franchise tax beginning next year

    New York Stock ExchangeHouse Bill 4611, effective next year, provides an important benefit to small and mid-sized Texas banks – often called community banks – under the revised franchise tax, or “Margin Tax.” The bill, passed in the last days of the recently-ended legislative session, allows lending institutions (i.e., banks) to treat the gross proceeds (rather than just the net proceeds) from the sale of certain securities as part of their gross receipts for apportionment purposes. Whether gross or net revenue from securities sales can be counted in determining a bank’s (or any other taxpayer’s) apportionment percentage is significant. That’s because, under Subsection (e)(25) of the Comptroller of Public Accounts’ Rule 3.591 (“Margin: Apportionment”), revenue from the sale of securities is sourced at the location of the payor and, more importantly, “If securities are sold through an exchange, and the buyer cannot be identified, then 7.9% of the revenue is a Texas receipt.”

    Stated another way, 92.1% of the revenue from the typical sale of securities over a stock exchange is sourced outside of Texas, so it’s almost always beneficial to be able to include gross revenue rather than just net profit from such a sale in calculating a taxpayer’s apportionment percentage.

    Image: Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain 

    House Bill 4611 was designed to fix a problem that arose from the Comptroller’s interpretation of Subsection (f) of Tax Code Sect. 171.106 ("Apportionment of Margin to this State"). Specifically, in Subsection (e)(16) of Rule 3.591 and in pronouncements like the 2008 Memorandum indexed as document no. 200809240L in the agency’s STAR database, the way a bank treats securities for federal income tax purposes – and regardless of how it categorizes those securities for accounting purposes – determines whether gross or net proceeds from the sale of those securities could be counted in gross receipts under the apportionment formula. As the Legislature’s Bill Analysis of the language that became the final (enrolled) version of the bill explained,

    [T]he comptroller’s office provides that Section 171.106(f) only applies to securities and loans for which a taxable entity is required or elects treatment under Section 475(a)(1), Internal Revenue Code, or accounts for securities and loans under Section 471, Internal Revenue Code.

    The comptroller’s policy position on Section 171.106(f) can be complied with most easily by the large multistate banks, due to the large security trading components of these businesses.  These large multistate banks with security broker divisions have already established all the necessary procedures and policies needed to comply with Section 475(a)(1), Internal Revenue Code.

    The comptroller’s policy position on Section 171.106(f) will create significant administrative burdens and potential regulatory issues for small to medium-sized banks that exclusively do business in Texas and are commonly recognized as the state’s community banks. These banks do not normally have large security trading components but do sell securities and loans as part of their normal course of business. These banks are faced with implementing costly and extensive administrative procedures and policies to comply with the comptroller’s position or will suffer from significantly higher franchise tax burdens (as a percentage of income) than their large multistate counterparts.

    The Legislature’s solution to that problem is Subsection (f-1) as added to Section 171.106 by House Bill 4611. Under the new subsection, for apportionment purposes a bank will be allowed to count as part of its gross receipts the gross proceeds from the sale of securities categorized as “Securities Available for Sale” or “Trading Securities” under Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) No. 115 as in effect on January 1, 2009. In other words, if a bank is holding securities categorized that way under FAS 115, when it sells those securities 92.1% of the gross proceeds will be treated as coming from out-of-state sources, thereby lowering the bank’s Texas apportionment percentage and ultimately its franchise tax. So, community banks, and their tax advisors, should keep this law change in mind when preparing next year’s franchise tax reports.

    One final note: Section 2 (providing that the legislation applies only to a report originally due on or after the bill’s effective date) and Section 3 (providing that the legislation takes effect January 1, 2010) of House Bill 4611 taken together appear to rule out refund claims for banks that used the net proceeds from their securities sales in reporting and paying their 2008 and 2009 franchise taxes.


    Swiss Treaty Aims to Limit Offshore Tax Evasion

    The U.S. Treasury has tax fraud and tax evasion."

    The treaty must still be approved by the Swiss Parliament. At this point it is not known what effect this will have on the UBS summons enforcement action in Florida in which the Internal Revenue Service is attempting to obtain the names of over 50,000 UBS customers with tax fraud or offshore bank account, the deadline is June 30th for filing an voluntary disclosure under the tax controversy attorneys at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C.


    Notice of deficiency rules for imposition of IRS tax lein

    United States of America, Plaintiff v. Theodore T. Navolio, Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Defendants.

    U.S. District Court, Mid. Dist. Fla., Orlando Div.; 6:06-cv-1461-Orl-19GJK, August 6, 2008.

    [ Code Secs. 6212 and 7403]
    -
    The government was entitled to reduce to judgment the unpaid tax liabilities of the individual and to foreclose federal tax liens on his property. The IRS properly sent a statutory notice of deficiency by certified mail to the individual's the last known address and other possible addresses after searching the IRS database and requesting "postal tracers" from the United States Postal Service. Contrary to the individual's argument, the IRS exercised reasonable diligence in determining his address. Although the individual was in contact with the IRS's criminal division while he was incarcerated, the IRS's civil division and criminal division generally do not share information and, therefore, the IRS's civil division was not aware of the individual's changes in address while he was incarcerated.




    [ Code Sec. 7121]


    A settlement agreement between the IRS and an individual concerning his unpaid federal tax liabilities was not enforceable because the state's (Florida) unilateral mistake doctrine applied. The individual's mistaken belief that he was bargaining to resolve all issues relating to the tax liabilities for the years at issue, including the levy on his social security benefits, went to the substance of the agreement. This mistaken belief arose from ambiguous language used in the letter from the IRS and was not a result of an inexcusable lack of due care. Moreover, the government did not demonstrate that it relied on the settlement agreement or change its position to its detriment. Back reference: ?41,090.279.







    ORDER


    FAWSETT, Chief District Judge: This case comes before the Court sitting as trier of fact after a one-day trial held on July 9, 2008. (Doc. No. 101.) Also pending before the Court is the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement by Plaintiff United States of America. (Doc. No. 99, filed July 8, 2008.)

    This action was brought by the United States (1) to reduce to judgment the unpaid federal income tax liabilities of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio for 1992 and 1993, and (2) to foreclose federal tax liens against two pieces of property in which Navolio possesses an interest. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2, ?1, filed Sept. 22, 2006.) The United States named as Defendants several other individuals possessing interests in these properties: Navolio's wife Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, and Option One Mortgage Corporation. ( Id. at 2-3, ? ?5-10.) However, Navolio and Kaneyama are the only Defendants actively opposing this action. 1



    I. Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

    On July 3, 2008, the United States filed a Notice of Settlement in the record of this case. (Doc. No. 97.) The following day, Defendants Theodore T. Navolio and Seiko Kaneyama informed counsel for the United States, Bruce T. Russell, that there might be a misunderstanding about the terms of the agreement and therefore no settlement. Mr. Russell then filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement on July 8, 2008 (Doc. No. 99), and Defendants filed a Notice of Retraction and Renouncement of Compromise (Doc. No. 100) with the Court. Both parties appeared before this Court on July 9, 2008 for an evidentiary hearing on the Motion of the United States and, in the event such Motion was denied, trial. (Doc. No. 101.) The Court reserved ruling on the Motion and proceeded with a joint evidentiary hearing and trial. ( Id.)




    Findings of Fact


    During his testimony, Navolio explained that he and Mr. Russell exchanged a number of phone calls at the end of June and the beginning of July concerning a possible settlement of this matter. In a letter to Mr. Russell dated June 11, 2008 and introduced by the United States at trial, 2 Navolio and Kaneyama listed the following proposed settlement terms:


    1. We would not contest the foreclosure of the Condo.



    2. I, Theodore T. Navolio would sign a judgment in favor of the government for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed to date.



    3. The properties and monies that the government has taken to this point in time will not be further contested.



    4. The foreclosure action of the final property still in litigation i.e. 24 hibiscus Dr. Ormond Beach Florida [sic] will not be further pursued by the government.


    (Ex. 26 at 1.)

    Nathan J. Hochman from the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Tax Division, responded to Navolio and Kaneyama's offer to compromise in a letter dated June 26, 2008. (Ex. 27.) In this letter, Mr. Hochman recited the terms of the offer as follows:


    1. You will sign a consent judgment in favor of the United States for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed for taxable years 1992 and 1993, and you will not [] contest the properties and monies that the United States has levied on to date.



    2. You agree not to contest the foreclosure of the United States' liens on the condominium unit located at 219 S. Atlantic Avenue, # 335, Daytona Beach, in Volusia County, Florida.



    3. The United States will discharge the property still at issue in the litigation, located at 24 Hibiscus Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida, from the tax liens that attach to it.



    With the exception of the discharge of lien from this latter property, we understand your offer will not impair the ability of the United States to collect a consent judgment entered in this case.



    In addition, we understand that a compromise will resolve all issues still pending between the parties in this litigation, and each party will bear its own costs of litigation, including any possible attorney's fees.





    * * *



    Upon receipt of your signed acknowledgment, your offer will be processed in accordance with our usual procedures. Final action will then be taken by the Attorney General or an official designated by him for that purpose. We are sure you understand that, unless you receive a formal notice of acceptance from this office, the Department of Justice is in no way committed to resolving this matter in the manner set forth above.


    ( Id. at 1-2.) On June 27, 2008, Navolio and Kaneyama signed a confirmation indicating that these terms accurately reflected their offer to compromise. (Ex. 28 at 2.)

    Later, on July 3, 2008, Mr. Hochman sent Navolio and Kaneyama a letter which stated in part:


    This offer has been accepted on behalf of the Attorney General on the condition that Mr. Navolio agree not to pursue any claim against the United States under 26 U.S.C. ?7433 with respect to the taxes at issue in this case, or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income, and to file federal income tax returns for future taxable years as required by law. Please acknowledge these conditions by signing the acknowledgment below and returning it to this office as quickly as possible.



    We will prepare a Consent Judgment for your signature for the balance of the liabilities for 1992 and 1993 remaining at issue in the lawsuit and a proposed Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale with respect to the condominium unit described in the complaint. When we receive the executed Consent Judgment, we will ask the IRS to prepare and file a Certificate of Discharge of Lien from the Ormond Beach, Florida [property] described in the complaint.


    (Ex. 29 at 1.) That same day, Navolio spoke with Mr. Russell on the phone and expressed his concern about the phrase "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income."

    According to the undisputed testimony at trial, 3 Navolio, throughout his settlement conversations with Mr. Russell, maintained that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") was permitted by statute to levy only fifteen percent of his Social Security benefits. His understanding was that the agreed upon sale of the condominium unit would pay off the majority of his tax liabilities for 1992 and 1993 and that he would be responsible for the balance. Navolio believed that the IRS would collect this balance through a fifteen percent levy on his Social Security benefits.

    However, the conditional acceptance that Mr. Hochman sent on July 3, 2008 gave Navolio pause. Navolio felt that if he signed the agreement as written, he would be forever consenting to a one hundred percent levy on his Social Security benefits. Therefore, he wanted the language "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income" struck from the agreement. Mr. Russell permitted this alteration, agreeing that the language was perhaps overly broad. Navolio and Kaneyama then signed an acknowledgment which stated: "The foregoing accurately reflects the amended terms of our offer to compromise the claims of the United States of America in the abovereferenced case, as amended through our telephone discussions with Bruce T. Russell of the Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice." (Ex. 30 at 3.) They faxed this confirmation to Mr. Russell.

    Despite the confirmation, Navolio was again concerned that his understanding of the terms of the settlement differed from the understanding of the DOJ. Therefore, on July 4, 2008, Navolio sent an email to Mr. Russell to clarify their agreement. (Ex. 31 at 1.) The email stated:


    Please see the attached letter. I just want to be sure that I have the correct understanding. It was towards the end of our conversations where you made so[me] statements about my social security that got me thinking maybe I was reading something into the compromise letter of June 26, 2008 that was not there. I need clarification.


    ( Id.) Navolio further explained in the attached letter that he believed that the phrase "will resolve all issues still pending" in the July 3, 2008 letter meant "that the IRS would cease from the further taking of my social security, based on the pending litigation." ( Id. at 2.) Navolio stated that if this was not the agreement, then he and Kaneyama would "retract and renounce the compromise of June 26, 2008 and the modification of July 03, 2008." ( Id.) Upon receiving this email from Navolio, Mr. Russell filed the instant Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. No. 99.)




    Conclusions of Law


    As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, "A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of Florida's general contract law." Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Wong v. Bailey, 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985)). "The Court's role is to determine the intention of the parties from the language of the agreement, the apparent objects to be accomplished, other provisions in the agreement that cast light on the question, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the agreement." Id. (citing K & S Coin Operated Machs., Inc. v. Gottlieb, 362 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).

    To compel enforcement of a settlement agreement, its terms must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreed upon as to every essential element. BP Prods. of N. Am. v. Oakridge at Winegard, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Don L. Tullis & Assocs., Inc. v. Benge, 473 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). The party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement bears the burden of showing the opposing party assented to the terms of the agreement. Id. (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 532 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989)). A trial court's finding that a meeting of the minds occurred between the parties must be supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. (citing Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)).

    When one of the parties to a contract has made a unilateral mistake, Florida case law follows the minority rule and permits rescission of the contract. Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Hardaway Co., 152 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998); Md. Cas. Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So. 2d 541, 542-44 (Fla. 1965). For Florida's unilateral mistake doctrine to apply, three conditions must be met: "(1) the mistake goes to the substance of the agreement, (2) the error does not result from an inexcusable lack of due care, and (3) the other party has not relied upon the mistake to his detriment." Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Krasnek, 174 So. 2d at 542-43.

    The first condition is "compelled by the rule that a meeting of the minds must occur in order to create a contract." Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291. "Where one party misunderstands, or otherwise makes a mistake that goes to the substance of the agreement into which it enters, no meeting of the minds occurs, and thus, no contract exists." Id. In the instant case, Navolio mistakenly believed he was bargaining to resolve all issues relating to his 1992 and 1993 tax liabilities in the settlement negotiations, including the levy on his Social Security benefits in excess of fifteen percent. This mistake was caused in part by the statement "we understand that a compromise will resolve all issues still pending between the parties in this litigation " 4 in the response to Navolio's offer to compromise from Mr. Hochman. (Ex. 27 at 1 (emphasis added).) The issue of the levy on Navolio's Social Security benefits in excess of fifteen percent was not, however, an issue still pending in the litigation. This misunderstanding went to the very nature of the benefit for which Navolio was bargaining and concerns a material term of the contract. See Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1291-92 (explaining that Florida courts have found that the first element of the unilateral mistake doctrine is met when one party thinks "that the contract pertains to something other than it does"). Thus, Navolio's mistake goes to the substance of the agreement, and the first condition is met.

    Under the second condition, a party claiming mistake must "demonstrate that the error did not result from an inexcusable lack of due care." Id. at 1293. "Florida courts have interpreted this standard generously to the benefit of the erring party." Id. As demonstrated by Navolio's undisputed trial testimony, Navolio's confusion was a result of the ambiguous language used in the letter from Mr. Hochman and the conversations with Mr. Russell which led Navolio to believe that the Social Security benefits issue would be resolved in the settlement agreement. Navolio promptly sought to clarify his confusion, as demonstrated by his email to Mr. Russell the day after faxing the confirmation letter to the DOJ. These circumstances do not suggest a lack of due care.

    Furthermore, Navolio had good reason to believe that the agreement had yet to be finalized. The confirmation letter that Navolio signed stated: "We will prepare a Consent Judgment for your signature for the balance of the liabilities for 1992 and 1993 remaining at issue in the lawsuit[.]" (Ex. 30 at 2.) This indicates that the agreement between the United States and Navolio had not been reduced to a final, written, fully integrated contract. Navolio's mistake was not the result of an inexcusable lack of due care; therefore, the second condition is met.

    Finally, for the third condition to be satisfied, the opposing party must not have relied to its detriment on the unilateral mistake. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1294. To deny rescission on this ground, the opposing party must have "so changed his position in reliance upon [the mistaken party's] undertaking that it would be unconscionable to rescind the contract or that it would be impossible to restore him to the status quo." Krasnek, 174 So. 2d at 543, quoted in Roberts & Schaefer Co., 152 F.3d at 1294. The United States has not demonstrated how it has in any way changed its position in reliance on the settlement agreement, much less how it relied on the agreement to its detriment. On the contrary, Mr. Russell appeared on behalf of the United States before this Court on July 9, 2008, prepared to try the case. Accordingly, the United States did not rely on the agreement to its detriment, and the third condition is met.

    Since all three conditions have been satisfied, Florida's unilateral mistake doctrine applies. A rescission is warranted in this case; therefore, the Court declines to enforce the settlement agreement. Since the Motion of the United States to enforce the settlement agreement is denied (Doc. No. 99), the Court proceeds to a decision on the merits of the case.



    II. Bench Trial

    In its Order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment by the United States, the Court found that there were two factual issues remaining for determination at trial: (1) whether the IRS sent a statutory notice of deficiency to Navolio, and (2) whether the IRS used reasonable diligence in ascertaining Navolio's last known address. (Doc. No. 87 at 7-13, filed June 11, 2008.) Subject to these factual determinations, the Court found no triable issues involving either the amount of assessment or the propriety of foreclosure on the relevant properties. ( Id. at 13-16.)

    After consideration of the evidence presented at trial and the submissions by the parties, and after making determinations on the credibility of the witnesses, the Court enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, as follows.




    Findings of Fact


    Defendant Theodore T. Navolio had taxable income in 1992 and 1993 but failed to pay federal income taxes or file any tax returns for those years. (Ex. 5 at 1.) Therefore, pursuant to its standard operating procedures, the IRS filed Substitutes for Returns for the 1992 and 1993 tax years on Navolio's behalf. (Ex. 8 at 3; Ex. 9 at 3.)

    On April 15, 1994, Navolio was arrested for an unrelated matter and was initially incarcerated in Tampa, Florida. He was then moved back and forth between Tampa and a Brooksville, Florida facility. In 1995, Navolio was relocated to a prison in South Carolina. Finally, on February 26, 1996, Navolio was released to Las Vegas, Nevada. During this time, Navolio failed to send any notice to the IRS of his change in address or relocation from Florida to Nevada.

    On October 11, 1995, the IRS sent by certified mail a statutory notice of deficiency for tax years 1988 through 1993 to Navolio at three different addresses: (1) 662 George Miller Circle, Port Orange, FL 32127; (2) 604 Mockingbird Lane, Alatamonte (sic) Springs, FL 32714; and (3) 850 Muary Road Box 97, Orlando, FL 32804. (Ex. 24 at 1.) Pursuant to established procedures, the IRS sent the notice to Navolio's last known residential address in Port Orange, Florida. The IRS also researched other possible addresses for Navolio by searching the IRS database, called "Masterfile," reviewing Navolio's case file for recent correspondence or third party payor information, and requesting "postal tracers" from the United States Postal Service. The two additional addresses to which the notices were sent were the product of this additional investigation.

    After receiving no response from Navolio, on March 11, 1996, the IRS assessed Navolio's 1992 and 1993 income tax liabilities. (Ex. 8 at 2-3; Ex. 9 at 2-3.) As of March 3, 2008, Navolio's total federal income tax liability for 1992 and 1993, including interest and penalties, is $154,381.44. (Ex. 8 at 2; Ex. 9 at 2.) Approximately six months after assessment, on September 26, 1996, the United States filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien against Navolio with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Volusia County, Florida for tax years including 1992 and 1993. (Ex. 11.) The United States refiled this Notice on March 7, 2006. (Ex. 12.) The lien attached to the two properties still at issue in this case. The first is referred to as the "First Parcel" and is a piece of real property purchased by Navolio on July 13, 2001. 5 The second is referred to as the "Condominium Unit" and was purchased by Navolio on April 15, 2003. 6 The United States seeks to foreclose these tax liens pertaining to taxable years 1992 and 1993.




    Conclusions of Law


    According to the statutory scheme set forth in detail in this Court's Order denying Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 87 at 4-6), the mailing of a notice of deficiency is a statutory prerequisite to a valid tax assessment. 26 U.S.C. ?6213(a). The notice must be sent by registered or certified mail to the deficient taxpayer's last known address. Id. ?6212(b)(1); Wiley v. United States [ 94-1 USTC ?50,089], 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Guthrie v. Sawyer [ 92-2 USTC ?50,391], 970 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 91-2 USTC ?50,317], 935 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Labato [ 2002-2 USTC ?50,541], No. 6:97-cv-900-Orl-28JGG, 2002 WL 1770804, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2002).

    A taxpayer's "last known address" is "the address to which the IRS, in light of all the reasonable facts and circumstances, reasonably believed the taxpayer wished the notice to be sent." United States v. Bell [ 95-2 USTC ?50,389], 183 B.R. 650, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1995). In determining the taxpayer's "last known address," the IRS must exercise "reasonable diligence." Id. The focus is on "the information available to the IRS at the time it issued the notice of deficiency." Id. Generally, the IRS is deemed to have used reasonable diligence if "it mailed the deficiency notice to the address contained on the taxpayer's most recently filed tax return." Ward v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 90-2 USTC ?50,430], 907 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990). The taxpayer has the burden of providing "clear and concise" notice to the IRS of an address change. Pugsley v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 85-1 USTC ?9121], 749 F.2d 691, 693 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985).

    The burden of the IRS to determine the last known address and the burden of the taxpayer to notify the IRS of a change in address are separate and independent of each other. E.g., Sicari v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ 98-1 USTC ?50,237], 136 F.3d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1998). As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "This is not to say...that the IRS has no obligation to attempt to ascertain the taxpayer's new address; where it is shown that the IRS has failed to exercise reasonable care in determining an address, a notice sent to the wrong address will not satisfy the statutory requirement, and the 90-day period will not begin to run." Id. Similarly, a decision from the trial court the Southern District of Florida has stated:


    The IRS must also exercise reasonable diligence in determining [the last known] address, separate and distinct from the taxpayer's burden to provide clear and concise notification. What constitutes reasonable diligence will vary according to the information available to the IRS, including any notice from the taxpayer. However, the test focuses not on the information that the taxpayer provides but the information which the IRS possesses. More importantly, the test is fact specific and must be addressed on a case by case basis.


    Bell [ 95-2 USTC ?50,389], 183 B.R. at 653. The court continued, "While the taxpayer should bear the burden of notification of the new address, the IRS cannot simply ignore that which it obviously knows." Id. In the case of an incarcerated taxpayer, if the IRS has specific information concerning the taxpayer's whereabouts, this information may constitute sufficient notice of the incarcerated taxpayer's prison address. E.g., Broomfield v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue [ CCH Dec. 56,066(M)], 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1466, 2005 WL 1444131, at **4-5 (T.C. 2005) (citing cases).

    The Court concludes that the IRS mailed a statutory notice of deficiency to Navolio's last known address. Navolio's arguments that the IRS did not exercise reasonable diligence in determining his address are unavailing. While incarcerated, Navolio moved numerous times to multiple detention facilities. Upon his release, Navolio relocated to Nevada. At no point did Navolio submit a change of address form or provide notice of his relocation to the civil division of the IRS. While Navolio was in contact with agents in the IRS criminal division during this time, IRS agents Cathleen Curry and Roger D. Maurice testified at trial that the civil division and the criminal division of the IRS do not share information as a general rule. This testimony was not refuted by Navolio, and Navolio did not provide any evidence that the civil division knew of his whereabouts during his incarceration. Therefore, the Court concludes that the IRS exercised reasonable diligence by following its standard procedures to obtain Navolio's last known address.

    Since the Court resolves the two remaining factual issues in favor of the United States, 7 the United States is entitled to foreclose its tax liens against the First Parcel and Condominium Unit in the amounts assessed by the IRS.




    CONCLUSION


    Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:


    1. The Motion by Plaintiff United States of America to Enforce the Settlement Agreement (Doc. No. 99, filed July 8, 2008) is DENIED .



    2. The assessments made by the Internal Revenue Service against Defendant Theodore T. Navolio dated March 11, 1996 for tax years 1992 and 1993 are declared valid.



    3. Defendant Theodore T. Navolio is indebted to the United States for unpaid federal income tax liabilities for the years 1992 and 1993 in the total amount of $154,381.44 as of March 3, 2008, plus further interest and statutory additions as allowed by law, to the date of payment.



    3. The federal tax liens, notice of which has been filed in the public records of Volusia County, Florida, are declared valid and attach to all property and to rights to property of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio, including:



    a. The real property referred to as the "First Parcel," more particularly described as Lot 124, Ormond-By-The-Sea Plat 6, according to the plat thereof, recorded in Map Book 11, Page[s] 282 and 283 of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida; 8 and



    b. The "Condominium Unit" described as Unit 335, Daytona Inn Beach Resort, a condominium, according to Declaration of Condominium recorded in Official Records Book 4360, page[] 4884, and amended in Official Records Book 4368, page 2695, and amended in Official Records Book 4367, page 3313 and amended in Official Records Book 4493, page 737, of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida.



    4. Within eleven days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff United States shall file in the record a Proposed Final Judgment setting forth the remaining balance of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio's tax liabilities for 1992 and 1993 to be recovered by the United States of America as well as a Proposed Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale for the properties detailed in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) above. 9 Defendants have ten (10) days thereafter in which to object.


    DONE and ORDERED.

    1 Defendants Ivan and Dorothy Saxe have disclaimed any interest in the property that is the subject of this litigation. (Doc. No. 66, filed Jan. 22, 2008.) Defendant Option One Mortgage and the United States have reached an agreement to subordinate the tax lien to Option One's security interest in one of the properties at issue. (Doc. No. 64, filed Jan. 18, 2008.) Defendant Gail P. Kendall has failed to respond or file an appearance in this case, and the Clerk has issued a default against her. (Doc. No. 58, filed June 19, 2007.)

    2 Trial exhibits shall be cited as "Ex. ___."

    3 While Mr. Russell suggested in argument that these facts might be disputed, he did not take the stand or otherwise present evidence to dispute Navolio's testimony.

    4 Though not raised by either party, the phrase "in this litigation" is ambiguous, as it could modify either "issues" or "parties."

    5 Lot 124, Ormond-By-The-Sea Plat 6, according to the plat thereof, recorded in Map Book 11, Page[s] 282 and 283 of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. (Exs. 13-20.)

    6 Unit 335, Daytona Inn Beach Resort, a condominium, according to Declaration of Condominium recorded in Official Records Book 4360, page[] 4884, and amended in Official Records Book 4368, page 2695, and amended in Official Records Book 4367, page 3313 and amended in Official Records Book 4493, page 737, of the Public Records of Volusia County, Florida. (Exs. 21-23.)

    7 Navolio filed a Notice of Additional Authority with the Court on August 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 103.) He attached a case from a Bankruptcy Court in Montana, Anderson v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Anderson), 250 B.R. 707 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2000), involving the maximum permitted continuous levy of Social Security benefits under 26 U.S.C. ?6331(h)(1). The Social Security Benefits levy issue, however, was not preserved for trial and is not currently before the Court. ( See Doc. Nos. 35, 79.) The case therefore has no bearing on the instant decision.

    8 Pursuant to the agreement between the United States and Defendant Option One Mortgage (Doc. No. 64), the lien on this property is subordinate to the security interest of Option One (Ex. 19).

    9 Contemporaneously with filing these documents, the United States shall email copies of these filings in WordPerfect format to the Chambers email address of the undersigned Judge at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .
    Offer In Compromise Co-Pay Repeal

    To submit an Offer In Compromise (OIC) with the Internal Revenue Service in order to pay pennies on the dollar, a nonrefundable 20% downpayment is required. Combined with a very low acceptance rate by the Internal Revenue Service of OICs, the downpayment has the effect of discouraging people from applying for an Offer.

    A Congressional bill was recently introduced the title to which tells it all: ?Repeal of the Partial Payment Requirement on Submissions of Offers in Compromise?. If this is enacted into law, the struggle with your tax debts may be a bit easier.

    If you have a tax problem and need a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" tax lawyer, call Mitchell A. Port at (310) 559-5259.


    IRC ?183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit Audit Technique Guide, June 19, 2009

    June 23, 2009

    Internal Revenue Service : Audit Technique Guide : Hobby losses .



    IRC ? 183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit (ATG)

    NOTE: This document is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the Service and can not be used, cited, or relied upon as such. This guide is current through the publication date. Since changes may have occurred after the publication date that would affect the accuracy of this document, no guarantees are made concerning the technical accuracy after the publication date.

    Audit Guide Rev. 6/09



    Table of Contents

    Chapter One: Introduction and Overview
    ? Purpose of Guide

    ? Objectives of Guide

    ? IRC ?183 Overview

    ? Taxpayer's Subject to IRC ? 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

    ? Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

    ? Election to Postpone Determination

    Chapter 2: Examination Techniques
    ? Examination Techniques Overview

    ? Pre-audit Analysis

    ? Information Document Request

    ? Initial Interview

    ? Place of Examination

    ? Business/Activity Tour

    ? Factual Development

    ? Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

    Chapter 3: Supporting Law
    ? Internal Revenue Code

    ? Treasury Regulations

    ? Revenue Rulings

    ? Case Law

    Chapter 4: Report Writing
    ? Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC ? 183

    ? RGS Input

    ? Taxpayer Penalties

    ? Return Preparer Penalties

    ? Unagreed Reports

    ? Alternative positions

    ? Inadequate Books and Records

    Appendix
    ? Appendix A - Treas. Regs. ? 1.183-2(b)

    ? Appendix B - Suggested Interview Questions for Each of 9 Relevant Factors

    ? Appendix C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

    ? Appendix D - Comparative Analysis Income Expense and Losses

    ? Appendix E - Example of an IDR for a Yacht Charter Activity



    Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview



    Purpose of Guide

    This audit technique guide (ATG) has been developed to provide guidance to Revenue Agents and Tax Compliance Officers in pursuing the application of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) ? 183, Activities Not Engaged in for Profit (sometimes referred to as the "hobby loss rule").

    The purpose of the guide is to:
    ? assist in distinguishing between a business activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC ? 162); a non-business "for profit" activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC ? 212; an activity not engaged in for profit (where deductions are strictly limited by specific rules contained in IRC ? 183); and a personal activity (where deductions are generally disallowed by IRC ? 262, except to the extent not otherwise allowable),

    ? provide examination techniques,

    ? supply applicable law, and

    ? provide written guidance in report writing.

    This guide is not designed to be all inclusive.

    This guide is not legal precedent and should not be relied upon as such. It is not designed to remove the discretion given to managers and examiners in the application of a variety of audit techniques or procedures appropriate to any given examination.



    Objectives of Guide

    Upon completion of this audit techniques guide, the examiner will be able to:

    1. Determine when and to whom IRC ? 183 may be asserted,

    2. Identify and develop relevant factors for making an IRC ? 183 determination, and

    3. Compute the examination adjustments when a determination is made that an activity is not engaged in for profit.



    IRC ? 183 Overview

    A number of taxpayers who have significant income from other sources reduce their taxable income by reporting losses from activities that may or may not be engaged in for profit. It is up to IRS examiners to make a factual determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit.

    On September 27, 2007, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report entitled "Significant Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Taxpayers With Schedule C Losses are Engaged in Tax Abuse." The review looked at high income Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) taxpayers (total income sources of $100,000 or greater) who claimed business losses using a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) for activities considered to be not-for-profit. The results of the audit found the following:
    "In general, if a taxpayer has hobby income and expenses, the expense deduction should be limited to the hobby income amount. About 1.5 million taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources, filed form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over consecutive Tax Years 2002 - 2005 (4 years); 73 percent of these taxpayers were assisted by tax practitioners. By claming these losses to reduce their taxable incomes, about 1.2 million of the 1.5 million taxpayers potentially avoided paying $2.8 billion in taxes in Tax Year 2005. Changes are needed to prevent taxpayers from continually deducting losses in potentially not-for-profit activities to reduce their tax liabilities."

    It is important to note that the report limited their review to Schedule C's with four years of consecutive losses and to total income sources of $100,000 or greater. It did not cover Schedule F farm activities nor did it cover any type of entity other than the 1040.

    IRC ? 183 generally limits deductions, in the case of an activity engaged in by a taxpayer, if the activity is not engaged in for profit. The term "activity not engaged in for profit" is defined by IRC ? 183(c) to mean any activity, other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under IRC ? 162 or under paragraphs (1) or (2) of IRC ? 212. IRC ? 183 applies to individuals, partnerships, S corporations, trusts and estates. It does not apply to C corporations.

    The determination of whether an activity is an activity not engaged in for profit is a factual determination. Neither the Code nor the Regulations provide an absolute definition. They instead serve to provide guidance in formulating the facts necessary to determine whether an activity is a not for profit activity. Historically, IRC ? 183 has been a difficult issue to pursue.

    The first "hobby loss" provision in the Internal Revenue Code was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1943 as IRC ? 270. The act was intended to limit the ability of individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities. IRC ? 270 was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 1969, and replaced with IRC ? 183.

    Generally, the Code allows individuals to deduct expenses which are incurred (1) in a trade or business (IRC ? 162); or (2) for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income (IRC ? 212).

    For the expenses to be deductible under IRC ?? 162 or 212, the taxpayer must engage in or carry on an activity to which the expenses relate with an actual and honest objective of making a profit. Keanini v. Comr ., 94 T.C. 41 (1990) (citing Golanty v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 411, 425 (1979), aff'd without published opinion, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981)); Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982), aff'd without opinion, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

    Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they engaged in the activity with an actual and honest objective of realizing a profit. Hendricks v. Comr ., 32 F.3d 94 (4th Cir. 1994), aff'g T.C. Memo 1993-396, Comr. v. Groetzinger , 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987); Bot v. Comr ., 353 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 2003), aff'g 118 T.C. 138 (2002); Am. Acad. Of Family Physicians v. U.S. , 91 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1996).

    The taxpayer must devote time to the business in the honest belief that the business will sometime in the future become profitable. It is necessary for the taxpayer to show what their projected profit is expected to be.

    If an activity is not engaged in for profit, IRC ? 183(b) allows a taxpayer the deductions that would be allowable without regard to whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit. If the gross income derived from the activity for the taxable year exceeds these deductions, IRC ? 183(b) also allows a taxpayer to deduct the amounts that would be allowable as deductions if the activity were engaged in for profit, to the extent of any remaining gross income.

    Treas. Regs. ? 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC ? 183, gross income includes the total of all gains from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property and all other gross receipts derived from such activity. It also provides that gross receipts from the activity may be reduced by cost of goods sold to determine gross income.

    It is generally to the taxpayer's advantage to determine gross income based on gross profit (gross receipts less cost of goods sold). The examiner should ensure that cost of goods sold is reduced by any personal expenses or nondeductible items prior to making the gross income computation.

    Making a determination as to whether an activity is not for profit has more implications than whether the loss will be allowed to offset other income. Many other areas on the tax return can be affected by this determination including but not limited to:
    ? self-employment tax

    ? deductions for health insurance premiums

    ? alternative minimum tax (AMT)

    ? itemized deductions

    ? adjusted gross income (AGI)

    ? personal exemption phase out

    ? Roth IRA contributions

    The determination of the proper amount of adjusted gross income can affect many items on the return, including but not limited to rental losses, medical expenses, casualty losses, miscellaneous deductions, the adoption expense credit and interest on education loans.

    Also, when there is an IRC ? 183 problem, the taxpayer may be subject to AMT since miscellaneous itemized deductions (where many not for profit expenses end up) are not deductible for AMT purposes.

    Whether or not an activity is presumed to be operated for profit requires an analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. Deciding whether a taxpayer operates an activity with an actual and honest profit motive typically involves applying the nine non-exclusive factors contained in Treas. Reg. ? 1.183-2(b). Those factors are:
    1. the manner in which the taxpayer carried on the activity,

    2. the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers,

    3. the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity,

    4. the expectation that the assets used in the activity may appreciate in value,

    5. the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities,

    6. the taxpayer's history of income or loss with respect to the activity,

    7. the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned,

    8. the financial status of the taxpayer, and

    9. elements of personal pleasure or recreation.

    No single factor controls, other factors may be considered, and the mere fact that the number of factors indicating the lack of a profit objective exceeds the number indicating the presence of a profit objective (or vice versa) is not conclusive. For example, if five factors say the activity is not for profit, but four are on the profit side, the activity still could be determined to be engaged in for profit. More weight is given by the courts to objective facts than to the taxpayer's statement of his or her intent. Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982).

    A profit objective in an earlier year does not automatically provide a taxpayer a blank check with regard to losses incurred in later years. For example, in a later year an activity may be treated as an activity not engaged in for profit even though in an earlier year the activity may have been conducted by the taxpayer with a profit objective. See Daugherty v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1983-188; Dennis v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1984-4.

    An examiner should not tell a taxpayer that, because he is involved in a particular business activity, it is not possible to make a profit and his/her losses are therefore disallowed. Each taxpayer is entitled to be evaluated by a fair, impartial examiner so that a fully reasoned determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit can be made.

    IRC ? 183(d) is a safe harbor for the taxpayer. It allows a presumption that the taxpayer is engaged in for profit if in 3 of 5 consecutive years (2 of 7 in the case of breeding, training, showing or racing of horses), the activity is profitable. This is covered in more detail below.

    IRC ? 183(e) allows the taxpayer to elect to postpone the determination as to whether the IRC ? 183(d) presumption applies. This is also covered in more detail below.

    IRC ?162 allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. A bona fide business must truly exist prior to claiming expenses under IRC ? 162. An expense may qualify as ordinary and necessary if it is appropriate and helpful in carrying on a trade or business, is commonly and frequently incurred in the type of business conducted by the taxpayer, and is not a capital expenditure." Welch v. Helvering , 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

    A trade or business expense deduction under IRC ? 162, however, is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in certain limited circumstances by IRC ? 280A. An examiner should consult the rules of IRC ? 280A (which generally supersede the IRC ? 183 rules) if the taxpayer's deductions are suspect and involve a personal residence. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-32.



    Multiple Activities

    Treas. Regs. ? 1.183-1(d) provides that if a taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC ? 183. Multiple undertakings may be treated as one activity if the undertakings are sufficiently interconnected.

    The regulations define an activity and provide that where the taxpayer is engaged in several undertakings, each of these may be a separate activity, or several undertakings may constitute one activity. In ascertaining the activity or activities of the taxpayer, all the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken into account. Generally, the most significant facts and circumstances in making this determination are the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of various undertakings, the business purpose which is (or might be) served by carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or business or in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings. Generally, the Commissioner will accept the characterization by the taxpayer of several undertakings either as a single activity or as separate activities. The taxpayer's characterization will not be accepted, however, when it appears that his characterization is artificial and cannot be reasonably supported under the facts and circumstances of the case.

    If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC ? 183.



    Farming Activities and Farmland Appreciation

    Where land is purchased or held primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value, and the taxpayer also engages in farming on such land, the farming and the holding of the land will ordinarily be considered a single activity only if the farming activity reduces the net cost of carrying the land for its appreciation in value. Thus, the farming and holding of the land will be considered a single activity only if the income derived from farming exceeds the deductions attributable to the farming activity which are not directly attributable to the holding of the land (that is, deductions other than those directly attributable to the holding of the land such as interest on a mortgage secured by the land, annual property taxes attributable to the land and improvements, and depreciation of improvements to the land). Treas. Regs. ? 1.183-1(d).

    Some courts have avoided the restrictive rule discussed in the preceding paragraph by finding that the taxpayer did not purchase or hold the land primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value. Instead, these courts have found the taxpayer purchased and held the land for farming. See e.g., Engdahl v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 659 n.4 (1979), acq. 1979-C.B.1. On distinguishable facts, an opposite conclusion was reached in Burrus v. Comr ., T.C. Memo 2003-285.



    Taxpayer's Subject to IRC ? 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

    The IRC ? 183 activities not engaged in for profit rules applies to (1) individuals; (2) S corporations; (3) partnerships; (4) and trusts and estates. IRC ? 183 does not apply to C corporations.



    Individuals

    The provisions under IRC ? 183(a) specifically applies to individuals.



    S corporations

    The provisions under IRC ? 183(a) specifically applies to S corporations. Treas. Regs. ?1.183-1(f) provides that IRC ? 183 and this section shall be applied in determining the allowable deductions of an electing small business corporation.



    Partnerships

    Rev. Rul. 77-320 holds that IRC ? 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC ? 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares. IRC ? 703(a) provides in general that the taxable income of a partner shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual.



    Trusts and Estates

    Treas. Reg. ? 1.183-1(a) states that "Pursuant to ? 641(b), the taxable income of an estate or trust is computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual with certain exceptions not here relevant. Accordingly, where an estate or trust engages in an activity or activities which are not for profit, the rules of IRC ? 183 apply in computing the allowable deductions of such trust or estate."



    C Corporations

    The provisions of IRC ? 183 do not apply to C corporations.



    Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

    IRC ? 183(d) provides a presumption that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity is profitable for 3 years of a consecutive 5 year period or 2 years of a consecutive 7 year period for activities that consist of breeding, showing, training, or racing horses.

    This presumption rule applies only after an activity incurs a third profitable (or second) profitable year within a 5 year (or 7 year) presumption period that begins with the first profitable year.

    Note: Treasury Regulation ? 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

    Example 1 - A taxpayer has the following profits and losses with a car racing activity (5 year presumption period):
    Example 1 profits and losses



    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Tax Year Gain or (Loss)

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2000 (30,000)

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2001 5000

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2002 (60,000)

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2003 2,000

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2004 5,000

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2005 (70,000)

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2006 3,000

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    2007 (63,000)

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________


    The first 5 year presumption period begins with the first profit year of 2001, but the benefit of the presumption does not begin until the third profit year of 2004. The presumption is not available for 2001 through 2003 because it does not apply until the third profit year. The presumption is available during the first presumption period only in 2004 and 2005. The second five year presumption period begins with the 2003 profit year and runs through 2007. The presumption applies to the third profit year of 2006 and will be of benefit to the taxpayer for 2006 and 2007.

    If the taxpayer meets the presumption rule, the Service can still argue that the activity is not engaged in for profit; however, the burden of proving that the activity is not engaged in for profit shifts to the Service. In addition, examiners cannot use IRC ? 183(d) as the sole basis for disallowing losses under IRC ? 183 even if it is shown that the taxpayer has not met the presumption rule.

    Examiners should be alert for situations where the taxpayer may have manipulated income and or expenses to meet the presumption rule determination.



    Election to Postpone Determination

    Under IRC ? 183(e), a taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether the presumption applies until the close of the fourth taxable year (or the sixth year for qualifying horse activities) following the first taxable year in which the taxpayer engages in the activity. An electing taxpayer may file returns in the interim on the assumption that the activity is conducted for profit.

    If an activity that is generating losses has not yet been carried on for the full profit presumption period, the taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether or not an activity is engaged in for profit.

    The examiner should first determine whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit from all available facts without regard to the presumption test or the possible election to postpone determination under IRC ? 183(e). This determination should take into account the "nine relevant factors" listed in Treas. Reg. ? 1.183-2(b) as well as the pertinent facts.

    Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a determination if the activity is presumed to be an activity engaged in for profit.



    Making the Election

    Form 5213, Election to Postpone Determination as To Whether the Presumption Applies That an Activity Is Engaged in for Profit, is used when taxpayers wish to postpone an IRS determination as to whether the presumption applies that they are engaged in an activity for profit. An election made by a partnership or an S corporation is binding on all persons who were partners or shareholders at any time during the presumption period.

    The election to postpone determination generally can be filed anytime within three years after the due date of the return (determined without regard to extensions) for the first year of the activity but not later than 60 days after the taxpayer receives written notice from the IRS proposing to disallow deductions attributable to the activity.

    Note: Form 5213 is rarely used by the taxpayer until an examiner proposes to disallow the activity as not engaged in for profit.

    The examiner should determine if the taxpayer wants, and is eligible to elect to postpone the determination under IRC ? 183(e). If the taxpayer makes the decision to make the election, all legal and procedural implications should be explained. If the taxpayer is eligible to make the election but does not wish to, the examiner should obtain a written statement from the taxpayer or his representative stating that the taxpayer does not wish to elect the provisions of IRC ? 183(e).



    Placing in Suspense

    If there is an election to postpone the determination, the examiner will generally close the case to suspense until the end of the presumption period. Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a final determination if the activity is engaged in for profit.

    If the taxpayer wishes to make an ?183(e) election to postpone determination, the examiner should:
    1. secure fully completed and properly signed Form 5213,

    2. requisition all returns beginning with the initial year,

    3. obtain AMDISA, IMFOLT, IMFOLR for all tax returns,

    4. perform audit functions as warranted, paying particular attention to the full development of the activity not engaged in for profit issue,

    5. examine and complete any open years prior to placing in suspense,

    6. prepare a report on each of the open years of the IRC ? 183 adjustments,

    7. attach a completed Form 3198, Special Handling Notice for Examination Case Processing, checking the blocks "Suspense Cases" and "Sec. 183 (Form 5213),"

    8. make appropriate comments in the workpapers to document the election,

    9. advise the taxpayer of the suspense process and to retain all pertinent books and records for each of the presumptive years,

    10. attach the Form 5213 to the back of the first year's return with the form number showing above the tax return, and, if applicable,

    11. resolve all other issues through partial assessments or unagreed procedures prior to sending the case to Technical Services for suspense.

    A partially agreed report should be prepared if there are other issues which are agreed and generate a deficiency. One report will contain the agreed issues and the other report only the IRC ? 183(a) issue as unagreed. IRM 4.10.8.5 contains the report writing instructions for partially agreed cases.

    The Form 4549-A, Income Tax Discrepancy Adjustments, in the "Other Information' section should include the following statement:
    "You have elected to postpone the determination with respect to the presumption that this activity is engaged in for profit by filing Form 5213 on (insert date) and thus, this issue will be suspended.

    On the unagreed report, the IRC ? 183(a) issue should be written up as if the case will go directly to Appeals. The Form 3198 should indicate in the Other Section "Partial Agreement Secured and Processed."

    If there are other unagreed issues besides the ? 183 (a) issue, the unagreed report will contain both the unagreed issue(s) and the IRC ? 183(a) issue(s) before the case is forwarded to Appeals. The Form 3198 should be notated "Case to be forwarded to Technical Services for suspense after resolution of unrelated issues."

    It is the IRS's position that the interest suspension period specified in IRC ? 6404(g) is tolled (ceases to run) during the time the IRC ? 183 election is in effect and for the particular activity to which the election relates.



    Statute of Limitations

    The filing of Form 5213 automatically extends the period of limitations for assessing any income tax deficiency specifically attributable to the activity during any year in the presumption period.

    Under IRC ? 183(e)(4), if a taxpayer elects a postponement, the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency attributable to the issue is extended to 2 years after the due date (without extensions) for filing the return for the last taxable year in the 5 or 7 year presumption period to which the election relates.

    For example, for an activity subject to a 5 year presumption period that began in 2004 and ends in 2008, the period of limitations automatically extends to April 15, 2012, for all tax years in the presumption period that would otherwise expire before that date with regards to the ? 183 issue.

    Note: The automatic extension applies only to those deductions attributable to the activity and to any deductions (such as medical expenses or charitable contribution deductions) that are affected by changes to AGI. It does not extend the statute of limitations for issues not related to the IRC ? 183 issue.



    Chapter 2: Examination Techniques



    Examination Techniques Overview

    Once an examiner believes there is a possible activity not engaged in for profit issue, the case must be adequately developed. In order to adequately develop an IRC ? 183 issue, the examiner must address each of the nine relevant factors contained in Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are contained in Appendix A .

    An IRC ? 183 issue will not be sustained in Appeals or in the courts if it has not been properly developed and documented.

    Included below are examination techniques specific to the IRC ? 183 issue. Some of these techniques are the same or similar to techniques performed on a typical case.



    Pre-audit Analysis

    It is not always easy to determine from looking at the return if an activity is not engaged in for profit. Examiners should be alert to see if there is a "reasonable" indication that there is a "likelihood" of an activity not engaged in for profit in the pre-audit stage of the examination. The amount of pre-plan time spent will vary with the complexity of the case.

    Examiners should consider the following in their pre-audit analysis:
    ? Are there activities with large expenses and little or no income?

    ? Are losses offsetting other income on the return?

    ? Does the activity result in a large tax benefit to the taxpayer?

    ? Does the history of the activity show that it is generating any profit in any years?

    Examples of possible IRC ? 183 activities include but are not limited to:
    Possible IRC ? 183 activities



    Fishing Horse Racing Horse Breeding

    Farming Motorcross Racing Auto Racing

    Craft Sales Bowling Stamp Collecting

    Dog Breeding Yacht Charter Artists

    Gambling Fishing Bowling

    Direct Sales Photography Writing

    Entertainers Airplane Charter Rentals



    An in-depth pre-audit analysis is essential to conducting a quality examination Examiners should prepare a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's returns for multiple years to assist in the identification of:
    ? large, unusual and questionable items,

    ? missing schedules,

    ? inconsistencies between different years, and

    ? audit potential.

    A successful taxpayer interview depends upon what is done before the interview. The examiner should obtain as much information about the taxpayer, be organized, and prepare an interview outline that is tailored to the taxpayer under examination.

    Information may be obtained by the use of internal sources such as IDRS, CFOL, MACS/CDE, IRP transcripts and YK-1 to learn everything possible about the taxpayer. External electronic sources of information such as Accurint, Google, Yahoo, and Altavista should also be searched. This information should be compared with the taxpayer's return.

    Examiners should perform any preliminary research including reviewing applicable code sections, regulations, court cases, revenue rulings and procedures, and ATGs.

    As preliminary information is gathered, it should be carefully reviewed and documented.



    Information Document Request

    The initial Information Document Request (IDR) for a possible IRC ? 183 case should be tailored to the specific taxpayer under examination but will more than likely be the same as for a typical case.

    The examiner should not issue an IDR asking the taxpayer to respond to each of the nine factors. This should be done in person with the taxpayer present and the examiner documenting responses. Also, examiners should not request the Business Plan with the first IDR as this should be addressed at the initial interview.

    Subsequent IDR's should address other needed information to complete the examination.

    An example of an IDR with possible items an examiner might request to assist in determining if a yacht charter activity is an activity engaged in for profit is in Appendix E .



    Initial Interview

    An examiner may not become aware that there is a possible IRC ? 183 activity until the initial interview with the taxpayer and/or representative. A subsequent interview may be necessary to gather the factual information to evaluate each of the nine factors contained in Treas. Reg. ? 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are in Appendix A . An effective and well documented interview is vital to the success in developing an IRC ? 183 issue.

    The business history should be developed and documented in the examiner's workpapers. Interviews provide information about the taxpayer's financial history, business/activity operations, and accounting records. Interviews should be used to obtain information needed to reach informed judgments about the scope of an examination and the resolution of issues. Interviews can be used to obtain leads, develop information and establish evidence.

    A list of possible interview questions to consider for each of the nine factors used in determining whether an IRC ? 183 issue present is in Appendix B . Not all of these questions are warranted in every case and questions should be tailored to address items specific to the taxpayer under examination. This interview plan is a guide, which should be modified based upon the responses of the taxpayer and should not be used as an inflexible outline.

    Examiners should use short questions that can be easily understood and in a logical order. Sufficient questions should be asked to give a clear understanding of the taxpayer's operations. Follow-up questions should be used to clarify questionable areas. If both the taxpayer and preparer/authorized representative are present for the interview, direct the questions to the taxpayer. Listen to the answers and follow up on any answers that are incomplete or unclear.

    The examiner should consider preparing Memorandum of Interview summarizing information obtained and statements made. This will become part of the case file to aid in the case development.



    Authority to conduct interviews

    The authority to conduct interviews and request information is granted by IRC ? 7602.

    Every attempt should be made to schedule the initial appointment with the taxpayer. IRC ? 7521(c) permits a representative authorized by the taxpayer to represent that taxpayer at any interview. Although a request for the taxpayer's voluntary presence should be made through his/her representative, the taxpayer's presence will not be mandated as long as the person being interviewed has first hand knowledge of the taxpayer's business, business practices, bookkeeping methods, accounting practices and the daily operation of the business. That person must commit to having first hand knowledge of the information requested and affirm that the examiner can rely upon the information provided.

    A representative may claim to have first hand knowledge, but when questions are asked it is clear he/she is unable to give adequate answers. If an examiner determines that the representative does not have sufficient knowledge of the taxpayer and his/her business to provide factual information, the examiner should request a subsequent interview with the individual who possesses that information. The examiner should not conduct the audit with someone who will serve as a courier, shuffling back and forth between the examiner and the taxpayer with IRS questions and client answers.

    If the taxpayer's representative does not comply with the request to interview someone more knowledgeable, including the taxpayer, the examiner should consider management involvement, issuing an administrative summons to the taxpayer (IRC ? 7521(c) and/or by-passing the representative. More information can be found in IRM 4.10.2.and 4.11.55.2.

    The examiner may need to use third party contacts order to obtain corroborating information from third parties.



    Place of Examination

    IRC ? 7605(a) states, in part, that "the time and place of examination shall be such time and place as may be fixed by the Secretary and as are reasonable under the circumstances."

    For office examination cases the examination will be conducted in the office of the IRS closest to the taxpayer's residence in the assigned area.

    For field examinations an examination will be conducted at the location where the original books, records and source documents are maintained. This is usually the taxpayer's principal place of the business/activity being examined.

    On a case-by-case basis, examiners should consider requests by the taxpayer or representative to change the place of the examination (Treas. Reg. ? 301.7605-1(e).) In considering these requests, the following factors should be considered:
    ? The location of the taxpayer's current residence and location of the business/activity.

    ? The location where the books and records and source documents are maintained.

    ? The physical restrictions at the activity which could cause disruption of taxpayer's daily operations.



    Business/Activity Tour

    Viewing the facilities and observing the activities is an opportunity to acquire an overview of the operation, establish that books and records accurately reflect operations, observe and test internal controls, clarify information obtained through interviews, and identify potential audit issues.

    Treas. Reg. ? 301.7605-1 states "regardless of where an examination takes place, the Service may visit the taxpayer's place of business or residence to establish facts that can only be established by direct visit, such as inventory or asset verification." The visit can show evidence of financial status, equipment usage, undisclosed aspects of the operation, etc.

    Tours should be conducted after the initial interview and early in the examination process. Examiners should be alert to the physical surroundings and confirm that assets identified on the tax return are physically present and identify assets that are physically present but are not represented on the return. Examiners should ask questions to confirm an understanding of what is observed.

    When determining the validity of office in the home deductions, the office or activity should be toured.

    Examiners should document that a tour was completed and describe the results, including observations and resolution of any questions. If a tour of the business/activity is not conducted, the reason(s) for not conducting the tour should be documented in the workpapers.

    A Tax Compliance Officer (TCO) does not always have the opportunity to perform a physical tour of the taxpayer's activity. However, the TCO can inspect any photographs that the taxpayer may have of the activity.



    Factual Development

    Examiners must determine whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity with an objective of earning a profit. Although a "reasonable" expectation of profit is not required, the profit objective must be bona fide, as determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances.

    Treas. Reg. ?1.183-2(b) ( Appendix A ) contains nine relevant factors to be used in determining whether a taxpayer is conducting an activity with the intent to make a profit. An IRC ?183 case is not adequately developed until all nine relevant factors are considered and documented. No one factor is more important or heavily weighted; a numerical majority does not decide the issue.

    The examiner should obtain copies of prior year returns from the inception of the activity and should prepare a comparative analysis schedule of income and losses (expenses) since the inception of the business through the present as shown in Appendix D . All trends in profits or losses should be addressed and explained. Any unusual income items or expense items that occur and then "drop off" may mean the taxpayer's profit is contrived. The examiner should consider whether the profits shown were manipulated in order to meet the presumption test.

    Examiners should be alert to the nature of the gross receipts that have been reported and determine if the income source truly exists or relates to the activity. Income may have been "created" in order to make it appear as though the activity earned income.

    The case file should reflect an adequately documented interview. Each of the nine factors must be addressed and documented. Sample questions for each factor are contained in Appendix B .

    A taxpayer who claims a business expense deduction has the burden of proof. Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to the deductions claimed. Hawthorne v. Comr , T.C. Memo 1999-31 (citing Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1992)).

    A taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms. New Colonial Ice v. Helvering , 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Also see Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1993); Rockwell v. Comr , 512 F.2d 882, 886 (1975), aff'g TC Memo 1972-133.

    To take any deduction, the taxpayer must be able to cite an authority: Code, regulations, revenue rulings, notices. This includes the burden of substantiating the amount and purpose of the deduction claimed. IRC ? 6001 imposes a broad recordkeeping responsibility on all taxpayers, requiring them to maintain adequate records to substantiate the liability. IRC ? 6001 gives the IRS authority to require whatever records it deems necessary. If the taxpayer proves that a portion of the expenditure was made for a deductible purpose, the taxpayer may allocate that portion to the deductible purpose when the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable allocation. See Dillon v. Commissioner , 902 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1990).

    IRC ? 6201 provides examiners with the authority to resolve issues and to make determinations of tax liability. It also provides broad authority to exercise professional judgment to weigh conflicting factual information, data, and opinions on issues of law to determine the correct tax liability.



    Factual Development of IRC ? 162 Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses

    Like any other examination, the examiner should evaluate each large, unusual or questionable item to determine its deductibility as a business expense. IRC ? 162 allows the deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred to carry on any trade or business. Examiners should be alert for personal expenses which may be disguised as business deductions.



    Factual Development of Other Non ? 183 Issues

    Whether or not it is determined that an activity is engaged in for profit, the examiner should consider whether other Internal Revenue Code sections apply and treat as alternative positions. Substantiation of all large, unusual or questionable items should be performed on each examination.

    Some of the other Internal Revenue Code sections include, but are not limited to:
    ? IRC ? 704 partnership loss limitations

    ? IRC ? 1366 S corporation stock or debt basis limitations

    ? IRC ? 465 at-risk limitations

    ? IRC ? 469 passive activity loss limitations

    ? IRC ? 162 ordinary and necessary

    ? IRC ? 274(d) record keeping requirements

    ? IRC ? 179 election to expense certain depreciable assets

    ? IRC ? 167 and 168 depreciation

    ? IRC ? 212 expenses for production of income

    ? IRC ? 280A disallowance of certain expenses in connection with business use of the home, rental of vacation homes, motor homes, houseboats, yachts, etc.

    ? IRC ? 195 start up expenses

    Taxpayers may use the activity to claim personal expenses. Examiners should be on the alert for any one or a combination of the following:
    ? Deducting all or most of the cost of maintaining a personal residence. See IRC ? 280A. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously claim that the "exclusive use" restriction of IRC ? 280A can be avoided by placing business-related items in any given room of the house. The taxpayers sometimes cite the IRC ? 280A(c)(2) exception for storage use (storage on a regular basis of inventory or product samples). For example, the taxpayer may erroneously claim that if a poster, calendar, desk, file cabinet, telephone or other business item is placed in a room that secures the room's business status without regard to the fact that the room is used for personal purposes as a kitchen, bathroom, child's bedroom, etc.

    ? Paying children and/or family members for household duties that are not ordinary and necessary to the operation of any business (e.g. disposing of trash, mowing the law, answering the telephone, washing cars). Also, the payment may be excessive for the services performed.

    ? Deducting family education expenses by claiming an Education Assistance Program for family members claimed as employees. See IRC ?127.

    ? Deducting excessive car and truck expenses when the vehicle was used for both personal and business use. Taxpayers sometimes claim a business purpose for every trip, whether it is to commute to a regular job or a trip to the grocery store, golf course, church, etc. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously argue that the trips are deductible given that there is always a potential of recruiting new clients.

    ? Deducting personal furniture, home entertainment equipment, children's toys, etc.

    ? Deducting personal travel, meals, and entertainment under the guise that since everyone is a potential client, these are deductible, not personal expenses.

    ? Deducting 100% of personal medical expenses merely by "employing" a family member who is not a bona fide employee and creating a medical reimbursement plan.



    Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

    The examiner needs to obtain information regarding the history of the activity under consideration. This information should be reviewed to see if any profits are being generated in any years and to determine the overall history of losses exceeding the profits. Completing an analysis of tax savings is important in developing a ? 183 case. The analysis should begin, if possible, with the first year of the activity.

    This analysis should be discussed with the taxpayer and included in the examination report.

    A template that can be used in performing an income tax savings benefit analysis is in Appendix C .



    Chapter 3: Supporting Law



    Internal Revenue Code

    Various code sections may come into play whenever there is an adjustment that may involve IRC ?183, including but not limited to the following:

    ? 67(a) - In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions are allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2% of AGI.

    ? 67(c) - In the case of pass-thru entities (1120S and 1065), a partner or S corporation shareholder must take into account separately his/her distributive or pro rata share of the partnership's or S corporation's miscellaneous itemized deductions which are subject to the 2% limitation in IRC ? 67(a);

    ? 68(a) - Overall limitation on itemized deductions.

    ? 162 - A deduction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business.

    ? 183 - Provides, generally, that if an activity is not engaged in for profit, deductions are allowable in the following order and only to the following extent:
    1. amounts allowable as deductions during the taxable year without regard to whether the activity was engaged in for profit are allowable in full (e.g. home mortgage interest, real estate taxes, etc.);

    2. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit and that would not result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent the gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1);

    3. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit that would result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent that gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1) and (2).

    ? 212 - An itemized deduction is allowed for individuals for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for the production or collection of income, for the management, conservation, or maintenance held for the production of income; or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.

    ? 262 - Except as otherwise expressly provided, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expense.

    ? 280A - A trade or business expense deduction under IRC ? 162 is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in limited circumstances by IRC ? 280A(a). In order for allocable expenses to be deductible, the portion of the taxpayer's residence must be used exclusively by the taxpayer on a regular basis as a principal place of business for the taxpayer's trade or business, or to meet or deal with patients, clients or customers in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business. If the taxpayer is an employee, the exclusive and regular use of a portion of the taxpayer's residence must be for the convenience of the taxpayer's employer before any expenses relating to the part of the taxpayer's residence may be deducted.

    ? 465 - This code section limits a taxpayer's deduction for losses from an activity to the amount at risk. IRC ? 465 applies to activities in which the taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of income. Therefore, for the rules of IRC ? 465 to apply, the taxpayer must be engaged in the activity for profit. Accordingly, an activity subject to IRC ? 183 cannot be subject to IRC ? 465 in the same year. If IRC ? 465 applies, any loss in excess of the taxpayer's amount at-risk cannot be deducted in the current year. If the taxpayer has no personal liability, but has pledged property as security for repayment of the debt, the amount at-risk is the fair market value of the pledged property, less any superior liens. If the taxpayer pledges property that is used in the activity as security, that property does not increase the amount at-risk. There is a special rule for real estate activities - a nonrecourse loan qualifies as an amount at-risk if it is "qualified non-recourse financing."

    ? 469 - Passive losses in excess of passive income are nondeductible. A passive activity is any rental activity or any business activity in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. If the average customer use is 7 days or less, the rental activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation. If the average customer use is 30 days or less, and there are significant personal services, the activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation.

    ? 704 - A partner's distributive share of partnership loss shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership.

    ? 1366 - A S corporation's shareholder's pro rata share of loss is not deductible if the loss exceeds the shareholder's basis in his or her stock, plus certain debt basis.



    Treasury Regulations

    Below are applicable Treasury regulations:

    1.183-1 - General information for IRC ? 183.

    Caution: Treasury Regulation ? 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

    1.183-2 - Nine relevant factors to be used in determining if an activity is engaged in for profit. These factors are included in their entirety in Appendix A .



    Revenue Rulings

    Rev. Rul. 55-258 - holds that income received in an activity not engaged in for profit must be included in taxable income but is not subject to self-employment tax.

    Rev. Rul. 75-14 - holds that the rental of a house to a relative at less than the full fair market value and less than the total expenses attributable to the house is an activity not engaged in for profit within the meaning of IRC ? 183. Therefore, the taxpayer may only deduct the expenses to the extent allowable under Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(b)(1) provided he itemizes deductions.

    Rev. Rul. 77-320 - holds that IRC ? 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC ? 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares.

    Rev. Rul. 2004-32 - holds that taxpayers cannot use schemes designed to create the appearance of having a home-based business, where none actually exists, for the purpose of converting otherwise nondeductible personal, living or family expenses into purportedly legitimate deductions.



    Case Law

    There are numerous court cases which discuss IRC ? 183. Some opinions are taxpayer-favorable while other opinions support the Government's position.

    Where the specific facts warrant, the examiner should cite cases both favorable and unfavorable to the Government. The taxpayer or authorized representative should be requested to provide any cases which defend the taxpayer's position.



    Chapter 4: Report Writing



    Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC ? 183

    When the examiner has determined that the taxpayer falls under the provisions of IRC ? 183, it is important to calculate the proper adjustments.

    A common error is for the examiner to simply disallow the net loss from the activity. Income must be reported on the 1040, line 21, as unearned income and expenses that fall in category 2 and/or 3 are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized deductions. These category 2 and/or 3 deductions are subject to the 2% of AGI limitations (IRC ?67) and the overall limitation on itemized deductions (IRC ? 68). Also, an individual may be subject to alternative minimum tax since miscellaneous deductions are not deductible for alternative minimum tax purposes.



    Gross Income

    Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC ? 183, gross income derived from an activity not engaged in for profit includes the total of all gains derived from the sale, exchange, or other disposition
    Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, June 5, 2009

    June 24, 2009

    111th CongressCongressional

    Research Service



    Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion

    Jane G. Gravelle

    Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

    June 5, 2009

    Congressional Research Service

    7-5700

    www.crs.gov

    R40623

    CRS Report for Congress

    Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



    Summary

    The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries, often referred to as tax havens. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. International tax avoidance can arise from large multinational corporations who shift profits into low-tax foreign subsidiaries or wealthy individual investors who set up secret bank accounts in tax haven countries.

    Recent actions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 industrialized nations have targeted tax haven countries, focusing primarily on evasion issues. There are also a number of legislative proposals that address these issues including the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 506, H.R. 1265); draft proposals by the Senate Finance Committee; two other related bills, S. 386 and S. 569; and a proposal by President Obama.

    Multinational firms can artificially shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions using a variety of techniques, such as shifting debt to high-tax jurisdictions. Since tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries (except for certain passive income) is deferred until repatriated, this income can avoid current U.S. taxes and perhaps do so indefinitely. The taxation of passive income (called Subpart F income) has been reduced, perhaps significantly, through the use of "hybrid entities" that are treated differently in different jurisdictions. The use of hybrid entities was greatly expanding by a new regulation (termed "check-the-box") introduced in the late 1990s that had unintended consequences for foreign firms. In addition, earnings from income that is taxed can often be shielded by foreign tax credits on other income. On average very little tax is paid on the foreign source income of U.S. firms. Ample evidence of a significant amount of profit shifting exists, but the revenue cost estimates vary from about $10 billion to $60 billion per year.

    Individuals can evade taxes on passive income, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting income earned abroad. In addition, since interest paid to foreign recipients is not taxed, individuals can also evade taxes on U.S. source income by setting up shell corporations and trusts in foreign haven countries to channel funds. There is no general third party reporting of income as is the case for ordinary passive income earned domestically; the IRS relies on qualified intermediaries (QIs)who certify nationality without revealing the beneficial owners. Estimates of the cost of individual evasion have ranged from $40 billion to $70 billion.

    Most provisions to address profit shifting by multinational firms would involve changing the tax law: repealing or limiting deferral, limiting the ability of the foreign tax credit to offset income, addressing check-the-box, or even formula apportionment. President Obama's proposals include a proposal to disallow overall deductions and foreign tax credits for deferred income and restrictions on the use of hybrid entities. Provisions to address individual evasion include increased information reporting, and provisions to increase enforcement, such as shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer, increased penalties, and increased resources. Individual tax evasion is the main target of the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act and the Senate Finance Committee proposals; some revisions are also included in President Obama's plan.



    Contents

    Where Are the Tax Havens?


    Formal Lists of Tax Havens



    Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List



    Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics


    Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance


    Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping



    Transfer Pricing



    Contract Manufacturing



    Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments



    Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits


    The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting


    Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting



    Estimates of the Cost and Sources of Corporate Tax Avoidance



    Importance of Different Profit Shifting Techniques


    Methods of Avoidance and Evasion by Individuals


    Tax Provisions Affecting the Treatment of Income by Individuals



    Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions



    U.S. Collection of Information on U.S. Income and Qualified Intermediaries



    European Union Savings Directive


    Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion

    Alternative Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit Shifting


    Broad Changes to International Tax Rules



    Repeal Deferral



    Targeted or Partial Elimination of Deferral



    Allocation of Deductions and Credits with Respect to Deferred Income/Restrictions on Cross Crediting



    Formula Apportionment



    Eliminate Check the Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments; Foreign Tax Credit Splitting From Income



    Narrower Provisions Affecting Multinational Profit Shifting



    Tighten Earnings Stripping Rules



    Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit, Or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit



    Transfer pricing



    Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



    Prevent Dividend Repatriation Through Reorganizations


    Options to Address Individual Evasion


    Information Reporting



    Multilateral Information Sharing or Withholding; International Cooperation



    Expanding Bilateral Information Exchange



    Unilateral Approaches: Withholding/Refund Approach; Increased Information Reporting Requirements



    Other Measures That Might Improve Compliance



    Incentives/Sanctions for Tax Havens



    Revise the and Strengthen the Qualified Intermediary (QI)Program



    Placing the Burden of Proof on the Taxpayer



    Treat Shell Corporations as U.S. Firms



    Impose Restrictions on Foreign Trusts



    Treat Dividend Equivalents as Dividends



    Extend the Statute of Limitations



    Greater Resources for the Internal Revenue Service to Focus on Offshore



    Make Civil Cases Public as a Deterrent



    Revise Rules for FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report)



    Joe Doe Summons



    Strengthening of Penalties



    Address Tax Shelters; Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



    Regulate the Rules Used by States to Permit Incorporation



    Make Suspicious Activity Reports Available to Civil Side of IRS


    Summary of Legislative Proposals


    President Obama's International Tax Proposals



    Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes



    Provision Relating to Individual Tax Evasion



    Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 and H.R. 1265



    Finance Committee Proposal



    Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S. 386



    Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569




    Tables

    Table 1. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists

    Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7

    Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands

    Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists

    Table 5. Source of Dividends from "Repatriation Holiday": Countries Accounting for at Least 1% of Dividends



    Contacts

    Author Contact Information

    The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. 1 International tax avoidance can arise from wealthy individual investors and from large multinational corporations; it can reflect both legal and illegal actions.

    Tax avoidance is sometimes used to refer to a legal reduction in taxes, while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal. Both types are discussed in this report, although the dividing line is not entirely clear. A multinational firm that constructs a factory in Ireland rather than in the United States to take advantage of low Irish corporate tax rates is engaged in avoidance, while a U.S. citizen who sets up a secret bank account in the Caribbean and does not report the interest income is engaged in evasion. There are, however, many activities, particularly by corporations, that are often referred to as avoidance but could be classified as evasion. One example is transfer pricing, where firms charge low prices for sales to low-tax affiliates but pay high prices for purchases from them. If these prices, which are supposed to be at arms-length, are set at an artificial level, then this activity might be viewed by some as evasion, even if such pricing is not overturned in court because evidence to establish pricing is not available.

    Most of the international tax reduction of individuals reflects evasion, and this amount has been estimated to range from about $40 billion to about $70 billion a year. 2 This evasion occurs in part because the U.S. does not withhold tax on many types of passive income (such as interest) paid to foreign entities; if U.S. individuals can channel their investments through a foreign entity and do not report the holdings of these assets on their tax returns, they evade a tax that they are legally required to pay. In addition, individuals investing in foreign assets may not report income from them.

    Corporate tax reductions arising from profit shifting have also been estimated As discussed below, estimates of the revenue losses from corporate profit shifting vary substantially, ranging from about $10 billion to about $60 billion.

    In addition to differentiating between individual and corporate activities, and evasion and avoidance, there are also variations in the features used to characterize tax havens. Some restrictive definitions would limit tax havens to those countries that, in addition to having low or non-existent tax rates on some types of income, also have such other characteristics as the lack of transparency, bank secrecy and the lack of information sharing, and requiring little or no economic activity for an entity to obtain legal status. A definition incorporating compounding factors such as these was used by the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in their tax shelter initiative. Others, particularly economists, might characterize as a tax haven any low-tax country with a goal of attracting capital, or simply any country that has low or non-existent taxes. We address tax havens in their broader sense as well as in their narrower sense in this report.

    While international tax avoidance can be differentiated by whether it is associated with individuals or corporations, whether it is illegal evasion or legal avoidance, and whether it arises in a tax haven narrowly defined or broadly defined, it can also be characterized by what measures might be taken to reduce this loss. In general, revenue losses from individual taxes are more likely to be associated with evasion and more likely to be associated with narrowly defined tax havens, while corporate tax avoidance occurs in both narrowly and broadly defined tax havens and can arise from either legal avoidance or illegal evasion. Evasion is often a problem of lack of information, and remedies may include resources for enforcement, along with incentives and sanctions designed to increase information sharing, and possibly a move towards greater withholding. Avoidance may be more likely to be remedied with changes in the tax code.

    Several legislative proposals have been advanced that address international tax issues. President Obama has proposed several international corporate tax revisions which relate to multinational corporations, including profit shifting, as well as individual tax evasion. Some of these provisions had earlier been included in a bill introduced in the 110 th Congress by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee (H.R. 3970). The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has been engaged in international tax investigations since 2001, holding hearings proposing legislation. 3 In the 11 th Congress, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, has been introduced by the Chairman of that committee, Senator Levin, with a companion bill, H.R. 1265, introduced by Representative Doggett. The Senate Finance Committee also has circulated draft proposals addressing individual tax evasion issues. S. 386, introduced by Chairman Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would expand the money-laundering provisions to include tax evasion, and provide additional funding for the tax division of the Justice Department. S. 569, also introduced by Chairman Levin, would impose requirements on the states for determination of beneficial owners of corporations formed under their laws. This proposal has implications for the potential use of incorporation in certain states as a part of an international tax haven plan.

    The first section of this report reviews what countries might be considered tax havens, including a discussion of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) initiatives and lists. The next two sections discuss, in turn, the corporate profit-shifting mechanisms and evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting activity. The following two sections provide the same analysis for individual tax evasion. The report concludes with overviews of alternative policy options and a summary of specific legislative proposals.



    Where Are the Tax Havens?

    There is no precise definition of a tax haven. The OECD initially defined the following features of tax havens: no or low taxes, lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency, and no requirement of substantial activity. 4 Other lists have been developed in legislative proposals and by researchers. There are also a number of other jurisdictions that have been identified as having tax haven characteristics.



    Formal Lists of Tax Havens

    The OECD created an initial list of tax havens in 2000. A similar list was used in S. 396, introduced in the 110 th Congress, which would treat firms incorporated in certain tax havens as domestic companies; the only difference between this list and the OECD list was the exclusion of the U.S. Virgin Islands from the list in S. 396. Legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress to address tax haven abuse (S. 506, H.R. 1265) uses a different list taken from IRS court filings, but has many countries in common. The definition by the OECD excluded low- tax jurisdictions, some of which are OECD members, that were thought by many to be tax havens, such as Ireland and Switzerland. These countries were included in an important study of tax havens by Hines and Rice. 5 GAO also provided a list. 6

    Table 1 lists the countries that appear on various lists, arranged by geographic location. These tax havens tend to be concentrated in certain areas, including the Caribbean and West Indies and Europe, locations close to large developed countries. There are 50 altogether.


    Table I. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists





    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Caribbean/West Indies Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, d,e British
    Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, a
    Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
    Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands a,e

    Central America Belize, e Costa Rica, b,c Panama e

    Coast of East Asia Hong Kong, a,b,e Macau, a,b,e Singapore b,e

    Europe/Mediterranean Andorra, a Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey), e Cyprus, e
    Gibralter, Isle of Man, e Ireland, a,b,e Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
    a,b Malta, e Monaco, a San Marino, a,e Switzerland a,b

    Indian Ocean Maldives, a,d,e Mauritius, a,c,e Seychelles a,e

    Middle East Bahrain, Jordan, a,b,e Lebanon a,b,e

    North Atlantic Bermuda

    Pacific, South Pacific Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, a Samoa, Nauru, c Niue, a,c Tonga,
    a,c,d,e Vanuatu

    West Africa Liberia

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Sources: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), Towards Global Tax
    Competition , 2000; Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines, "Which Countries Become Tax Havens?"
    December 2006; Tax Justice Network, "Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance Centers:
    http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/ldentifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf. The OECD's "gray" list
    as of April 2, 2009 is posted at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf. The countries in
    Table I are the same as the countries, with the exception of Tonga, in a recent GAO Report,
    International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in
    jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy jurisdictions , GAO-09-157, December 2008.

    Notes: St. Kitts may also be referred to as St. Christopher. The Channel Islands are sometimes
    listed as a group and sometimes Jersey and Guernsey are listed separately. S. 506 and H.R. I 245
    specifically mention Jersey, and also refer to Gurensey/Sark/Alderney, the latter two are islands
    associated with Guernsey.

    a. Not included in S. 506, H.R. 1245.

    b. Not included in original OECD tax haven list.

    c. Not included in Hines and Rice (1994)

    d. Removed from OECD's List; Subsequently determined they should not be included.

    e. Not included in OECD's "gray" list as of April 7, 2009. Note that the "gray" list is divided
    into countries that are tax havens and countries that are other financial centers. The latter
    classification includes three countries listed in Table I (Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland)
    and five that are not (Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, and Guatemala). Of the four countries moved
    from the "black" to the "gray" list, one, Costa Rica, is in Table I and three, Malaysia, Uruguay
    and the Philippines are not.






    Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List

    The OECD list, the most prominent list, has changed over time. Nine of the countries in Table 1 did not appear on the earliest OECD list. These countries not appearing on the original list tend to be more developed larger countries and include some that are members of the OECD (e.g., Switzerland and Luxembourg).

    It is also important to distinguish between OECD's original list and its blacklist. OECD subsequently focused on information exchange and removed countries from a "blacklist if they agree to cooperate." OECD initially examined 47 jurisdictions and identified a number as not meeting the criteria for a tax haven; it also initially excluded six countries with advance agreements to share information (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino). The 2000 OECD blacklist included 35 countries; this list did not include the six countries eliminated due to advance agreement. The OECD had also subsequently determined that three countries should not be included in the list of tax havens (Barbados, the Maldives, and Tonga). Over time, as more tax havens made agreements to share information, the blacklist dwindled until it included only three countries: Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco.

    A study of the OECD initiative on global tax coordination by Sharman, also discussed in a book review by Sullivan, argues that the reduction in the OECD list was not because of actual progress towards cooperation so much as due to the withdrawal of U.S. support in 2001, which resulted in the OECD focusing on information on request and not requiring reforms until all parties had signed on. 7 This analysis suggests that the large countries were not successful in this initiative to rein in on tax havens. A similar analysis by Spencer and Sharman suggests little real progress has been made in reducing tax haven practices. 8

    Interest in tax haven actions has increased recently. The scandals surrounding the Swiss bank UBS AG (UBS) and the Liechtenstein Global Trust Group (LGT), which led to legal actions by the United States and other countries, focused greater attention on international tax issues, primarily information reporting and individual evasion. 9 The credit crunch and provision of public funds to banks has also heightened public interest. The tax haven issue was revived recently with a meeting of the G20 industrialized and developing countries that proposed sanctions, and a number of countries began to indicate commitments to information sharing agreements. 10

    The OECD currently has three lists: a "white list" of countries implementing an agreed-upon standard, a "gray" list of countries that have committed to such a standard, and a "black" list of countries that have not committed. On April 7, 2009 the last four countries on the "black list, which were countries not included on the original OECD list, Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines and Uruguay, were moved to the "gray" list. 11 The gray list includes countries not identified as tax havens but as "other financial centers." According to news reports, Hong Kong and Macau were omitted from the OECD's list because of objections from China, but are mentioned in a footnote as having committed to the standards; they also noted that a "recent flurry of commitments brought 11 jurisdictions, including Austria, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Singapore, and Switzerland into the committed category." 12

    Many countries that were listed on the OECD's original blacklist protested because of the negative publicity and many now point to having signed agreements to negotiate tax information exchange agreements (TIEA) and some have negotiated agreements. The identification of tax havens can have legal ramifications if laws and sanctions are contingent on that identification, as is the case of some current proposals in the United States and of potential sanctions by international bodies.



    Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics

    Criticisms have been made by a range of commentators that many countries are tax havens or have aspects of tax havens and have been overlooked. These jurisdictions include major countries such as the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary Iceland, Israel, Portugal, and Canada. Attention has also been directed at three states in the United States, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. Finally there are a number of smaller countries or areas in countries, such as Campione d'Italia, an Italian town located within Switzerland, that have been characterized as tax havens.

    A country not on the list in Table 1 , but which is often considered a tax haven, especially for corporations, is the Netherlands, which allows firms to reduce taxes on dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries and has a wide range of treaties that reduce taxes. 13 In 2006, for example, Bono and other members of the U2 band moved their music publishing company from Ireland to the Netherlands after Ireland changed its tax treatment of music royalties. 14

    Some have identified the United States and the United Kingdom as having tax haven characteristics. Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker urged other EU member states to challenge the United States for tax havens in Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. 15 One website offering offshore services mentions, in their view, several overlooked tax havens which include the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, and Portugal's Madeira Island. 16 (Others on their list and not listed in Table 1 were Hungary, Brunei, Uruguay, and Labuan (Malaysia)). 17 In the case of the United States the article mentions the lack of reporting requirements and the failure to tax interest and other exempt passive income paid to foreign entities, the limited liability corporation which allows a flexible corporate vehicle not subject to taxation, and the ease of incorporating in certain states (Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming).

    Another website includes in its list of tax havens Delaware, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico, along with other jurisdictions not listed in Table 1 : the Netherlands, Campione d'Italia, a separate listing for Sark (identified as the only remaining "fiscal paradise"), the United Kingdom, and a coming discussion for Canada. 18 Sark is an island country associated with Guernsey, part of the Channel Islands, and Campione d'Italia is an Italian town located within Switzerland.

    The Economist reported a study by a political scientist experimenting with setting up sham corporations; the author succeeded in incorporating in Wyoming and Nevada, as well as the United Kingdom and several other places. 19 Michael McIntyre discusses three U.S. practices that aid international evasion: the failure to collect information on tax exempt interest income paid to foreign entities, the system of foreign institutions that act as qualified intermediaries (see discussion below) but do not reveal their clients, and the practices of states such as Delaware and Wyoming that allow people to keep secret their identities as stockholder or depositor. 20

    In a meeting in late April 2009, Eduardo Silva, of the Cayman Islands Financial Services Association, claimed that Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and the United Kingdom were the greatest offenders with respect to, among other issues, tax fraud. He suggested that Nevada and Wyoming were worse than Delaware because they permit companies to have bearer shares, which allows anonymous ownership. A U.S. participant at the conference noted that legislation in the United States, S. 569, would require disclosure of beneficial owners in the United States. 21

    In addition, any country with a low tax rate could be considered as a potential location for shifting income to. In addition to Ireland, three other countries in the OECD not included in Table 1 have tax rates below 20%: Iceland, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 22 Most of the eastern European countries not included in the OECD have tax rates below 20%. 23

    The Tax Justice Network probably has the largest list of tax havens, and includes some specific cities and areas. 24 In addition to the countries listed in Table 1 , they include in the Americas and Caribbean, New York and Uruguay; in Africa, Mellila, Sao Tome e Principe, Somalia, and South Africa; in the Middle East and Asia, Dubai, Labuan (Malaysia), Tel Aviv, and Taipei; in Europe, Alderney, Belgium, Campione d'Italia, City of London, Dublin, Ingushetia, Madeira, Sark, Trieste, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Frankfurt; and in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Marianas. The only county listed in Table 1 and not included in their list was Jordan.



    Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance

    U.S. multinationals are not taxed on income earned by foreign subsidiaries until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends, although some passive and related company income that is easily shifted is taxed currently under anti-abuse rules referred to as Subpart F. (Foreign affiliates or subsidiaries that are majority owned U.S. owned are referred to as controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs, and many of these related firms are wholly owned.) Taxes on income that is repatriated (or, less commonly, earned by branches and taxed currently) is allowed a credit for foreign income taxes paid. (A part of a parent company treated as a branch is not a separate entity for tax purposes, and all income is part of the parent's income.)

    Foreign tax credits are limited to the amount of tax imposed by the United States, so that they, in theory, cannot offset taxes on domestic income. This limit is imposed on an overall basis, allowing excess credits in high-tax countries to offset U.S. tax liability on income earned in low-tax countries, although separate limits apply to passive and active income. Other countries either employ this system of deferral and credit or, more commonly, exempt income earned in foreign jurisdictions. Most countries have some form of anti-abuse rules similar to Subpart F.

    If a firm can shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction from a high-tax one, its taxes will be reduced without affecting other aspects of the company. Tax differences also affect real economic activity, which in turn affects revenues, but it is this artificial shifting of profits that is the focus of this report. 25

    Since the United States taxes all income earned in its borders as well as imposing a residual tax on income earned abroad by U.S. persons, tax avoidance relates both to U.S. parent companies shifting profits abroad to low-tax jurisdictions and the shifting of profits out of the United States by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. In the case of U.S. multinationals, one study suggested that about half the difference between profitability in low-tax and high-tax countries, which could arise from artificial income shifting, was due to transfers of intellectual property (or intangibles) and most of the rest through the allocation of debt. 26 However, a study examining import and export prices suggests a very large effect of transfer pricing in goods (as discussed below). 27 Some evidence of the importance of intellectual property can also be found from the types of firms that repatriated profits abroad following a temporary tax reduction enacted in 2004; a third of the repatriations were in the pharmaceutical and medicine industry and almost 20% in the computer and electronic equipment industry. 28



    Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping

    One method of shifting profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax one is to borrow more in the high-tax jurisdiction and less in the low-tax one. This shifting of debt can be achieved without changing the overall debt exposure of the firm. A more specific practice is referred to as earnings stripping where either debt is associated with related firms or unrelated debt is not subject to tax by the recipient. As an example of the former earnings stripping method, a foreign parent may lend to its U.S. subsidiary. Alternatively, an unrelated foreign borrower not subject to tax on U.S. interest income might lend to a U.S. firm.

    The U.S. tax code currently contains provisions to address interest deductions and earnings stripping. It applies an allocation of the U.S. parent's interest for purposes of the limit on the foreign tax credit. The amount of foreign source income is reduced when part of U.S. interest is allocated and the maximum amount of foreign tax credits taken is limited, a provision that affects firms with excess foreign tax credits. 29 There is no allocation rule, however, to address deferral, so that a U.S. parent could operate its subsidiary with all equity finance in a low-tax jurisdiction and take all of the interest on the overall firm's debt as a deduction. A bill introduced in 2007 (H.R. 3970) by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee would introduce such an allocation rule, so that a portion of interest and other overhead costs would not be deducted until the income is repatriated. 30 This provision is also included in President Obama's proposals for international tax revision.

    While allocation-of-interest approaches could be used to address allocation of interest to high-tax countries in the case of U.S. multinationals, they cannot be applied to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. To limit the scope of earnings stripping in either case, the United States has thin capitalization rules. (Most of the United States' major trading partners have similar rules.) A section of the Internal Revenue Code (163(j)) applies to a corporation with a debt-to-equity ratio above 1.5 to 1 and with net interest exceeding 50% of adjusted taxable income (generally taxable income plus interest plus depreciation). Interest in excess of the 50% limit paid to a related corporation is not deductible if the corporation is not subject to U.S. income tax. This interest restriction also applies to interest paid to unrelated parties that are not taxed to the recipient.

    The possibility of earnings stripping received more attention after a number of U.S. firms inverted, that is, arranged to move their parent firm abroad so that U.S. operations became a subsidiary of that parent. The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 addressed the general problem of inversion by treating firms that subsequently inverted as U.S. firms. During consideration of this legislation there were also proposals for broader earnings stripping restrictions as an approach to this problem that would have reduced the excess interest deductions. This general earnings stripping proposal was not adopted. However, the AJCA mandated a Treasury Department study on this and other issues; that study focused on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents and was not able to find clear evidence on the magnitude. 31

    An noted in the Treasury's mandated study, there is relatively straightforward evidence that U.S. multinationals allocate more interest to high-tax jurisdictions, but it is more difficult to assess earnings stripping by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries, because the entire firm's accounts are not available. The Treasury study focused on this issue and used an approach that had been used in the past of comparing these subsidiaries to U.S. firms. The study was not able to provide conclusive evidence about the shifting of profits out of the United States due to high leverage rates for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms but did find evidence of shifting for inverted firms.



    Transfer Pricing

    The second major way that firms can shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is through the pricing of goods and services sold between affiliates. To properly reflect income, prices of goods and services sold by related companies should be the same as the prices that would be paid by unrelated parties. By lowering the price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions and raising the price of purchases, income can be shifted.

    An important and growing issue of transfer pricing is with the transfers to rights to intellectual property, or intangibles. If a patent developed in the U.S. is licensed to an affiliate in a low-tax country (such as one in Ireland) income will be shifted if the royalty or other payment is lower than the true value of the license. For many goods there are similar products sold or other methods (such as cost plus a mark up) that can be used to determine whether prices are set appropriately. Intangibles, such as new inventions or new drugs, tend not to have comparables, and it is very difficult to know the royalty that would be paid in an arms-length price. Therefore, intangibles represent particular problems for policing transfer pricing.

    Investment in intangibles is favorably treated in the United States because costs, other than capital equipment and buildings, are expensed for research and development, which is also eligible for a tax credit. In addition, advertising to establish brand names is also deductible. Overall these treatments tend to produce an effective low, zero, or negative tax rate for overall investment in intangibles. Thus, there are significant incentives to make these investments in the United States. On average, the benefit of tax deductions or credits when making the investment tend to offset the future taxes on the return to the investment. However, for those investments that tend to be successful, it is advantageous to shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction, so that there are tax savings on investment and little or no tax on returns. As a result, these investments can be subject to negative tax rates, or subsidies, which can be significant.

    Transfer pricing rules with respect to intellectual property are further complicated because of cost sharing agreements, where different affiliates contribute to the cost. 32 If an intangible is already partially developed by the parent firm, affiliates contribute a buy-in payment. It is very difficult to determine arms length pricing in these cases where a technology is partially developed and there is risk associated with the expected outcome. One study found some evidence that firms with cost sharing arrangements were more likely to engage in profit shifting. 33



    Contract Manufacturing

    When a subsidiary is set up in a low-tax country and profit shifting occurs, as in the acquisition of rights to an intangible, a further problem occurs: this low-tax country may not be a desirable place to actually manufacture and sell the product. For example, an Irish subsidiary's market may be in Germany and it would be desirable to manufacture in Germany. But to earn profits in Germany with its higher tax rate does not minimize taxes. Instead the Irish firm may contract with a German firm as a contract manufacturer, who will produce the item for cost plus a fixed markup. Subpart F taxes on a current basis certain profits from sales income, so the arrangement must be structured to qualify as an exception from this rule. There are complex and changing regulations on this issue. 34



    Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments

    Another technique for shifting profit to low-tax jurisdictions was greatly expanded with the "check-the-box" provisions. These provisions were originally intended to simplify questions of whether a firm was a corporation or partnership. Their application to foreign circumstances, through the "disregarded entity" rules has led to the expansion of hybrid entities, where an entity can be recognized as a corporation by one jurisdiction but not by another. For example, a U.S. parent's subsidiary in a low-tax country can lend to its subsidiary in a high-tax country, with the interest deductible because the high-tax country recognizes the firm as a separate corporation. Normally, interest received by the subsidiary in the low-tax country would be considered passive or "tainted" income subject to current U.S. tax under Subpart F. However, under check-the-box rules, the high-tax corporation can elect to be disregarded as a separate entity, and thus from the perspective of the United States there is no interest income paid because the two are the same entity. Check-the-box and similar hybrid entity operations can also be used to avoid other types of Subpart F income, for example from contract manufacturing arrangements. According to Sicular, this provision, which began as a regulation, has been effectively codified, albeit temporarily. 35

    Hybrid entities relate to issues other than Subpart F. For example, a reverse hybrid entity can be used to allow U.S. corporations to benefit from the foreign tax credit without having to recognize the underlying income. As an example, a U.S. parent can set up a holding company in the Netherlands that is treated as a disregarded entity, and the holding company can own a corporation that is treated as a partnership in a foreign jurisdiction. Under flow through rules, the holding company is liable for the foreign tax and, because it is not a separate entity, the U.S. parent corporation is therefore liable, but the income can be retained in the foreign corporation that is viewed as a separate corporate entity from the U.S. point of view. In this case, the entity is structured so that it is a partnership for foreign purposes but a corporation for U.S. purposes. 36

    In addition to hybrid entities that achieve tax benefits by being treated differently in the U.S. and the foreign jurisdiction, there are also hybrid instruments that can avoid taxation by being treated as debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another. 37



    Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits

    Income from a low-tax country that is received in the United States can escape taxes because of cross crediting: the use of excess foreign taxes paid in one jurisdiction or on one type of income to offset U.S. tax that would be due on other income. In some periods in the past the foreign tax credit limit was proposed on a country-by-country basis, although that rule proved to be difficult to enforce given the potential to use holding companies. Foreign tax credits have subsequently been separated into different baskets to limit cross crediting; these baskets were reduced from nine to two (active and passive) in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357).

    Because firms can choose when to repatriate income, they can arrange realizations to maximize the benefits of the overall limit on the foreign tax credit. That is, firms that have income from jurisdictions with taxes in excess of U.S. taxes can also elect to realize income from jurisdictions with low taxes and use the excess credits to offset U.S. tax due on that income. Studies suggest that between cross crediting and deferral, U.S. multinationals typically pay virtually no U.S. tax on foreign source income. 38

    This ability to reduce U.S. tax due to cross crediting is increased, it can be argued, because income that should be considered U.S. source income is treated as foreign source income, thereby raising the foreign tax credit limit. This includes income from U.S. exports which is U.S. source income, because a tax provision (referred to as the title passage rule) allows half of export income to be allocated to the country in which the title passes. Another important type of income that is considered foreign source and thus can be shielded with foreign tax credits is royalty income from active business, which has become an increasingly important source of foreign income. This benefit can occur in high-tax countries because royalties are generally deductible from income. (Note that the shifting of income due to transfer pricing of intangibles, advantageous in low-tax countries, is a different issue.) Interest income is another type of income that may benefit from this foreign tax credit rule.

    Since all of this income arises from investment in the United States, one could argue that this income is appropriately U.S. source income, or that, failing that, it should be put in a different foreign tax credit basket so that excess credits generated by dividends cannot be used to offset such income. Two studies, by Grubert and by Grubert and Altshuler have discussed this sourcing rule in the context of a proposal to eliminate the tax on active dividends. 39 In that proposal, the revenue loss from exempting active dividends from U.S. tax would be offset by gains from taxes on royalties.



    The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting

    This section examines the evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting and the techniques that are most likely to contribute to it.



    Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting

    There is ample, and simple, evidence that profits appear in countries inconsistent with an economic motivation. This section first examines the profit share of income of controlled corporations compared to the share of gross domestic product. 40 The first set of countries, acting as a reference point, are the remaining G-7 countries that are also the United States' major trading partners. They account for 32% of pre-tax profits and 38% of rest-of-world gross domestic product. The second group of countries are larger countries from Table 1 (with GDP of at least $10 billion), plus the Netherlands, which is widely considered a tax conduit for U.S. multinationals because of their holding company rules. These countries account for about 30% of earnings and 5% of rest-of-world GDP. The third group of countries are smaller countries listed in Table 1 , with GDP less than $10 billion. These countries account for 14% of earnings and less than 1% of rest-of-world GDP.

    As indicated in Table 2 , income to GDP ratios in the large G-7 countries range from 0.2% to 2.6%, the latter reflecting in part the United States' relationships with perhaps its closest trading partners. Overall, this income as a share of GDP is 0.6%. Outside the United Kingdom and Canada, they are around 0.2 to 0.3% and do not vary with country size (Japan, for example, has over twice the GDP of Italy). Note also that Canada and the United Kingdom have also appeared on some tax haven lists and the larger income shares could partially reflect that. 41


    Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7





    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Profits of U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations
    Country as a Percentage of GDP

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Canada 2.6

    France 0.3

    Germany 0.2

    Italy 0.2

    Japan 0.3

    United Kingdom 1.3

    Weighted Average 0.6

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Source: CRS calculations, see text




    Table 3 reports the share for the larger tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available, plus the Netherlands. In general, U.S. source profits as a percentage of GDP are considerably larger than those in Table 2 . In the case of Luxembourg, these profits are 18% of output. Shares are also very large in Cyprus and Ireland. In all but two cases, the shares are well in excess of those in Table 2 .


    Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands





    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
    Country Percentage of GDP

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Costa Rica 1.2

    Cyprus 9.8

    Hong Kong 2.8

    Ireland 7.6

    Luxembourg 18.2

    Netherlands 4.6

    Panama 3.0

    Singapore 3.4

    Switzerland 3.5

    Taiwan 0.7

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Source: CRS calculations, see text




    Table 4 examines the small tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available. In three of the islands off the U.S. coast (in the Caribbean and Atlantic) profits are multiples of total GDP. Profits are well in excess of GDP in four jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions they are a large share of output. These numbers clearly indicate that the profits in these countries do not appear to derive from economic motives related to productive inputs or markets, but rather reflect income easily transferred to low-tax jurisdictions.


    Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists





    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
    Country Percentage of GDP

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Bahamas 43.3

    Barbados 13.2

    Bermuda 645.7

    British Virgin Islands 354.7

    Cayman Islands 546.7

    Guernsey 11.2

    Jersey 35.3

    Liberia 61.1

    Malta 0.5

    Marshall Islands 339.8

    Mauritius 4.2

    Netherland Antilles 8.9

    ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Source: CRS calculations, see text




    Evidence of profit shifting has been presented in many other studies. Grubert and Altshuler report that profits of controlled foreign corporations in manufacturing relative to sales in Ireland are three times the group mean. 42 GAO reported higher shares of pretax profits of U.S. multinationals than of value added, tangible assets, sales, compensation or employees in low-tax countries such as Bermuda, Ireland, the UK Caribbean, Singapore, and Switzerland. 43 Martin Sullivan reports the return on assets fo
    Statement of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman
    From the IRS website: This month, the Internal Revenue Service asked for comments on ways to simplify compliance with rules related to employer-provided cellular telephones. The current law, which has been on the books for many years, is burdensome, poorly understood by taxpayers, and difficult for the IRS to administer consistently. Some have incorrectly implied that [...]
    Fraudulent transfer

    United States of America, Plaintiff v. Alvin A. Tolbert, Roberta Sue Tolbert, A&R Equity Holdings, Defendants.

    U.S. District Court, West. Dist. Ark., Fayetteville Div.; Civ.06-5146, September 13, 2007.

    [

    Validity of Tax Assessments


    4. IRS certificates of assessments for unpaid taxes are sufficient evidence to establish the validity of the assessments and support a summary judgment reducing those assessments to a judgment in favor of the Government. See United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8 Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 th U.S. 1193 (1994); United States v. Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, *2 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2007). In an action to reduce federal tax assessments to judgment, certificates of assessments offered by the Government establish the Government's prima facie case and shift to the taxpayer the burden of proving that the IRS tax assessments are incorrect. See Mattingly v. United States [ 91-1 USTC ?50,068], 924 F.2d 785, 787 (8 Cir. 1991); Kiesel v. United States [ 77-1 USTC ?9101], 545 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8 Cir. 1976); Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, * 2. th

    5. The Government has submitted Certified Form 4340 Certificates of Assessments for Mr. Tolbert's income tax liabilities for the years 1992 through 2002. In response, Mr. Tolbert has submitted copies of IRS 1040 Forms which he completed on August 7, 2007, indicating that he had no wages for the years in question. In an affidavit attached to the forms, Mr. Tolbert explains:
    arly meritless. Mr. Tolbert has submitted nothing of substance to challenge the accuracy of the
    Attachment of Tax Liens to the Property and Fraudulent Transfer


    8. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay it after demand, the amount owing "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 26 U.S.C. ?6321. The lien "shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed . . . is satisfied." 26 U.S.C. ?6322. Thus, on the dates of the assessments for the tax years in question, federal tax liens attached to all of Mr. Tolbert's property.

    9. The Government may collect the tax debts of a taxpayer from property that has been fraudulently transferred to another. See United States v. Scherping [ 99-2 USTC ?50,758], 187 F.3d 796, 804-06(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000). The Government argues that the conveyance of the subject property from the Tolberts to A & R Equity was a fraudulent conveyance and that the property is therefore subject to the tax liens.

    Whether a conveyance may be set aside as fraudulent is determined in accordance with state law. Id. at 804. Under Arkansas law, a transfer of property by a debtor is considered fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. See Ark. Code Ann. ?4-59-204(a)(1). The factors to be considered in determining the intent to defraud include whether:
    * the transfer was to an insider;

    * the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer;

    * the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;

    * the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; and

    * the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the property transferred.

    See Ark. Code Ann. ?4-59-204(b).

    10. In the present case, the Tolberts transferred title to the subject property to A & R Equity approximately two months after the IRS sent its first notice to Mr. Tolbert regarding his failure to pay taxes. While the value of the property is in excess of $100,000.00, A & R Equity paid only $10.00 to acquire title to the property. Further, Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are the sole beneficiaries of the A & R (which stands for Alvin and Roberta Tolbert) Equity trust, the trustee is unknown, and the address for the entity is the Tolberts' residential address. Even more significant is the fact that the Tolberts have continued to reside at the property, have continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and other bills on the property, and they do not have a lease agreement or pay rent on the property to A & R Equity.

    These circumstances clearly demonstrate that title to the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to A & R Equity in an attempt to avoid tax liens attaching to the property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the transfer should be set aside and that the property is subject to the tax liens. 3
    California Estate Planning And Your Kids

    With a play on words, the Wall Street Journal recently published an article entitled "Deciding if Your Kid is Trust-Worthy". Estate planners in California often ask clients the same question since having a living trust may make sense depending on, for instance, whether their children are worthy of getting property when they are young or at an older age.

    California Wills, living trusts, durable powers of attorney for property management and the advance health care directive are usually prepared by lawyers. There are many forms available for free online but it is often inadvisable to use them.

    Speak with an estate planning attorney about your own situation. Call Mitchell A. Port at 310.559.5259.


    New Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) FAQs Issued

    The IRS has just issued new FAQs related to the Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBAR). There are 21 new offshore financial account penalty as part of the FBAR prior post. If the taxpayer disagrees with the imposition of the penalties then the taxpayer may go to the IRS Appeals Division.

    It is unfortunate that the IRS has chosen to take this draconian stance with respect to the tax litigation attorneys are currently advising clients with tax attorneys at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C.


    TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION






    Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers? Rights During the Lien Due Process







    June 16, 2009



    Reference Number: 2009-30-089





    This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.



    Redaction Legend:

    1 = Tax Return/Return Information

    3(d) = Identifying Information - Other Identifying Information of an Individual or Individuals



    Phone Number | 202-622-6500

    Email Address | This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

    Web Site | http://www.tigta.gov



    June 16, 2009





    MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION



    FROM: Michael R. Phillips /s/ Michael R. Phillips

    Deputy Inspector General for Audit



    SUBJECT: Final Audit Report ? Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers? Rights During the Lien Due Process (Audit # 200930001)



    This report presents the results of our review to determine whether liens issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) comply with legal guidelines set forth in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section (?) 6320 (a)[1] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required by law to determine annually whether lien notices sent by the IRS comply with the legal guidelines in I.R.C. ? 6320.[2] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine the IRS? compliance with the law and with its own related internal guidelines when sending lien notices.

    Impact on the Taxpayer

    After filing Notices of Federal Tax Lien, the IRS must notify the affected taxpayers in writing, at their last known address,[3] within 5 business days of the lien filings. However, as noted in previous audits, the IRS has not always complied with this statutory requirement and did not always follow its own internal guidelines for notifying taxpayer representatives of the filing of lien notices. Therefore, some taxpayers? rights to appeal the lien filings may have been jeopardized, and others may have had their rights violated when the IRS did not notify their representatives of lien filings.

    Synopsis

    The IRS attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer?s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[4] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien, which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

    Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases determined that in all 125 cases the IRS mailed lien notices in a timely manner, as required by I.R.C. ? 6320 and internal procedures. However, the IRS did not always follow its own regulations and internal guidelines for notifying taxpayers? representatives of the filing of lien notices. For 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases in which the taxpayer had an authorized representative at the time of the lien actions, the IRS did not notify the taxpayer?s representative of the lien filing. The IRS did not have an automated process that updated taxpayer representative information directly with the system that generates the lien notices.

    When an initial lien notice is returned because it could not be delivered and a different address is available for the taxpayer, the IRS does not always meet its statutory requirement to send the lien notice to the taxpayer?s last known address. For 234 (83 percent) of 283 cases, employees did not research IRS computer systems for different addresses. We also identified 17 cases for which a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address because the IRS systems listed the address prior to the lien filing. The 17 cases could involve legal violations because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending lien notices to the taxpayer?s last known address.

    In August 2007, the IRS decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employees or functions requesting the lien instead of returning them to a single location. This was done because employees were not always researching undelivered notices timely and the IRS believes that the originating employee is in the best position to address undelivered lien notices. However, instead of improving the process, the number of undelivered notices that were not timely researched increased from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009. This occurred, in part, because management oversight was not adequate to ensure undelivered mail was worked timely. In addition, management did not have the information necessary to monitor the processing of undelivered lien notices, which are now being returned to over 450 locations throughout the country instead of 1 centralized site.

    To provide a method of monitoring and reviewing undelivered lien notices, the IRS established procedures to enable employees and managers to determine the mail status of lien notices without Automated Lien System (ALS)[5] research. These procedures require employees processing undelivered lien notices to input a specific transaction code with an appropriate action code to the Integrated Data Retrieval System[6] to indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (e.g., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). This would allow management to monitor and track the status of undelivered lien notices. Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that the IRS is not complying with this procedure. The transaction code and associated action code were not input to the Integrated Data Retrieval System for any of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled. Management recognized this problem prior to our review and began corrective action by revising the Internal Revenue Manual to require employees to enter the undeliverable lien information into the Integrated Data Retrieval System. Because the corrective action occurred after the period of our sample cases, we are not making a recommendation to address this problem. We will assess the effectiveness of the corrective action in next year?s review.

    Recommendations

    To ensure taxpayers? representatives receive lien notices, we recommended that the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File[7] to the ALS. In addition, the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers? representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the upload of Centralized Authorization File information to the Automated Collection System was automated and take actions to correct the problem. Also, to ensure accurate notification of lien filings, we recommended that the Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated check of a taxpayer?s last known address in the ALS prior to printing a lien notice.

    Response

    IRS management agreed with all of our recommendations and is taking corrective actions. The Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, will determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File to the ALS and, if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements. The Director, Collection, also reviewed the cases we identified in this report and has taken appropriate corrective actions. In addition, the Director, Collection, will review current programming of the systems interfacing with the ALS to ensure that taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and, if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request. Further, the Director, Collection Policy, will determine if the ALS can accommodate Integrated Data Retrieval System real-time data exchange and, if feasible, initiate programming work requests. Management?s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix VII.

    Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS managers affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations), at (202) 622-8510.





    Table of Contents



    Background

    Results of Review

    Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

    The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

    Recommendation 1:

    Recommendation 2:

    Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers? Rights

    Recommendation 3:

    Appendices

    Appendix I ? Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology

    Appendix II ? Major Contributors to This Report

    Appendix III ? Report Distribution List

    Appendix IV ? Outcome Measures

    Appendix V ? Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes

    Appendix VI ? Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien

    Appendix VII ? Management?s Response to the Draft Report





    Abbreviations



    ACS
    Automated Collection System

    ALS
    Automated Lien System

    CAF
    Centralized Authorization File

    ICS
    Integrated Collection System

    IDRS
    Integrated Data Retrieval System

    I.R.C.
    Internal Revenue Code

    IRS
    Internal Revenue Service

    SB/SE
    Small Business/Self-Employed






    Background



    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer?s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[8] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien. The IRS files in appropriate local government offices a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[9] (lien notice), which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

    The IRS must notify taxpayers in writing of the filing of a Federal Tax Lien within 5 business days of the filing.

    Since January 19, 1999, Internal Revenue Code Section (I.R.C. ?) 6320[10] has required the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. The IRS is required to notify taxpayers the first time a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed for each tax period. The lien notice, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320[11] (Letter 3172), is used for this purpose and advises taxpayers that they have 30 calendar days, after that 5-day period, to request a hearing with the IRS Appeals office. The lien notice indicates the date on which this 30-day period expires.

    The law also requires that the lien notice explain, in simple terms, the amount of unpaid tax, administrative appeals available to the taxpayer, and provisions of the law and procedures relating to the release of liens on property. The lien notice must be given in person, left at the taxpayer?s home or business, or sent by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer?s last known address.[12]

    Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail rather than being delivered in person. The IRS Automated Lien System (ALS) generates a certified mail list which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for and date stamps the list and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. A synopsis of the IRS collection and lien filing processes is included in Appendix V.

    Depending on employee access, lien requests can be generated using one of three IRS systems: 1) the Integrated Collection System (ICS), 2) the Automated Collection System (ACS), or 3) the ALS. A description of IRS computer systems used in the filing of lien notices is included in Appendix VI.

    The IRS has increased the number of Federal Tax Liens it has filed to protect the Federal Government?s interest. As shown in Figure 1, the number of Federal Tax Liens increased sharply in Fiscal Year 2001, decreased slightly in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, and has increased each year since then.

    Figure 1: Number of Liens Filed From Fiscal Years 2000 - 2008

    Figure 1 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 1, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.[13]

    The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required to determine annually whether, when filing lien notices, the IRS complied with the law regarding the notifications of affected taxpayers and their representatives.[14] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine whether the IRS complied with the legal requirements of I.R.C. ? 6320 and its own related internal guidelines for filing lien notices. In prior years, we reported that the IRS had not yet achieved full compliance with the law and its own internal guidelines. This year, our statistically valid sample did not identify any lien notices that were not mailed in a timely manner. However, we identified potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not notify the taxpayer?s representative. Our review of a judgmental sample of undelivered lien notices found potential violations of taxpayer rights when the IRS did not use the taxpayer?s last known address. Figure 2 shows the percentages of potential violations of taxpayer rights we identified during our prior annual audits.

    Figure 2: Potential Violations of Taxpayer Rights Based on Timely Notification

    Figure 2 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 2, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page..

    We performed our audit work in the Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division Office of Collection Policy in Washington, D.C., and the Centralized Lien Unit in Covington, Kentucky, during the period August 2008 through January 2009. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.





    Results of Review



    Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

    Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 lien notices from the ALS did not identify any legal violations with I.R.C. ? 6320. I.R.C. ? 6320 requires the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing, at their last known address, within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.

    The majority of lien notices are sent to the taxpayers via certified mail. In order to support the timely notification of taxpayers, IRS procedures require retention of the date-stamped copy of the certified mail lists for 10 years after the end of the processing year. This year, the IRS was able to provide proof for the timely mailing of all 125 lien notices in our statistical sample. This is an improvement over our last year?s audit, in which the IRS could not provide proof of mailing for 3 percent of sampled lien notices.

    The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

    Taxpayer representative information is contained on the Centralized Authorization File (CAF)[15] that is located on the Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS).[16] Using the IDRS, employees can research the CAF to identify the types of authorization given to taxpayer representatives.

    IRS regulations[17] require that once a taxpayer representative has been recognized as such, he or she must be given copies of all correspondence issued to the taxpayer. This applies to all computer or manually generated notices or other written communications. Employees responsible for making lien filing determinations are to ensure that all appropriate persons, such as those with a taxpayer?s power of attorney, receive a notice of the lien filing and the taxpayer?s appeal rights. Specifically, IRS procedures require that a copy of the notice be sent to the taxpayer?s representative no later than 5 business days after the notice is sent to the taxpayer when a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed.

    The ACS and the ICS interface with the ALS. In January 2008, the ACS implemented a process that provides CAF information to the ALS during the upload of the lien notice information. When a lien request is initiated on the ICS or the ACS, the taxpayer representative information on these systems is sent to the ALS as part of the lien request, which then generates the lien notice and any taxpayer representative copies. For this upload to be effective, the taxpayer representative data must be current and be on the CAF as well as the ACS or the ICS. For example, if a taxpayer submits a Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative (Form 2848) to a revenue officer, the revenue officer must forward the Form 2848 to the Centralized Authorization Unit to ensure the representative information is input to the CAF. There is no interface between the ALS and the CAF, so representative information must be manually input to the ALS when a lien request is initiated on the ALS.

    Our review of the statistically valid sample of 125 liens determined that 27 cases involved taxpayers with representatives authorized to receive notifications at the time the liens were filed. In 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases, ALS records did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. Specifically:

    Four of the eight liens were initiated in the ACS. ****(1, 3(d))**** The other three liens were initiated after the IRS automated the upload of CAF information to the ACS. IRS management indicated that a lien notice may not have been sent to taxpayer representatives because systemic problems may exist with the automated upload established in January 2008.
    ****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ICS. ****(1, 3(d))****
    ****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ALS. ****(1, 3(d))****
    Taxpayers might be adversely affected if the IRS does not follow requirements to notify both the taxpayers and their representatives of the taxpayers? rights related to liens. We projected that 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided lien notices, resulting in potential violations of the taxpayers? right to have their representative notified of the filing of a lien notice.

    In addition to this year?s results, Figure 3 shows the error rates reported on the notification of taxpayer representatives in our last three reports. While the error rate has been reduced from 76 percent in Fiscal Year 2006 to 30 percent in Fiscal Year 2009, the potential for violations still exist in nearly one third of all cases requiring taxpayer representative notification.

    Figure 3: Error Rates Reported on Notification of Taxpayer Representatives

    Fiscal
    Year
    Sampled Lien Cases Requiring Representative Notification
    Sampled Lien Cases Not Receiving Representative Notification
    Error Rate

    2006
    45
    34
    76%

    2007
    25
    15
    60%

    2008
    30
    12
    40%

    2009
    27
    8
    30%


    Source: Prior and current year results of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration tests of taxpayer representative notification.

    In last year?s report,[18] we recommended that the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, provide better oversight to ensure that employees notify taxpayer representatives of lien filings and computer enhancements are uploading power-of-attorney information as intended. Management agreed to establish taxpayer representative verification procedures for employees initiating liens. They also agreed to determine if the ACS and the CAF could include programming to match lien notice data with taxpayer representative data prior to sending lien requests to the ALS to ensure the Notice of Federal Tax Lien and the CAF had at least one matching tax period. This would ensure there was no potential for unauthorized disclosure. Management also agreed to identify any computer program enhancements to the lien process. These corrective actions were implemented before our sample selection. However, we did not identify any plans to enhance the automated processes, which would help reduce the number of taxpayer representatives who are not notified of lien filings.

    Recommendations

    The Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, should:

    Recommendation 1: Establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS.

    Management?s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS and 2) if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements.



    Recommendation 2: Determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers? representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the implementation of the automated CAF process and take appropriate corrective actions to resolve the problem.

    Management?s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and has already taken corrective action by reviewing the cases we identified and taking appropriate corrective actions. They will also 1) review current programming of systems interfacing with the ALS with systems owners to ensure taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and 2) if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request.

    Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers? Rights

    IRS procedures require that employees send another lien notice to a new address if 1) the originally mailed notice is returned as undelivered mail, 2) research confirms the original lien notice was not sent to the last known address, 3) a different address is available for the taxpayer, and 4) the address was effective prior to the lien notice filing. Employees are responsible for certain actions when notices are returned as undeliverable. For example, they should research the IRS computer system within 5 business days to ensure that the address on the original lien notice is correct. If the employee cannot find a new address on the computer system, the undelivered lien notice will be destroyed and a new notice is not issued.

    If the address on the notice is not the last known address and a different address was in effect prior to issuance of the original lien notice, employees should issue a new notice to the better address. A new notice may be created by using an option in the ALS.

    We selected a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices returned to the Cincinnati, Ohio, Service Center for the period November 18 through November 25, 2008. The sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered and did not include returned mail identified as refused or unclaimed. For these 283 notices, we reviewed computer system audit trails to determine whether IRS employees performed timely research to determine whether the addresses were correct on the originally mailed notices. Our results showed that employees are not timely researching IRS computer systems.

    In 234 (83 percent) of 283 notices, employees did not perform required research of the IRS computer system for a different address within 5 business days of receipt of the returned notice. This is significantly higher than last year?s review in which employees did not timely perform the research in 33 percent of lien notices. Employees performed the required research within 5 days of receipt of the returned notice for the remaining 49 notices (17 percent).

    Our test of undelivered lien notices identified 26 notices where the address on the IRS computer system and the original lien notice did not agree. For 9 (35 percent) of the 26 notices, the address on the IRS computer system was updated after the original lien notice was sent to the taxpayer. Per IRS procedures, no additional action was required. However, for 17 notices (65 percent), the address was updated prior to the issuance of the original lien notice and, according to IRS procedures, a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address. These cases could involve potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending each lien notice to the taxpayer?s last known address.

    Lien notices are not sent to the most current addresses on the IDRS because, in part, the user guides and applicable procedures pertaining to the systems that generate lien requests are inconsistent in regards to verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien. In addition, employees are not always following established procedures for verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien request. Specifically, ACS procedures do not require the user to verify the taxpayer?s name and address prior to preparing a lien. In addition, the ALS does not perform an automated verification of the taxpayer?s last known address prior to printing the lien notice. Further, management oversight was not adequate to ensure that undelivered mail is worked appropriately. Management also indicated that the routing of the returned mail could have contributed to the cause of the untimely research of the undelivered mail (i.e., not within the required 5 business days of receipt).

    In last year?s report, we identified similar conditions and recommended that the IRS provide better oversight to ensure that employees are properly controlling and processing returned mail as undelivered, researching computer systems for correct addresses, and resending lien notices. The IRS agreed to establish proper control and processing of undelivered lien notices and, in August 2007, revised its requirements to return undelivered lien notices to the employee or function requesting the lien. This corrective action was implemented before our sample selection. However, instead of correcting the problem, the number of undeliverable lien notices that were not timely researched by employees increased from 33 percent to nearly 83 percent. This may have occurred because employees were not following procedures designed to establish accountability and visibility in the decentralized environment.

    Employees are not following new procedures designed to monitor undeliverable lien notices

    In August 2007, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, revised procedures for handling undelivered lien notices. The new procedures decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employee or function requesting the lien notice instead of returning them to a single location. To provide a method of reviewing undelivered lien notices, the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, also established procedures to enable employees to determine the mail status of lien notices without ALS research. Specifically, employees handling undelivered lien notices are now required to input a specific IDRS transaction code with an appropriate action code. The transaction code and appropriate action code indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (i.e., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). These codes are required to be entered into the IDRS after appropriate research of the returned lien notice is performed.

    Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that employees are not complying with this procedure. None of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled had the transaction code and associated action code input to the IDRS. Management believes that the requirements to enter these codes were not being enforced because, initially, procedures were not consistent. For example, ACS procedures for processing undelivered lien notices did not include any reference to the requirement. Management also indicated that the procedures may not have been clear.

    Compliance with these procedures is important because it allows management to review the handling of undelivered lien notices. Undelivered lien notices are being sent back to over 450 Collection function groups throughout the country where the employees or functions that requested the liens are located. The combination of decentralizing the handling of undelivered lien notices and the failure of employees to update taxpayers? data in the IDRS resulted in management?s inability to ensure and enforce the timely resolution of undelivered lien notices. This contributed to the number of undelivered lien notices that were not researched timely increasing from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009.

    Further, because employees are not following the procedures to enter the information into the IDRS, information about undelivered mail is limited to the employees working the undelivered mail. IRS management, including Accounts Management organization[19] employees and even Centralized Lien Unit employees, who have access to the ALS, do not have access to information on undelivered lien notices. As a result, Taxpayer Assistance Center[20] employees would not be able to answer taxpayer questions about their Federal Tax Liens.

    Management was aware of this condition and issued a memorandum in May 2008 to remind Collection function employees of this requirement. However, an internal review in July 2008 found that transaction and action codes were not entered in all 63 cases the IRS sampled in its review. As a result, in January 2009, management revised Internal Revenue Manual sections specifying the requirement to enter information about undeliverable mail into the IDRS. This corrective action was taken after our sample selection and will be evaluated in next year?s review.

    Recommendation

    Recommendation 3: To ensure accurate notification of lien filings, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, should establish an automated check of a taxpayer?s last known address within the ALS immediately prior to printing a lien notice. This automated check should include an increase in the frequency of updates of IDRS information to reach the ALS to provide more timely updates of taxpayer information.

    Management?s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine if the ALS can accommodate IDRS real-time data exchange and 2) if feasible, initiate programming work requests.



    Appendix I



    Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology



    Our overall objective was to determine whether liens issued by the IRS comply with legal guidelines set forth in I.R.C. ? 6320 (a)[21] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. To accomplish the objective, we:

    I. Determined whether taxpayer lien notices related to 125 Federal Tax Liens filed by the IRS complied with legal requirements set forth in I.R.C. ? 6320 (a) and related internal guidelines.

    A. Selected a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases from the ALS[22] extract of the 711,780 liens filed by the IRS nationwide between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008. We used a statistical sample because we wanted to project the number of cases with errors. We used attribute sampling to calculate the minimum sample size (n),[23] which we rounded to 125:

    n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2)

    Z = Confidence Level: 90 percent (expressed as 1.65 standard deviation)

    p = Expected Rate of Occurrence: 4 percent (prior reports 5% - 3%)

    A = Precision Rate: ?3 percent

    B. Validated the ALS extract by comparing the sampled records to online data from the ALS and by reviewing management system evaluations that covered reliability, completeness, and accuracy.

    C. Determined whether the sampled liens adhered to legal guidelines regarding timely notifications of lien filings to the taxpayer, the taxpayer?s spouse, or business partners by reviewing data from the ALS, ICS, ACS, IDRS, and the certified mail list.

    D. Evaluated the controls and procedures established for transferring, storing, and safeguarding certified mail lists at the Centralized Case Processing function.

    E. Determined whether taxpayers? representatives were provided a copy of the lien due process notice by reviewing data from the ALS, IDRS, ICS, and ACS.

    1. Reviewed IDRS screens for CAF indicators (Transaction Code 960) for all sampled cases.

    2. Reviewed ALS history screens for accounts with CAF indicators to see if lien notices were mailed to taxpayers? representatives within 5 business days of mailing the taxpayer?s notice.

    F. Validated data from the ACS and the ICS by relying on the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Data Center Warehouse[24] site procedures that ensure that data received from the IRS are valid. The Data Center Warehouse performs various procedures to ensure that it receives all the records in the ACS, ICS, and IRS databases. In addition, we scanned the data for reasonableness and are satisfied that the data are sufficient, complete, and relevant to the review. All the liens identified are in the appropriate period, and the data appear to be logical.

    G. Provided all exception cases to Office of Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, for agreement to potential violations and corrective actions if appropriate.

    II. Evaluated the procedures for processing lien notices[25] that are returned as undelivered.

    A. Selected a judgmental sample of unprocessed mail containing undelivered lien notices received during the period November 18 through November 25, 2008, and recorded the taxpayer?s name, address, Social Security Number, and serial lien identification number. The judgmental sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered. The population of returned mail identified as undelivered is unknown because the IRS does not record the receipt of undelivered mail. A judgmental sample was used for this reason and the test was conducted to show weaknesses for which management needed to take corrective action.

    B. Researched the IDRS using command code INOLES and determined whether the address on the Master File[26] matched the address on the undelivered lien notice for each sampled case.

    C. Reviewed IDRS audit trails and determined whether IRS employees timely performed the required IDRS research for resolution of undelivered status for each sampled case.

    D. Reviewed the IDRS and verified whether the Transaction Code 971 and corresponding action codes were entered into the IDRS for each sampled case.

    III. Determined whether internal guidelines had been implemented or modified since our last review by discussing procedures and controls with appropriate IRS personnel in the National Headquarters.

    IV. Determined the status of ICS and ACS system enhancements and any problems encountered.



    Appendix II



    Major Contributors to This Report



    Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations)

    Carl Aley, Director

    Timothy Greiner, Audit Manager

    Meaghan Shannon, Lead Auditor

    Janis Zuika, Senior Auditor

    Stephen Elix, Auditor

    Curtis Kirschner, Auditor

    Jeffrey Williams, Information Technology Specialist



    Appendix III



    Report Distribution List



    Commissioner C

    Office of the Commissioner ? Attn: Chief of Staff C

    Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE

    Deputy Commissioner, Small Business/Self Employed Division SE:S

    Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C

    Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C:CP

    Chief Counsel CC

    National Taxpayer Advocate TA

    Director, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LA

    Director, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O

    Office of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC

    Audit Liaison: Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S



    Appendix IV



    Outcome Measures



    This appendix presents detailed information on the measurable impact that our recommended corrective actions will have on tax administration. These benefits will be incorporated into our Semiannual Report to Congress.

    Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

    ? Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements ? Potential; 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided Notices of Federal Tax Lien and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. ? 6320 (Letter 3172),[27] resulting in potential violations of taxpayers? rights (see page 4).

    Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

    From a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases, we identified 8 (30 percent) of 27 cases for which IRS employees did not provide notice to taxpayer representatives, resulting in potential violations of taxpayers? rights. In the eight cases, the ALS record did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. The sample was selected based on a confidence level of 90 percent, a precision rate of ?3 percent, and an expected rate of occurrence of 4 percent. We projected the findings to the total population provided by the IRS of 711,780 Notices of Federal Tax Lien generated by the ALS between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008.

    Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

    ? Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements ? Actual; 17 taxpayers were not provided Letters 3172, resulting in potential legal violations of taxpayers? rights (see page 7).

    Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

    In a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices, we determined that the IRS did not send notices to the updated addresses of 17 taxpayers. Taxpayer rights could be affected because a taxpayer not receiving a notice or receiving a late notice might be unaware of the right to appeal or might receive less than the 30-calendar day period allowed by the law to request a hearing. In addition, taxpayer rights could be further affected when the taxpayer appeals the filing of the lien and the IRS denies the request for the appeal.



    Appendix V



    Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes



    The collection of unpaid tax begins with a series of letters (notices) sent to the taxpayer advising of the debt and asking for payment of the delinquent tax. IRS computer systems are programmed to mail these notices when certain criteria are met. If the taxpayer does not respond to these notices, the account is transferred for either personal or telephone contact.

    ? IRS employees who make personal (face-to-face) contact with taxpayers are called revenue officers and work in various locations. The ICS[28] is used in most of these locations to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

    ? IRS employees who make only telephone contact with taxpayers work in call sites in Customer Service offices. The ACS is used in the call sites to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

    When these efforts have been taken and the taxpayer has not paid the tax liability, designated IRS employees are authorized to file a lien by sending a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[29] to appropriate local government offices. Liens protect the Federal Government?s interest by attaching a claim to the taxpayer?s assets for the amount of unpaid tax. The right to file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is created by I.R.C. ? 6321 (1994) when:

    ? The IRS has made an assessment and given the taxpayer notice of the assessment, stating the amount of the tax liability and demanding payment.

    ? The taxpayer has neglected or refused to pay the amount within 10 calendar days after the notice and demand for payment.

    When designated employees request the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien using either the ICS or the ACS, the ALS processes the lien filing requests from both Systems. In an expedited situation, employees can manually prepare the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Even for manually prepared liens, the ALS controls and tracks the liens and initiates subsequent lien notices[30] to notify responsible parties of the lien filings and of their appeal rights. The ALS maintains an electronic database of all open Notices of Federal Tax Lien and updates the IRS? primary computer records to indicate that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien has been filed.

    Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail, rather than delivered in person. To maintain a record of the notices, the IRS prepares a certified mail list (United States Postal Service Form 3877), which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A United States Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for, date stamps the list, and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. IRS guidelines require that the stamped certified mail list be retained for 10 years after the end of the processing year.



    Appendix VI



    Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien



    The Automated Collection System (ACS) is a computerized call site inventory system that maintains balance-due accounts and return delinquency investigations. ACS function employees enter all of their case file information (online) on the ACS. Lien notices requested using the ACS are uploaded to the ALS, which generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien[31] and related lien notices and updates the IRS? primary computer files to indicate that Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

    The Automated Lien System (ALS) is a comprehensive database that prints Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices, stores taxpayer information, and documents all lien activity. Lien activities on both ACS and ICS cases are controlled on the ALS by Technical Support or Case Processing functions at the Cincinnati, Ohio, Campus.[32] Employees at the Cincinnati Campus process Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices and respond to taxpayer inquiries using the ALS.

    The Integrated Collection System (ICS) is an IRS computer system with applications designed around each of the main collection tasks such as opening a case, assigning a case, building a case, performing collection activity, and closing a case. The ICS is designed to provide management information, create and maintain case histories, generate documents, and allow online approval of case actions. Lien requests made using the ICS are uploaded to the ALS. The ALS generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien and related lien notices and updates the IRS? primary computer files to indicate Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

    The Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) is an online data retrieval and data entry system that processes transactions entered from terminals located in campuses and other IRS locations. It enables employees to perform such tasks as researching account information, requesting tax returns, entering collection information, and generating collection documents. The IDRS serves as a link from campuses and other IRS locations to the Master File[33] for the IRS to maintain accurate records of activity on taxpayers? accounts.



    Appendix VII



    Management?s Response to the Draft Report



    The response was removed due to its size. To see the response, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.



    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [1] I.R.C. ? 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

    [2] I.R.C. ? 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

    [3] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

    [4] I.R.C. ? 6321 (1994).

    [5] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

    [6] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer?s account records.

    [7] The Centralized Authorization File contains information regarding the types of authorization that taxpayers have given representatives for various tax periods within their accounts.

    [8] Internal Revenue Code Section 6321 (1994).

    [9] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

    [10] I.R.C. ? 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

    [11] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

    [12] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

    [13] The IRS Data Book is published annually by the IRS and contains statistical tables and organizational information on a fiscal year basis.

    [14] I.R.C. ? 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

    [15] The CAF contains information about the type of authorizations taxpayers have given their representatives for their tax returns.

    [16] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer?s account records.

    [17] 26 Code of Federal Regulations ? 601.506.

    [18] Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Lien Due Process Procedures (Reference

    Number 2008-30-082, dated March 27, 2008).

    [19] The Accounts Management organization is responsible for providing taxpayers with information on the status of their returns, refunds, and for resolving the majority of issues and questions to settle their accounts.

    [20] IRS offices with employees who answer questions, provide assistance, and resolve account-related issues for taxpayers face to face.

    [21] I.R.C. ? 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

    [22] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

    [23] The formula n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2) is from Sawyer?s Internal Auditing - The Practice of Modern Internal Auditing, 4th Edition, pp. 462-464.

    [24] A centralized storage and administration of files that provide data and data access services to IRS data.

    [25] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

    [26] The IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

    [27] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

    [28] See Appendix VI for detailed descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

    [29] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

    [30] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

    [31] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

    [32] A campus is the data processing arm of the IRS. The campuses process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.

    [33] The Master File is the IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.
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    FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report TD 90-22.1) Tax Audits

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    According to what I was told, the voluntary disclosures that were made before the IRS issued its voluntary disclosures being filed now will not undergo a civil voluntary disclosure under the tax attorneys at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C. for a consultation. No one should consider contacting the IRS without first having spoken with a qualified

    Self Help With California Probate

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    The Los Angeles Superior Court has a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" self-help website. The web site provides help with Probate matters in general and pays special attention to areas where people represent themselves without an attorney to help them. The self-help site is not supposed to be a do-it-yourself guide and is instead intended to help you help yourself through the court system and probate matters.

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    Probate Guardianship/Conservatorship Information Sheet

    Glossary of Probate Terms

    Conservatorship

    Guardianship

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    Transfer Of Small Estates Without Probate

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    Probate Forms Packets

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    Step transaction doctrine -

    William A. Linton and Stacy A. Linton, Plaintiffs v. United States of America, Defendant.

    U.S. District Court. Dist. Wash.; C08-227Z, July 1, 2009.

    [ Code Sec. 2511]

    Gift tax: Transfers in general: Indirect gifts: Transfers to partnerships. --
    A husband's transfer of property and securities to a limited liability company (LLC) was an indirect gift to his children for purposes of Code Sec. 2511. The husband formed the LLC in November of 2002. On January 22, 2003, the husband transferred half of his interest to his wife and contributed property and securities to the LLC. The couple then executed trusts for each of their four children and gifted a percentage of their interest in the LLC to the trusts. The gifts were discounted by 47 percent for lack of control and lack of marketability. Although, the trust agreements and the transfers to the trust were originally undated, the language in both documents indicated the trusts were signed and funded on January 23, 2003. Furthermore, the couple's attempts to reform the documents to indicate that the trusts' creation and funding occurred on January 31, 2003, were denied. Accordingly, the court held that the gifts to the trust were indirect because they lacked the proper sequence of transactions. Instead, the funding of the trusts and the funding of the partnership occurred simultaneously. Moreover, even if the reformation of the trust agreement and the gift documents had been permitted, the court found that the step transaction doctrine applied. Because the couple failed to show any volatility in the LLC assets which would demonstrate that they a bore a real economic risk of a change in value from January 23 to January 31, the case was distinguishable from T.H. Holman, Jr., Dec. 57,455, 130 TC --, No. 12 and B. Gross, 96 TCM 187, Dec. 57,544(M), TC Memo. 2008-221. J. Shepherd, Dec. 54,098, 115 TC 376, aff'd CA-11, 2002-1 USTC ?60,431, 283 F3d 1258 and M. Senda, 88 TCM 8, Dec. 55,685(M), TC Memo. 2004-160, aff'd CA-8, 2006-1 USTC ?60,515, 433 F3d 1044


    Before: Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge.


    ORDER


    ZILLY, United States District Judge: THIS MATTER comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of and in opposition to each motion, and having heard the arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the Government's motion for summary judgment, docket no. 19, DENIES plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, docket no. 21, and DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment consistent with this Order.



    Background

    Plaintiffs William and Stacy Linton seek a partial refund of gift taxes paid for the year 2003. For that year, William Linton reported taxable gifts of $725,548, while Stacy Linton reported taxable gifts of $724,000. See Exh. I to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-10). The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") examined both gift tax returns and concluded that, during the year 2003, William and Stacy Linton actually made taxable gifts of $1,587,988 and $1,520,440, respectively. See Exhs. A & B to Complaint (docket no. 1-2 at 29 & docket no. 1-3 at 29). The Lintons timely paid the additional gift taxes computed by the IRS, in the aggregate amount of $518,331.41, including interest, and in this action, they seek a refund of this additional amount, together with costs and attorney fees.

    The gift taxes at issue relate to interests in a limited liability company given by William and Stacy Linton to trusts established for the benefit of their children. In November 2002, William Linton formed WLFB Investments, LLC ("WLFB LLC"). Certification of Formation, Exh. A to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-2 at 20); see Limited Liability Company Agreement dated Nov. 7, 2002 [hereinafter "LLC Agreement"] at 1, 18, Exh. A to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-2 at 2, 19). At the time of formation, WLFB LLC had only one member, namely William Linton. LLC Agreement at 18, Exh. A to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-2 at 19).

    On January 22, 2003, William Linton gave to his wife Stacy Linton 50% of his percentage interests in WLFB LLC. Gift of Percentage Interest in WLFB Investments, LLC (docket no. 42). 1 Also on January 22, 2003, William and/or Stacy Linton executed and dated the following documents, which contributed property to WLFB LLC:
    ? A Quit Claim Deed signed by William Linton, conveying undeveloped real property in Snohomish County, which was his separate property, to WLFB LLC; see Exh. D to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-5);

    ? Letters signed by William Linton, authorizing transfers of securities, including municipal bonds, and cash to WLFB LLC; see Exh. D to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-5); Exh. E to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-6); and

    ? An Assignment of Assets signed by William Linton as Assignor and by both William and Stacy Linton as Managers of Assignee WLFB LLC; see Exh. F to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-7); see also LLC Agreement at ? 6 (identifying William and Stacy Linton as Managers of WLFB LLC).

    In addition, on January 22, 2003, William and Stacy Linton, as well as James Linton, William Linton's brother, signed a number of other documents, which they left undated. These executed, but contemporaneously undated, documents consist of:
    ? Four separate Trust Agreements signed by both William and Stacy Linton as Grantors, and by James Linton as Trustee, one Trust Agreement for each of the Lintons' four children, who are identified by initials as J.M.L., J.R.L., S.J.L., and T.W.L.; see Exh. E to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-6);

    ? Four separate documents titled "Gift of Percentage Interest in WLFB Investments, LLC" signed by William Linton as Assignor and James Linton, Trustee, on behalf of Assignee, one document for each of the four Trusts; see Exh. G to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-8); and

    ? Four separate documents titled "Gift of Percentage Interest in WLFB Investments, LLC" signed by Stacy Linton as Assignor and James Linton, Trustee, on behalf of Assignee, one document for each of the four Trusts; see Exh. G to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-8).

    Each of the Trust Agreements indicates that the Trust is irrevocable and that the Trust Agreement is "entered into effective upon contribution of property to the Trust." Exh. E to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-6). The Trust Agreements further state that "[a]t the time of signing of this Agreement, the Grantors have transferred percentage interests in the WLFB Investments, LLC ... to the Trustee of the Trust for the benefit of the Grantor's [sic] child." Id. Finally, the Trust Agreements reflect that the Trustee, James Linton, "acknowledges receipt of such property and agrees to administer all contributed property pursuant to the terms" of the Agreements. Id.

    The documents titled "Gift of Percentage Interest in WLFB Investments, LLC" (the "Gift Documents") contain the following language: Assignor "hereby gifts to the ... Trust, dated the same date hereof, (the "Assignee") a total of 11.25 of the percentage interests in WLFB Investments, LLC ... standing in his respective name on the books of the Company." Exh. G to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-8). Based on this language, each of the four Trusts received 11.25% from each parent, for a total of 22.5 of the percentage interests in WLFB LLC for each Trust.

    According to Richard Hack, the attorney who prepared the various documents, a few months after the transactions at issue, when he was preparing the minute book for WLFB LLC, he filled in the missing dates on the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents. Hack Dep. at 13:12-17:1, Exh. B to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-3 at 4-8). He put the date of January 22, 2003, on these documents, but he now believes that he made a "mistake" in doing so and that the intended date for the creation of the Trusts and the transfers of percentage interests in WLFB LLC to the Trusts was January 31, 2003. Hack Dep. at 20:18- 23:12, Exh. B to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-3 at 9-12).

    Mr. Hack's deposition testimony is consistent with that of Caryl Thorp, who provided estate planning and tax compliance services for the Lintons. See Thorp Dep. at 18:23-19:5, Exh. C to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-4 at 6-7). According to Ms. Thorp, the intended order of the transactions was as follows: "To form the LLC, transfer the assets into the LLC, and then determine the amount of any gifts they wanted to make of LLC units for the benefit of their children and do those after that." Thorp Dep. at 20:6-9, Exh. C to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-4 at 8). Ms. Thorp explained that this sequence was required "[b]ecause you have to get the assets into the LLC first so it's the owner of the assets before you start making transfers of units in the LLC." Thorp Dep. at 20:12-14, Exh. C to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-4 at 8).

    When asked in his deposition how he decided on the amount of assets he would transfer to WLFB LLC, William Linton testified as follows:
    Well, it started out Stacy and I were using our lifetime exemptions, and somewhere along the way, with my team of experts, they came up with this thing that people do in my situation and they discount it because as managers, we control it, and what a willing buyer will pay to a willing seller, who is going to buy a hundred percent of someone's share if they can't touch it or feel it or control it, so there's some proven way that they go out and they discount this stuff. Well, it was news to me... . They said somewhere between 40 and 49 percent discounting based on the blend of assets that you're proposing. So, based on that, I just did some back math to figure out how much money to put into the LLC.

    Linton Dep. at 26:6-23, Exh. B to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-3).

    The tax return filed on behalf of WLFB LLC for the calendar year 2003 provided the following information about the capital accounts of the LLC members:


    capital
    member contributed income withdrawals capital balance

    1 $1,792,386 $5,793 $1,613,148 $185,031

    2 $1,792,386 $5,793 $1,613,148 $185,031

    3 $806,574 $26,070 $832,644

    4 $806,574 $26,071 $832,645

    5 $806,574 $26,067 $832,641

    6 $806,574 $26,070 $832,644



    See Schedule L to Form 1065 for 2003, Exh. J-1 to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-11 at 15). Members 1 and 2 are William and Stacy Linton, while Members 3, 4, 5, and 6 are the Trusts for the Linton children. Schedule L reflects contributions of assets in the aggregate amount of $3,584,772, and transfers of capital in the aggregate amount of $3,226,296, divided evenly among the four Trusts, with each Trust receiving $806,574. The capital account balances shown in Schedule L appear consistent with the percentage interests held by each member after the gifts at issue, namely 5% for William Linton, 5% for Stacy Linton, and 22.5% for each of the Trusts. 2

    The LLC Agreement places certain restrictions on the transfer of percentage interests to persons who are not family members, and it limits the involvement of members in the dayto-day business of the LLC, reserving to the Managers (William and Stacy Linton) all "authority or power to act" for WLFB LLC. LLC Agreement at ?? 6.5, 9.1, 9.2, 9.2.1., 9.2.2., & 9.2.3 (docket no. 23-2 at 4-5, 8-10). In light of these provisions, in computing their gift taxes for the year 2003, plaintiffs applied a discount of 47% based on the theory that the limitations on alienability and non-controlling status rendered the percentage interests in WLFB LLC unmarketable. See Exh. 5 to Moss Adams Advisory Services Appraisal Report for WLFB LLC, Exh. H to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-9 at 39) [hereinafter "Moss Adams Report"]. The Government contends that any discounting is improper.



    Discussion



    A. Standard for Summary Judgment

    The Court should grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been presented, the adverse party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather, the non-moving party must set forth "specific facts" demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. All "justifiable inferences" are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. When the record, however, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, summary judgment is warranted. See Miller v. Glenn Miller Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006).



    B. Federal Gift Tax Analysis

    A tax is imposed "for each calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual." 26 U.S.C. ? 2501(a)(1). If property is transferred for less than adequate and full consideration, then "the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be deemed a gift." 26 U.S.C. ? 2512(b). The value of gifted property is determined as of the date of the gift. 26 U.S.C. ? 2512(a). A gift is measured "by the value of the property passing from the donor, rather than by the [value of the] property received by the donee," and the amount of a gift is generally an issue of fact. Shepherd v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 376, 383 (2000). A gift is complete when the donor "has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition." 26 C.F.R. ? 25.2511-2(b). Although federal revenue acts identify the property interests and rights that are taxed, state law governs the creation of those property interests and rights. Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).

    The gift tax applies "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise" and "whether the gift is direct or indirect." 26 U.S.C. ? 2511(a). An example of an indirect gift is a transfer of property for less than adequate consideration to a corporation, which constitutes an indirect gift of the property to each shareholder of the corporation to the extent of his or her proportionate interest in the corporation. Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 388 (citing 26 C.F.R. ? 25.2511-1(h)(1)). Because the corporate structure differs from a partnership relationship, the question whether a contribution of property to a partnership is an indirect gift to the partners requires further analysis. In situations in which property has been transferred for less than adequate consideration to a partnership, the distinguishing factor for gift tax purposes is whether the donating partner's contribution of property was apportioned among the other partners or was attributed only to the donor's own capital account. In the former circumstance, the contribution of property has been deemed an indirect gift to the other partners, see Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 388-89, while in the latter situation, the transfer has been held not to constitute an indirect gift, see Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121 (2001) (citing Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000)); see also Gross v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 187, 2008 WL 4388277 (2008).



    1. Indirect Gift to Partners (Shepherd)

    In Shepherd, the taxpayer and his wife executed deeds purporting to transfer certain leased land to a partnership, the partnership agreement for which the taxpayer signed on the same day. 115 T.C. at 379, 382. The following day, the taxpayer's two adult sons executed the partnership agreement. Id. at 379. The Tax Court concluded that, under the law of the state in which the partnership was created, the partnership came into existence on the second day, when the sons signed the partnership agreement. Id. at 384-85. As a result, the Tax Court held that the conveyance of land occurred on the second day, not on the first day. Id. at 385 (on the first day, "there was no completed gift, because there was no donee, and petitioner had not parted with dominion and control over the property"). On a subsequent day, the taxpayer contributed bank stock to the partnership. Id. at 381. The Tax Court ultimately held that the taxpayer's transfers of both land and bank stock represented indirect gifts to each of his sons to the extent of their respective percentage interests in the partnership. Id. at 389. The Tax Court reasoned that, because the contributions of property were allocated, pursuant to the partnership agreement, to the taxpayer's and his sons' capital accounts according to their respective partnership shares, and because each son would be entitled upon dissolution of the partnership to receive payment of the balance in his capital account, the taxpayer had made indirect gifts to the sons. Id.



    2. Contributions to Own Capital Account (Jones and Gross)

    In contrast, in both Estate of Jones and Gross, one partner's contributions were not treated as indirect gifts to the other partners. In Estate of Jones, the decedent formed two different partnerships under Texas law. 116 T.C. at 123-24. The first partnership, Jones Borregos Limited Partnership ("JBLP"), was with his son, and the second partnership, Alta Vista Limited Partnership ("AVLP"), was with his four daughters. Id. Both decedent and his son transferred certain property to JBLP, with the contributions reflected in their respective capital accounts. Id. at 123. Decedent and each of his daughters transferred certain property to AVLP, with the contributions reflected in their respective capital accounts. Id. at 124.

    On the same day the partnerships were formed and property was contributed, decedent gave his son an 83.08% limited interest in JBLP, and he gave each of his daughters a 16.915% limited interest in AVLP. Id. at 123-25. Decedent filed a federal gift tax return in which he applied a 66% percent discount to the limited interests in JBLP and a 58% discount to the limited interests in AVLP, pursuant to a "minority interest, nonmarketable" theory. Id. at 127. The Tax Court concluded that, in making contributions to each of the partnerships, decedent had not made indirect gifts to his children because he had received continuing limited partnership interests in exchange for the property at issue, his contributions had been properly reflected in his respective capital accounts, and the value of the other partners' interests had not been enhanced by his contributions. Id. at 128.

    In Gross, the Tax Court found that the contributions of property were "similar in form to the contributions in Estate of Jones" and were "distinguishable in form from the gifts in Shepherd." 2008 WL 4388277 at *7. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, who had formed a partnership with her two daughters, "made a series of contributions of securities to Dimar [Holdings L.P.] and received increasing partnership interests in return. All of the contributions were reflected in her capital account, and the value of her daughters' capital accounts was not enhanced because of her contributions. After she contributed the ... securities to the partnership, she made gifts of [additional] interests in the partnership to her daughters... . [The taxpayer] made gifts of interests in Dimar to her daughters and did not make indirect gifts of portions of the ... securities that she had contributed to the partnership." Id.



    3. Uncertain Sequence of Events (Senda)

    Two important facts distinguish Shepherd from both Estate of Jones and Gross. First, in Shepherd, when property was contributed to the partnership, it was allocated among the partners according to their share of the partnership, whereas in Estate of Jones and Gross, the transferred property was attributed solely to the donor's capital account. Second, in Shepherd, no subsequent gift of partnership interests was involved, whereas in Estate of Jones and Gross, after the contributed property had been reflected in the donor's account, the donor gave interests in the partnership to the other partners. This sequence of activities, namely first creating the partnership, then contributing property to the partnership (and ascribing it to the taxpayer's own capital account), and finally making a gift of partnership interests, has been described as "critical" in evaluating the tax consequences of the transactions. See Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006). In Senda, however, the taxpayers did not present "reliable evidence that they contributed the stock to the partnerships before they transferred the partnership interests to the children." Id. Absent adequate proof of the chronology of events, the transactions in Senda were deemed to mirror those in Shepherd; the taxpayers were treated as having gifted partnership interests to their children before transferring property to the partnership, and the contributed property was therefore held to have enhanced the children's partnership interests and constituted an indirect gift to each child. See Senda v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-160, 2004 WL 1551275, aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006).



    4. Oral Testimony Is Insufficient

    In this case, the Government relies heavily on Senda and contends that the sequence of events here was equally uncertain. The various documents, contributing property to WLFB LLC, creating Trusts for each child, and giving each Trust percentage interests in the LLC, were all signed on the same day, January 22, 2003. Although the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents were not dated when executed, they were eventually given the date of January 22, 2003. The Membership Interest Ledger for the LLC shows the transfers of percentage interests from William to Stacy Linton, and from William and Stacy Linton to each of the four Trusts; however, the Ledger does not indicate the dates of these transfers. See Exh. K to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-13); compare Senda, 2004 WL 1551275 at *6 (noting that the taxpayers "did not maintain any books or records for the partnerships other than brokerage account statements and partnership tax returns"). In addition, although the letters directing US Bancorp Piper Jaffray 3 to transfer securities to WLFB LLC were signed and dated on January 22, 2003, they were not received by US Bancorp Piper Jaffray until January 24, 2003, and the instructions were not followed until after the date of receipt. See Exh. D to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-5); see also Exhs. M - Q to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket nos. 20-14, 20-15, 20-16, 20-17, & 20-18) (indicating that Mr. Linton's requested inter-account transfers did not occur until January 24, 2003, at the earliest, and as late as January 31, 2003). The Quit Claim Deed conveying real property in Snohomish County to WLFB LLC was dated and delivered to the Lintons' attorney on January 22, 2003, but it was not recorded until February 13, 2003. The parties, however, agree that this transfer was effective on the date the deed was executed and delivered, not on the date it was recorded. Plaintiffs' Response at 12 (docket no. 25); Government's Reply at 5 (docket no. 29).

    In connection with their attempt to establish a chronology of transfers having favorable tax consequences, plaintiffs ask the Court to consider transcripts from the depositions of William Linton, Richard Hack, and Caryl Thorp. The Government contends that this oral testimony is either inadmissible or insufficient, citing an unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that a taxpayer's claim for refund "must be substantiated by something other than tax returns, uncorroborated oral testimony, or selfserving statements." Lovelace v. United States, 1991 WL 275375 at *1 (9th Cir.) (quoting Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Government also references a tax regulation indicating that the applicability of the gift tax should be "based on the objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the subjective motives of the donor." 26 C.F.R. ? 25.2511-1(g)(1).

    The Court is persuaded that plaintiffs may offer parol evidence concerning the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents, but concludes that such testimony does not aid plaintiffs in their efforts to obtain a tax refund. The Court is aware of no authority that would preclude the Lintons from testifying they did not place the dates on the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents, or that would bar their attorney from indicating he filled in those dates. Moreover, no evidentiary or tax rule has been cited that would prohibit plaintiffs from proffering evidence about their intent or "state of mind" in connection with these transactions. See Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000) ("evidence about the state of mind of the [taxpayer] ... is considered direct evidence as to the reasonableness of her decisions, and will not be seen as merely self-serving statements"). Finally, because plaintiffs, as the non-moving party, are entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor, for purposes of the Government's summary judgment motion, the Court will treat the deposition testimony at issue as admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) (affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence").

    Plaintiffs' parol evidence, however, does not prove the sequence of events that they assert in this litigation, and thus, whether or not the Court considers the parol evidence, the result is the same. 4 Each Trust Agreement indicates that it is effective upon contribution of property to the Trust, and that, at the time of its signing, property consisting of interests in WLFB LLC had been transferred to the Trustee. See Exh. E to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-6). In turn, in executing each Trust Agreement, the Trustee "acknowledge[d] receipt of such property." Id. In addition, the Gift Documents each recite that the respective Trusts are "dated the same date hereof." Exh. G to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-8). Thus, the express language of these documents establishes that the Trusts were created and the gifts were made on January 22, 2003; on that date, when the Trust Agreements were signed, percentage interests in WLFB LLC had already been or were contemporaneously gifted to the Trusts, thereby making the Trusts effective.

    Plaintiffs seek to reform the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents to reflect that both the creation of the Trusts and the gifting to the Trusts occurred on January 31, 2003. They cite to Washington cases describing the circumstances under which a written instrument may be reformed, including to correct a scrivener's error, due to mutual mistake, or as a result of unilateral mistake caused by fraud or other inequitable conduct. See Wilhelm v. Beyersdorf, 100 Wn. App. 836, 843-44, 99 P.2d 54 (2000); Reynolds v. Farmers Ins. Co., 90 Wn. App. 880, 884-85, 960 P.2d 432 (1998); Snyder v. Peterson, 62 Wn. App. 522, 526-29, 814 P.2d 1204 (1991). Plaintiffs, however, fail to present any evidence to justify the reformation they desire. The proffered testimony proves only that the Lintons did not date the Trust Agreements or the Gift Documents and that the dates on those documents are in Mr. Hack's handwriting. At most, this evidence establishes only a scrivener's error with respect to the date; it does not demonstrate any scrivener's error 5 in the written terms of the documents. Those terms explicitly indicate that the gifting to the Trusts occurred before or with the signing of the Trust Agreements, which undisputedly took place on January 22, 2003. Plaintiffs cannot via parol evidence contradict or modify the express language of the Trust Agreements or the Gift Documents. Hearst Commc'ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 504, 115 P.3d 262 (2005) (Washington courts "do not interpret what was intended to be written but what was written" (clarifying the holding of Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990))).

    Moreover, plaintiffs have offered no theory under which the Trust Agreements and Gift Documents would have been rendered void or voidable had they never been dated. At oral argument, however, counsel for plaintiffs suggested that the Trusts could not have been effective on January 22, 2003, because no trust res existed on that date. This contention is flawed. Although a voluntary trust requires "subject matter" or res to be valid, e.g., Laughlin v. March, 19 Wn.2d 874, 878, 145 P.2d 549 (1944), any type of property may be held in trust, including undivided, reversionary, executory, or contingent future interests, remainders (whether contingent, vested, or vested subject to being divested), and choses in action, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts ? 40 cmt. b (2003). In this case, the res consisted of percentage interests in WLFB LLC, which existed and were contributed to the Trusts at or before the signing of the Trust Agreements on January 22, 2003.

    In addition, the percentage interests had value because, as of January 22, 2003, WLFB LLC had both real and personal property. The parties agree that the conveyance of undeveloped real estate in Snohomish County was effective on January 22, 2003, when Mr. Linton signed the Quit Claim Deed. Plaintiffs also contend that the transfer of securities was effective on January 22, 2003, when Mr. Linton executed the Assignment of Assets in favor of WLFB LLC. Although plaintiffs make this argument for another reason, namely in an effort to show that the contribution of securities to the LLC occurred prior to the gifts of LLC interests to the Trusts, having advanced this position, plaintiffs will not be heard to challenge whether WLFB LLC had assets, or whether percentage interests in WLFB LLC constituted adequate trust res, on January 22, 2003.

    On their claim for tax refund, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof. 6 See Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1935). They have not met this burden. They have not demonstrated the existence of any genuine issue for trial, and they have not refuted the appropriateness of treating the transactions in question as indirect gifts to the children's Trusts of the assets of WLFB LLC. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the Trusts were valid and irrevocable on January 22, 2003, regardless of what date, if any, was placed on the Trust Agreements. The Court also concludes that the gifts of percentage interests in WLFB LLC were made on January 22, 2003, regardless of what date, if any, was placed on the Gift Documents. In addition, the Court is satisfied that the percentage interests in WLFB LLC constituted sufficient trust res. Because the Trusts were created, and gifts of LLC interests were made to the Trusts, on January 22, 2003, either before or simultaneously with the contribution of property to WLFB LLC, the Court holds that this case is analogous to both Shepherd and Senda, and that the Lintons' transfers of real estate, cash, and securities enhanced the LLC interests held by the children's Trusts, thereby constituting indirect gifts to the Trusts of pro rata shares of the assets conveyed to the LLC.



    5. Step Transaction Doctrine

    The Court also finds persuasive the Government's alternative theory that, even if plaintiffs could establish the proper sequence of events, namely funding the LLC before gifting interests in it, they nevertheless made indirect gifts to their children's Trusts under the step transaction doctrine. The step transaction doctrine "treats a series of formally separate 'steps' as a single transaction if such steps are in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a particular result." Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987). Taxation is concerned more with the substance of a transaction than with its mere form. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 181, 197 (1989). Although a taxpayer has the right to minimize taxes as far as the law will allow, a taxpayer may not "through form alone achieve tax advantages which substantively are without the intent of the statute." Id.; see also id. at 197-98 ("A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path." (quoting Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938))). Accordingly, when "a taxpayer has embarked on a series of transactions that are in substance a single, unitary, or indivisible transaction, the courts have disregarded the intermediary steps and have given credence only to the completed transaction." Id. at 198.

    Whether a series of transactions should be "stepped" together and treated as a single transaction generally constitutes a question of fact. Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048; Cal-Maine Foods, 93 T.C. at 198. The proper characterization of a transaction for tax purposes, however, is an issue of law. Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048. No specific standard has been universally applied in assessing whether a number of separate steps or activities should be viewed as comprising one transaction; however, courts have generally used one of three alternative tests: (i) the "binding commitment" test; (ii) the "end result" test; and (iii) the "interdependence" test. Holman v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 170, 187-88 (2008); see Cal-Maine Foods, 93 T.C. at 198-99; see also Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 2005 WL 1111792 at *80-*81 (2005).

    The binding commitment test, which is the narrowest alternative, collapses a series of transactions into one "if, at the time the first step is entered into, there was a binding commitment to undertake the later step." Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429. The end result test stands at the other extreme and is the most flexible standard, asking whether the "series of formally separate steps are really pre-arranged parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to reach the ultimate result." Id. The interdependence test inquires whether, "on a reasonable interpretation of objective facts," the steps were "so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series" of transactions. Cal-Maine Foods, 93 T.C. at 199; Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1430. The interdependence test focuses on the relationships between the steps, rather than on their end result. Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1430. The question is whether "any one step would have been undertaken except in contemplation of the other integrating acts." Cal-Maine Foods, 93 T.C. at 199.

    Regardless of which of these three alternative tests is applied, plaintiffs made "stepped" indirect gifts to their children's Trusts of the assets they contributed to WLFB LLC. The binding commitment test is met because plaintiffs executed binding Trust Agreements and Gift Documents at the same time they took the first step of contributing property to the LLC; as counsel for plaintiffs conceded during oral argument, these documents would have been valid after signing had they never been dated. The end result test is likewise satisfied because plaintiffs undisputedly had a subjective intent to convey as much property as possible to their children while minimizing their gift tax liability, pursuant to which they crafted, with the aid of an attorney and a tax advisor, a scheme consisting of "pre-arranged parts of a single transaction." Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429. The pre-arrangement is most apparent in Mr. Linton's explanation for why he did not date the Gift Documents, namely in an effort to ensure, for tax purposes, that US Bancorp Piper Jaffray completed the transfers of securities before the gifts became effective. See Linton Dep. at 37:13-38:16, Exh. A to Colvin Decl. (docket no. 22-2). In addition, the interdependence test is met because the undisputed evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs would not have undertaken one or more of the steps at issue absent their "contemplation of the other integrating acts." Cal-Maine Foods, 93 T.C. at 199. But for the anticipated 40% to 49% discount in calculating gift taxes, premised on the low market appeal of WLFB LLC's structure, plaintiffs would not have contributed assets to the LLC. Indeed, the quantum of property transferred to WLFB LLC was determined solely on the basis of maximizing the tax advantages of the transaction. See Linton Dep. at 26:6-23, Exh. B to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-3). Because the events here satisfy all three of the step transaction tests, the Court need not choose among the different standards, and the Court holds as a matter of law that, under the step transaction doctrine, plaintiffs made gifts to their children's Trusts of pro rata shares of the assets they contributed to WLFB LLC. Although the applicability of the step transaction doctrine has been described as generally an issue of fact, in this case, no purpose would be served by deferring to trial the legal analysis of the undisputed evidence.

    This case is distinguishable from two recent cases in which the Tax Court concluded that the step transaction doctrine did not apply. See Holman v. Comm'r, 130 T.C. 170 (2008); see also Gross v. Comm'r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 187, 2008 WL 4388277 (2008). In Holman, the taxpayers, husband and wife, on the sixth day after the formation and funding of a limited partnership, made gifts of limited partnership shares ("LP units") to a trust for the benefit of their children. 130 T.C. at 174-79. The partnership had been funded with stock in Dell Computer Corporation ("Dell"). Id. at 172, 175. The Tax Court, observing that "the passage of time may be indicative of a change in circumstances that gives independent significance to a partner's transfer of property to a partnership and the subsequent gift of an interest in that partnership to another," id. at 189, examined the historical prices of Dell stock and concluded that the value of an LP unit changed over time due to its correlation with the worth of Dell stock, which dropped 1.316% during the six days at issue. Id. at 189-91. The Tax Court found that, during the six days between funding the partnership and gifting the LP units, the taxpayers bore a "real economic risk" that the value of an LP unit could change, and thus, the Tax Court refused to disregard the passage of time or to treat the contributions to the partnership and the subsequent gifts as occurring simultaneously pursuant to the step transaction doctrine. Id.

    The facts of Gross are similar to those of Holman. In Gross, the taxpayer and her daughters formed a limited partnership into which they each contributed a small amount of cash, which was reflected in their respective capital accounts. 2008 WL 4388277 at *1-*2. Over the course of three months following the formation of the partnership, the taxpayer transferred various securities to the partnership, each time receiving credit for the contributions on her capital account. Id. at *2, *7. The last of these transfers occurred eleven days before the taxpayer gave each daughter, by way of a "Deed of Gift," a 22.25% limited interest in the partnership. Id. In Gross, the Tax Court cited to Holman as support for its decision that the step transaction doctrine did not apply, focusing on the passage of eleven days between the last transfer of securities and the gifts of partnership interests, as well as on the status of the securities at issue as "common shares of well-known companies." Id. at *7-*8. The Tax Court in Gross concluded that "[t]he form of the transactions ... accords with their substance." Id. at *8.

    The case before this Court bears little resemblance to either Holman or Gross. In contrast to the taxpayers in Holman and Gross, plaintiffs here did not make affirmative decisions to delay the gifts for some period of time after funding. Rather, with the benefit of hindsight, knowing the date on which US Bancorp Piper Jaffray completed the last transfer of assets to WLFB LLC, plaintiffs devised the passage of time between funding and gifting that would have favorable tax consequences. Moreover, unlike in Holman, in this case, plaintiffs have submitted no data concerning the fluctuations, if any, in the prices of the various securities at issue on a daily basis during the period in question. On this subject, the Government contends that, with regard to the bulk of the assets in question, consisting of real property worth approximately $650,000, cash in the amount of $843,724, and municipal bonds valued at roughly $1.54 million, plaintiffs cannot show the volatility necessary to establish a real economic risk associated with the passage of less than ten days. See Exh. 1 to Moss Adams Report (docket no. 23-9 at 35); Exh. E to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-6); Exh. M to Auchterlonie Decl. (docket no. 20-14). Given the nature of the assets and the dearth of evidence in the record to suggest any real economic risk during the alleged interim between funding the LLC and gifting interests in it, the Court is satisfied that neither Holman nor Gross raise any doubt concerning the applicability of the step transaction doctrine in this case.



    Conclusion

    Plaintiffs have raised no genuine issue of material fact concerning their subjective intent, the contemplated sequence of transactions, or the way in which events actually unfolded. On January 22, 2003, plaintiffs executed documents and transferred property in a manner that, as a matter of law, constituted indirect gifts to their children. See Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006). These actions also, as a matter of law, satisfy the step transaction doctrine. See Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415 (1987). The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment in favor of the Government and DISMISSES plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.

    IT IS SO ORDERED.

    The Clerk is directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order and to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

    DATED this 1st day of July, 2009.

    1 This gift had no gift tax implications. See 26 U.S.C. ? 2523(a).

    2 The tax return for WLFB LLC indicates that the business started on January 31, 2003. See Exh. J-1 to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-11). This date is inconsistent with the Certificate of Formation for WLFB LLC, which was filed by the Washington Secretary of State on November 7, 2002, see Exh. A to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-2 at 21); see also RCW 25.15.070(2)(a) ( "a limited liability company is formed when its certificate of formation is filed by the secretary of state"), as well as with the Assignment of Assets signed by William Linton and Stacy Linton as Managers of WLFB LLC, which is dated January 22, 2003, and thereby manifests the conducting of business before the date indicated on the tax return, see Exh. F to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-7). The tax return itself, which was prepared by Moss Adams LLP, is dated March 29, 2004, and it does not constitute contemporaneously prepared evidence as to the sequence of the transactions resulting in the capital account balances disclosed in Schedule L.

    3 In his declaration, William Linton describes letters also directing RBC Dain Rauscher to transfer certain assets to WLFB LLC, but the record contains no such documents. See Linton Decl. at ?? 12 & 15 and Exh. E.

    4 To be clear, the various subsequently prepared documents in this case do not serve as reliable evidence of plaintiffs' intent. See Senda, 433 F.3d at 1047 (the tax returns and certificates of ownership generated months or weeks later were "unreliable in deciding whether petitioners transferred the partnership interest to the children before or after they contributed the stock to the partnerships" (quoting Senda, 2004 WL 1551275 at *6)). For example, the Membership Interest Ledger for WLFB LLC, which was prepared a few months after the transactions at issue, contains no dates and offers no information concerning the sequence of events. See Exh. K to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-13). Likewise, the Moss Adams Report provides no useful data, but rather makes assumptions about the transactions that occurred approximately six months before the report was generated. See Exh. H to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-9). Finally, the tax return for WLFB LLC was filed over a year after events, see Exh. J-1 to Linton Decl. (docket no. 23-11), and it does not constitute contemporaneous evidence of plaintiffs' intent.

    5 Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge the Trust Agreements or Gift Documents on the basis of any unilateral mistake generated by fraudulent conduct. At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that the mutual mistake doctrine is likewise not alleged as a ground for reformation because the documents at issue convey a gift. In response or perhaps as an addendum, the Government asserted that the failure to join Trustee James Linton as a party was fatal to plaintiffs' request for reformation and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant such relief because it would only flow from state law claims beyond the scope of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity. In light of its ruling in this matter, the Court need not address either of these contentions.

    6 Plaintiffs incorrectly suggest that the burden of proof has shifted to the Government pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ? 7491(a), which provides that, "[i]f ... a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue ..., the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue" so long as the taxpayer has satisfied certain prerequisites, including cooperation with the IRS. Plaintiffs have not identified any factual issue on which the Government should bear the burden of proof. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs conceded that the matter before the Court involves only questions of law. Thus, the burden-shifting provision of the tax code has no relevance to this case. See Calvert v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-7, 2007 WL 105129 at *1 n.1 ( "Since this case involves only a question of law, sec. 7491 is not applicable here."); see also Ayres v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-4, 2007 WL 54098 at *1 n.1 ( "The facts are not in dispute, and the issue is a question of law; therefore, with respect to the burden of proof, the Court need not address the applicability of sec. 7491." (citing Higbee v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 438 (2001))).
    Richardson: Make MA tax law fair to home-team retailers
    By Rep. Pam Richardson Massachusetts is fortunate to be home to many successful companies which provide jobs, generate tax dollars for our communities and serve as economic engines for the commonwealth. We have these companies because we do a lot of things right, however I am frustrated by recent changes to the state’s corporate tax laws [...]
    Congressional Research Service Report for Congress --Tax Benefits for Health Insurance and Expenses: Overview of Current Law and Legislation, June 29, 2009

    July 9, 2009

    111th Congress

    Tax Benefits for Health Insurance and Expenses: Overview of Current Law and Legislation

    Bob Lyke

    Julie M. Whittaker

    Specialist in Income Security

    June 29, 2009

    Congressional Research Service

    7-5700

    www.crs.gov

    RL33505



    Summary

    How tax policy affects health insurance and health care spending is a perennial subject of discussion in Washington. The issue is prompted by the size of the tax benefits, by their effect on the cost and allocation of health care resources, and by interest in comprehensive tax and health care reform. Health care reform proposals currently being considered could make important tax changes.

    Current law contains significant tax benefits for health insurance and expenses. By far the largest is the exclusion for employer-paid coverage, which employees may omit from their individual income taxes. The exclusion also applies to employment taxes and to health benefits in cafeteria plans. (The exclusion should be distinguished from the deduction employers may take for the payments they make and other costs they incur.) Some see ending or capping the exclusion as a way to raise revenue that might be used to pay for health care reform. Other important tax benefits include the following:


    ? Self-employed taxpayers may deduct 100% of their health insurance, even if they do not itemize deductions,



    ? Taxpayers who itemize may deduct insurance payments and other unreimbursed medical expenses to the extent they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income,



    ? Some workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance or receiving a pension paid by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation can receive the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) to purchase certain types of insurance,



    ? Four tax-advantaged accounts are available to help taxpayers pay their health care expenses: Flexible Spending Accounts, Health Reimbursement Accounts, Health Savings Accounts, and Medical Savings Accounts,



    ? Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association plans (VEBAs), are vehicles for prefunding retiree health benefits on a tax-advantaged basis for certain groups of workers, particularly unionized workers,



    ? Coverage under Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and military and veterans health care programs is not considered taxable income, and



    ? A temporary COBRA premium subsidy was included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.


    By lowering the after-tax cost of insurance, these tax benefits generally help extend coverage to more people; they also lead some people to obtain more coverage than they otherwise would. The incentives influence how coverage is acquired: the uncapped exclusion for employer-paid insurance, which can benefit nearly all workers and is easy to administer, is partly responsible for the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. In addition, the tax benefits increase the demand for health care by enabling insured people to obtain services at discounted prices; this in turn contributes to rising health care costs. Because many people would likely obtain insurance without tax benefits, they can be an inefficient use of public dollars. When insurance is viewed as a form of personal consumption, most tax benefits appear to be inequitable because taxpayers' savings depend on marginal tax rates. When viewed as spreading catastrophic economic risk over multiple years, however, basing those savings on marginal rates might be justified as the proper treatment for losses under a progressive tax system.



    Contents

    Most Recent Developments

    Tax Benefits in Current Law


    Employer-Paid Insurance



    COBRA Continuation Coverage



    Unreimbursed Medical Expenses



    Individual Market Policies



    Self-Employed Individuals



    Cafeteria Plans



    Premium Conversion



    Flexible Spending Accounts



    Health Reimbursement Accounts



    Health Savings Accounts



    Medical Savings Accounts



    Health Coverage Tax Credit



    Military Health Care



    Veterans Health Care



    Medicare



    Medicaid



    CHIP



    VEBAs


    Some Consequences of the Tax Benefits


    Increases in Coverage



    Sources of Insurance Coverage



    Increases in Health Care Use and Cost



    Equity


    Current Proposals


    Comprehensive Reform Proposals



    Exclusion for Employer-Provided Insurance



    Definition of Medical Care



    Expanded Tax Deduction



    Self-Employed Deduction



    Cafeteria Plans



    Premium Conversion



    Flexible Spending Accounts



    Health Savings Accounts



    Health Coverage Tax Credit



    Individual Tax Credit



    Employer Tax Credit


    For Additional Reading

    Appendixes

    Appendix. General Formula For Calculating Federal Income Taxes

    Contacts

    Author Contact Information

    Additional Author Information



    Most Recent Developments

    The congressional committees with principal jurisdiction for health care are working on comprehensive reform proposals. The Senate HELP Committee released a draft on June 9, while a coordinated measure by three House committees (Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means) was released on June 19. The Senate Finance Committee has not yet released a public draft. The HELP Committee draft does not include tax provisions related to health care aside from a penalty tax to enforce an individual mandate. 1 The House committees' draft also has a penalty tax for people without coverage, a requirement that employers either offer acceptable coverage or pay 8% of payroll into a health exchange trust fund, and a small business health insurance tax credit.



    Tax Benefits in Current Law

    Current law provides significant tax benefits for health insurance and expenses. The tax subsidies (mostly federal income tax exclusions and deductions) are widely available, though not everyone can take advantage of them. They reward some people more than others, raising questions of equity. They influence the amount and type of coverage that people obtain, which affects their ability to choose doctors and other providers. In addition, the tax benefits affect the distribution and cost of health care.

    This section of the report summarizes the current tax treatment of the principal ways that people obtain health insurance and pay their health care expenses. It describes general rules but does not discuss all limitations, qualifications, or exceptions. To understand possible effects on tax liability, readers may want to refer to the Appendix for an outline of the federal income tax formula. For example, exclusions are omitted from gross income, whereas deductions are subtracted from gross income in order to arrive at taxable income. Section number references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

    This section also includes Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates of tax expenditures, where available. Tax expenditures measure the difference in tax liabilities for individuals and corporations due to provisions that are exceptions to a normative comprehensive income tax. Tax expenditures are not the same as revenue losses to the government, the measurement of which reflects assumed behavioral responses, timing considerations, and changes in employment tax receipts. 2

    Most of the tax rules discussed here have also been adopted by states that have income taxes.



    Employer-Paid Insurance

    Over 60% of the noninstitutionalized population under age 65 is insured under an employment-based plan. In the average plan, employers pay about 85% of the cost of single coverage and 74% of the cost of family coverage, though some pay all and others pay none. 3

    Health insurance paid by employers generally is excluded from employees' gross income in determining their income tax liability; it also is not considered for either the employees' or the employer's share of employment taxes (i.e., Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes). 4 The income and employment tax exclusions apply to both single and family coverage, which includes the employee's spouse and dependents. Premiums paid by employees may be subject to a premium conversion arrangement under a cafeteria plan or counted towards the itemized medical expense deduction (both of which are discussed below). 5

    The exclusion for employer-paid insurance should be distinguished from the tax deduction employers are allowed for the payments they make and other costs they incur. For income taxes, the exclusion applies to employees as individual taxpayers, while the deduction applies to employers. The employer deduction is not a tax benefit but a calculation necessary for the proper measurement of the net income that is subject to taxation. Revenue loss attributable to this deduction is not considered a tax expenditure.

    Insurance benefits paid from employment-based plans are excluded from gross income if they are reimbursements for medical expenses or payments for permanent physical injuries. Benefits not meeting these tests are taxable in proportion to the share of the insurance costs paid by the employer that were previously excluded from gross income. 6 Benefits are also taxable to the extent that taxpayers received a tax benefit from deducting expenses in a prior year (e.g., if taxpayers claimed a deduction for medical expenditures in 2007 and then received an insurance reimbursement for them in 2008). In addition, benefits received by highly compensated employees under discriminatory self-insured plans are partly taxable. A self-insured plan is one in which the employer assumes the risk for a health care plan and does not shift it to a third party. 7

    The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that the FY2009 tax expenditure attributable to the exclusion for employer payments for health insurance premiums, health care, and long-term care insurance premiums will be $127.4 billion. The estimate does not include the effect of the exclusion on employment taxes. 8



    COBRA Continuation Coverage

    COBRA refers to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272), which in general allows separated employees and their family members the right to continue employer-sponsored coverage for a limited time (generally 18 to 36 months, depending on the qualifying event). Private-sector firms with 20 or more employees are subject to COBRA, as are state and local governments; the federal government must provide continuation rights under other legislation. 9

    The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) authorized temporary premium subsidies of 65% for 9 months to help unemployed workers afford COBRA coverage from their former employer. The subsidy is provided in the form of a credit that employers can use to offset payroll taxes (e.g., Social Security and Medicare taxes) they would otherwise pay; the unemployed workers would then pay the employer the other 35% of the cost. To qualify, workers must be involuntarily unemployed between September 1, 2008, and December 31, 2009. Workers who were involuntarily terminated between September 1, 2008, and February 17, 2009 (the date of enactment) but failed to initially elect COBRA are to be notified by their former employer that they are entitled to elect COBRA and receive the subsidy. The subsidy is phased out for workers whose annual household adjusted gross income exceeds $125,000 for single filers and $250,000 for joint filers. The temporary subsidy applies to coverage under other continuation laws as well, including state laws that may affect employers with fewer than 20 employees. 10



    Unreimbursed Medical Expenses

    Taxpayers who itemize their deductions may deduct unreimbursed medical expenses that exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income (AGI). 11 Medical expenses include health insurance premiums paid by the taxpayer, principally premiums for individual market policies and the employee's share of premiums for employment-based coverage (aside from those subject to a premium conversion arrangement). More generally, medical expenses include amounts paid for the "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body." 12 They also include certain transportation and lodging expenditures, qualified long-term care costs, and long-term care insurance premiums that do not exceed certain amounts.

    The deduction is intended to help only people with catastrophic expenses, so by design it is not widely used. For most taxpayers, the standard deduction is larger than the sum of their itemized deductions; moreover, most do not have unreimbursed expenses that exceed 7.5% AGI. In 2005, about 35% of all returns had itemized deductions, and of these, less than 21% (about 7% of all returns) claimed the medical expense deduction.

    The JCT estimates that the FY2009 tax expenditure attributable to the medical expense deduction (including long-term care expenses) will be about $10.6 billion.



    Individual Market Policies

    About 6% of the noninstitutionalized population under age 65 is insured through private individual market policies. Likely purchasers include early retirees, young adults, employees without access to employment-based insurance, and the self-employed. All of these people can claim the medical expense deduction just described, provided they qualify (i.e., they must itemize and then can deduct only unreimbursed expenses that exceed 7.5% AGI). Many self-employed taxpayers can claim a more generous deduction described below.

    Premiums for certain types of individual market insurance are not deductible, including policies for loss of life, limb, and sight; policies that pay guaranteed amounts each week for a stated number of weeks for hospitalization; policies to provide payment for loss of earnings; and the part of car insurance that provides medical coverage for persons injured in or by the policyholder's car.

    Benefits paid under accident and health insurance policies purchased by individuals are excluded from gross income, even if they exceed medical expenses.



    Self-Employed Individuals

    Self-employed individuals include sole proprietors (single owners of unincorporated businesses), general partners, limited partners who receive guaranteed payments, and individuals who receive wages from S-corporations in which they are more than 2% shareholders. 13

    Self-employed taxpayers may deduct payments for health insurance in determining their AGI (i.e., as an "above-the-line" deduction). 14 The "above-the-line" deduction for the self-employed is not restricted to itemizers or subject to a floor, as is the medical expense deduction described above. Currently, 100% of the insurance cost may be taken into consideration. However, the deduction cannot exceed the net profit and any other earned income from the business under which the plan is established, less deductions taken for certain retirement plans and for one-half the self-employment tax. It is not available for any month in which the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse is eligible to participate in a subsidized employment-based health plan (i.e., one in which the employer pays part of the cost). These restrictions prevent taxpayers with little net income from their business (which is not uncommon for a new business) from deducting much if any of their insurance payments. The portion not deductible under these rules may be treated as an itemized medical expense deduction.

    Self-employed individuals may not deduct their health insurance costs in determining the employment taxes they pay (the self-employment tax).

    In 2006, about 3.8 million tax returns (about 3% of all returns) claimed the self-employed health insurance deduction. For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to the deduction (including the self-employed deduction for long-term care insurance) will be $4.8 billion.



    Cafeteria Plans

    Cafeteria plans are employer-established benefit plans under which employees may choose between receiving cash (typically additional take-home pay) and certain normally nontaxable benefits (such as employer-paid health insurance) without being taxed on the value of the benefits if they select the latter. A general rule of taxation is that taxpayers given these options will be taxed on whichever they choose because they are deemed to be in constructive receipt of the cash. The cafeteria plan provisions of the Code provide an express exception to this rule when the plan meets various reporting and nondiscrimination requirements. 15 Nontaxable benefits received under a cafeteria plan are exempt from both income and employment taxes.

    Cafeteria plans may be simple or complex. Simple plans might allow employees to choose between cash and one nontaxable benefit, such as additional health insurance. Complex plans might give employees a "pot of money" to allocate among health insurance and reimbursement accounts, dependent care assistance, group term life insurance, commuter benefits, and cash as they see fit.



    Premium Conversion

    Under a cafeteria plan option known as premium conversion, employees may elect to reduce their taxable wages in exchange for having their share of health insurance premiums paid on a pretax basis. The arrangement reduces both income and employment taxes. Federal employees who participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) have been able to elect this option since October 2000. Private sector and state or local government employees may also elect premium conversion if their employers permit.

    In general, premium conversion is not available to retirees. The barrier is not the cafeteria plan rules but an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determination that distributions from qualified retirement plans are always subject to taxes, aside from several minor exceptions. 16 The IRS ruling precludes former employees from recasting pension payments as pretax income, as active workers can recast their wages. However, employer payments for retiree health insurance are excluded from taxes, just as they are for active workers. For many retirees, the employer pays much of the premium.

    The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) allows certain retired public safety officers to pay up to $3,000 of qualified health insurance premiums from their pensions on a pretax basis each year. Technically, the amount is excluded from the retirees' gross income. The premiums do not have to be for a plan sponsored by the former employer; however, the exclusion does not apply to premiums paid by the retiree and then reimbursed with pension distributions.

    For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to cafeteria plans will be $36.8 billion. The estimate includes the tax expenditures attributable to dependent care flexible spending accounts, though this is a minor portion. 17



    Flexible Spending Accounts

    Flexible spending accounts (FSAs) are employer-established benefit plans that reimburse employees for specified expenses as they are incurred. 18 Accounts may be used for dependent care or for medical and dental expenses, though there must be separate accounts for these two purposes. FSAs and cafeteria plans are closely related, but not all cafeteria plans have FSAs and not all FSAs are part of cafeteria plans. FSA reimbursements funded through salary reduction agreements (the most common arrangement) are exempt from income and employment taxes under cafeteria plan provisions because employees have a choice between cash (their regular salary) and a nontaxable benefit. In contrast, FSA reimbursements funded by nonelective employer contributions are exempt from taxation directly under provisions applying to employer-paid dependent care or health insurance. 19

    Health care FSAs must exhibit some of the risk-shifting and risk-distribution characteristics of insurance. Among other things, participants must elect a specific benefit amount prior to the start of a plan year; this election cannot be revoked except for changes in family status. The full benefit amount (less any benefits paid) must be made available throughout the entire year, even if employees spread their contributions throughout the year. Amounts unused at the end of the year must be forfeited to the employer (the "use it or lose it" rule), though employers may allow a 2 1/2 -month grace period. 20 FSAs cannot be used to purchase insurance; however, they can be combined with premium conversion arrangements under cafeteria plans to achieve the same tax effect. Employers are permitted, but not required, to allow military reservists called to active duty to receive some or all of the remaining funds in their account. 21

    In 2006, about 21% of private-sector establishments offered a health care FSA to their workers. 22 They are more common in larger firms: 70% of establishments with 50 or more workers offered them, but only 9% of smaller establishments. Similarly, more employees had access to an FSA if they worked in larger firms: 68% of workers did in firms with 50 or more workers, but only 11% did in smaller firms. Overall, 53% of private-sector employees could establish a health care FSA.

    Most people with access to an FSA do not use them. A 2006 survey by Mercer Human Resources Consulting showed that an average of 36% of eligible employees participated in health care FSAs offered by employers with 10 or more employees. The average amount contributed was $1,208.

    Federal employees have had the opportunity to use FSAs since July 2003. In September 2008, there were 240,000 federal health care FSAs.



    Health Reimbursement Accounts

    Health Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs) are employer-established arrangements to reimburse employees for medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance or otherwise reimbursable. As with FSAs, reimbursements are not subject to either income or employment taxes. In contrast, however, contributions cannot be made through salary reduction agreements; only employers may contribute. Employers need not actually fund HRAs until employees draw on them; the accounts may be simply notional. Also unlike FSAs, reimbursements can be limited to amounts previously contributed. Unused balances may be carried over indefinitely, though employers may limit the aggregate carryovers.

    HRAs are governed by the Code provisions discussed above for the exclusion of benefits paid from employment-based plans and various IRS guidance. 23



    Health Savings Accounts

    Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are one way that people can pay on a tax-advantaged basis for unreimbursed medical expenses (deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance). 24 Eligible individuals can establish and fund accounts when they have a qualifying high deductible health plan and no other health plan, with some exceptions. The high deductible plan may be through an employer-provided option or purchased individually. For 2009, the deductible for self-only coverage must be at least $1,150 with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $5,800; the deductible for family coverage must be at least $2,300 with an annual out-of-pocket limit not exceeding $11,600.

    The annual HSA contribution limit in 2009 for individuals with self-only coverage is $3,000; for family coverage, it is $5,950. Individuals who are at least 55 years of age but not yet enrolled in Medicare may contribute an additional $1,000. Contributions may be made by employers, individuals, or both. 25

    HSA contributions are deductible as an above-the line deduction if made by individuals, and they are exempt from both income and employment taxes if made by employers. Contributions may be made through salary reduction agreements, in which case they are treated as if made by employers. Withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses; however, they are taxable and usually subject to a penalty if used for other expenses or to purchase health insurance, with some exceptions. Account earnings are tax-exempt. Unused balances may accumulate without limit.

    In January 2009, there were about 8 million people covered by qualifying high deductible insurance plans ; the number includes both policyholders and their family members. The number of people covered by HSAs is smaller because it is not necessary to establish an account along with the insurance. Moreover, some accounts may not be funded. The number of HSAs grew rapidly after they were first allowed, but it is not clear what growth will occur in the future. 26

    For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to HSAs will be about $700 million.



    Medical Savings Accounts

    Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) are an older, more-restrictive version of HSAs. Begun as a demonstration program in 1997, they are limited to people who either are self-employed or are employees covered by a high deductible insurance plan established by a small employer (50 or fewer employees). Like HSAs, annual contributions are limited and can be made only when account owners have qualifying high deductible insurance, though the specific rules are different. Unlike HSAs, contributions can be made by individuals or employers, not both, and they cannot occur through salary-reduction agreements. The official name of MSAs is now Archer MSAs. 27

    MSA contributions are deductible (as an above-the-line deduction) if made by individuals, and they are exempt from both income and employment taxes if made by employers. Withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses under rules similar to those for HSAs. Account earnings are tax-exempt. Unused balances may accumulate without limit.

    The legislative upper limit on the number of MSAs is 750,000 (not counting accounts of owners who previously were uninsured, among others), though there never has been close to that many established. For tax year 2003 (just before HSAs were authorized), the IRS estimated that there were fewer than 80,000 accounts in total. Many of these have subsequently been rolled into HSAs. The IRS estimated that 20,361 MSAs had contributions in 2005. 28

    MSAs should be distinguished from Medicare MSAs, which are discussed below under "Medicare."



    Health Coverage Tax Credit

    Three groups of taxpayers are potentially eligible for the health coverage tax credit (HCTC):


    ? individuals receiving a Trade Readjustment Assistance allowance, including those eligible for but not yet receiving the allowance because they have not yet exhausted their state unemployment benefits;



    ? individuals receiving an Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance allowance; and



    ? individuals aged 55 and older receiving a Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation pension payment, including those who received a lump sum payment after August 5, 2002.


    Recipients cannot be enrolled in certain other health insurance, including Medicaid or employment-based insurance for which the employer pays at least half the cost, nor can they be entitled to Medicare. 29

    The HCTC equals 80% of the premiums the taxpayer pays for qualifying insurance for themselves and for their family. (The credit rate was raised from 65% by the ARRA until December 31, 2010.) Up to 11 types of coverage are specified in the statute, though most require state action to become effective. The credit is payable in advance to insurers, allowing workers to benefit before they file their tax returns. It is also refundable: workers can receive the full credit even if they have no regular tax liability.

    The Internal Revenue Services reports that approximately 28,000 taxpayers claimed the HCTC in tax year 2005. The average monthly premium for this group was $600, for an average credit of $429. Approximately 17,000 family members were covered under these plans; in total, 45,000 persons received some type of health insurance subsidized by the HCTC. 30

    For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to the HCTC will be about $100 million.



    Military Health Care

    The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) provides health care to active duty military personnel, military retirees, and their dependents. In general, active duty personnel receive care without cost (aside from small per diem charges), while the others may have deductibles, copayments, and premiums depending on where they are served and the particular insurance plan they are in. Military insurance plans currently are called Tricare plans. About 9 million people are eligible for services and coverage by these arrangements. 31

    Coverage under military health care programs and the benefits they provide are not considered taxable. 32

    For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to medical care and Tricare insurance for military dependents, retirees, and dependents of retirees will be approximately $2.2 billion.



    Veterans Health Care

    The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides health care directly to veterans through hospitals, nursing homes, residential rehabilitation treatment centers, and community-based outpatient clinics. In some cases, it pays for care provided by independent doctors and other health care professionals. Veterans health care is not an entitlement (unlike Medicare Part A, for example), and eligibility for services is prioritized according to several factors, including the severity of disabilities, whether disabilities occurred during or after military service, certain military events (e.g., having been a prisoner of war), the period of service, and means testing. Just over 5 million veterans receive services. 33

    Coverage under veterans health care programs and the benefits they provide are not considered taxable. 34



    Medicare

    Medicare is a national health insurance program for people aged 65 and older or who meet certain disability tests. Nearly 42 million people are covered by one or more of its parts. Coverage under Medicare and the benefits it pays for qualifying expenses are not considered taxable. 35

    Medicare Part A (insurance for hospitalization, skilled nursing facilities, post-hospitalization home health, and hospice care) is financed largely by employment taxes that workers and their employers both pay, currently 1.45% of covered wages. Individuals cannot take these tax payments into account for the itemized deduction for medical expenses. 36 However, employers may deduct what they pay as a business expense.

    Workers and their spouses become entitled to Part A once the workers have paid employment taxes on covered wages for certain periods of time. They pay no additional premium to be enrolled. People aged 65 and older who are not entitled to Part A may voluntarily enroll by paying a monthly premium. This premium may be taken into account for the itemized deduction for medical expenses, as may the deductibles and copayments associated with Part A.

    Medicare Part B (insurance for doctors' fees, hospital outpatient services, most home health, and other medical services) is financed by general tax revenues and monthly premiums paid by those who enroll. Usually the premiums are withheld from Social Security benefits. These premiums may be taken into account for the itemized deduction for medical expenses, as may the deductibles and copayments associated with Part B. 37

    Medicare Part D (insurance for prescription drugs) is also financed by general tax revenues and monthly premiums paid by those who enroll. Deductibles and copayments associated with Medicare Part D may be taken into account for the itemized deduction for medical care, as may the Part D premiums themselves. 38

    Medicare Part C authorizes a number of alternative Medicare health plans, now called Medicare Advantage plans. Participants must be enrolled in both Medicare Part A and Part B. Some of these plans may charge an additional premium, which can be taken into account for the itemized deduction for medical expenses. In 2007, for the first time there are Medicare Medical Savings Account plans offered under Part C. The tax treatment of these plans is similar to that of Health Savings Accounts; contributions and account earnings are exempt from taxes, as are withdrawals used to pay medical expenses. 39 However, other specifications differ depending on the plan. Contributions to Medicare MSA plans are made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

    For FY2009, the JCT estimates that the tax expenditure attributable to the exclusion of Medicare Part A benefits will be $23.7 billion. The tax expenditures attributable to Part B and Part D are estimated to be $16 billion and $5.3 billion, respectively. 40



    Medicaid

    Medicaid provides health care services for the elderly, people who have disabilities, pregnant women, families with dependent children, and children who have low income and few assets. It also pays for long-term care for people meeting similar needs tests. As each state designs and administers its own program, there is variation within broad federal guidelines with respect to who is served, benefits and delivery systems, and cost-sharing and other patient requirements. Medicaid waivers allow states even more flexibility for certain populations. Nearly 63 million people are covered by Medicaid each year. 41

    Coverage under Medicaid and the benefits it pays for qualifying expenses are not considered taxable. 42



    CHIP

    The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provides health insurance to children in families without coverage and with income above Medicaid eligibility levels. Some states expand their Medicaid programs to cover these children, whereas others have separate programs or a combination of both. CHIP waivers allow states to cover adults as well. More than 7 million children were covered by CHIP in FY2007, as were about 587,000 adults. 43

    As with Medicaid, coverage under CHIP and the benefits it pays for qualifying expenses are not considered taxable.



    VEBAs

    Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) plans provide life insurance, medical, disability, accident and other welfare benefits to employee members and their dependents. 44 Most are organized as trusts to be legally separate from employers, which is important if the latter become bankrupt. Provided certain conditions are met, the investment earnings of VEBAs are exempt from taxation, as are the benefits paid out if the benefit would normally be exempt. For example, VEBA medical benefits would be tax exempt, but severance pay would not be.

    VEBAs can be funded by employers or employees. Employer contributions are tax deductible as a business expense, but the deductions generally are limited to the sum of qualified direct costs (amounts employers could have deducted for the employee benefit for the year if they followed cash basis accounting) and additions to qualified asset account s (reserves for unpaid claims, some administrative costs, and certain post-retirement benefits), minus VEBA after-tax net income. Reserves for retiree health benefits normally must be funded over the working lives of covered individuals on a level basis, using actuarial assumptions incorporating current, but not projected, medical costs. These limitations reduce the utility of VEBAs for retiree health plans, but they do not apply to collectively-bargained plans or to multiple employer welfare arrangements (MEWAs) of ten or more employers. 45 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allows VEBAs in the case of certain bankruptcies to be considered qualified insurance for purposes of the Health Coverage Tax Credit.

    According to the 2005 Mercer National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Plans, 9% of employers with 500 or more employees use VEBAs for prefunding retiree health benefits. VEBAs are more common in heavy manufacturing, communication, transportation, and utility industries.



    Some Consequences of the Tax Benefits 46



    Increases in Coverage

    By lowering the after-tax cost of insurance, some of the tax benefits described above help extend coverage to more people. This is, of course, the intention: Congress has long been concerned about whether people have access to health care. The public subsidy implicit in the incentives (the foregone tax revenue) usually is justified on grounds that people would otherwise under-insure; that is, they would delay purchasing coverage in the hope that they will not become ill or have an accident. Uninsured people are an indication of what economists call market failure; they impose spill-over costs on society in the form of public health risks and uncompensated charity care. If insurance were purchased only by people who most need health care, its cost would become prohibitive for others.

    Tax benefits also lead some people to obtain more coverage than they might otherwise choose. They purchase insurance that covers more than hospitalization and other catastrophic expenses, such as routine doctor visits, prescription drugs, and dental care. They obtain coverage with smaller deductibles and copayments than are necessary. However, many people are risk-averse with respect to health care, so the tax benefits are only one factor influencing the amount of insurance purchased. Some people contend that comprehensive coverage and lower cost-sharing lead to better preventive care and possibly long-term savings for certain medical conditions.

    Tax benefits associated with Heath Savings Accounts are an attempt to encourage people to purchase less coverage by having higher deductibles. In this respect, they appear to differ from the tax benefits usually associated with health insurance. However, the accounts themselves might be viewed as a form of insurance, particularly as they grow in size, so it is not clear what their impact will be in reducing overall coverage.



    Sources of Insurance Coverage

    Tax benefits influence the way in which insurance coverage is acquired. The uncapped exclusion for employer-paid insurance, which can benefit nearly all workers and is easy to administer, is partly responsible for the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. In contrast, restrictions on the itemized deduction allowed for individual private market insurance may be one reason this insurance covers only about 6% of the noninstitutionalized population under age 65.

    Employment-based insurance carries both advantages and disadvantages for the typical worker. The principal advantage is that coverage is based on larger and often more stable risk pools; this generally lowers the cost for people who need more care. Usually, employee premiums do not vary by age or risk. Although young and healthy workers sometimes pay more than they would for identical individual market coverage, they are protected from cost increases as they get older or need additional care. However, plans chosen by employers may not meet individual workers' needs, particularly if there is only one available health plan, and changing jobs may require both new insurance and doctors.



    Increases in Health Care Use and Cost

    Tax benefits increase the demand for health care by enabling insured people to obtain services at discounted prices. This induced demand can be beneficial to the extent that it reflects needed health care (that which society deems everyone should have) that financial constraints otherwise would have prevented. It can be wasteful to the extent it results in less essential or ineffective care. In any case, increasing use of health care contributes to rising health care costs.

    Whether insurance coverage could be encouraged without increasing the cost of health care has long been a matter of debate. Comprehensive reforms that might accomplish this goal include capping the exclusion for employer-paid insurance and replacing both the exclusion and the deduction with a limited tax credit. But substantial changes along these lines could be difficult to implement and might create serious inequities. Consumer-driven health care (most commonly associated with high deductible insurance plans coupled with Health Reimbursement Accounts and Health Savings Accounts) is a recent attempt to help people obtain coverage without driving up costs as much. The Congressional Budget Office analyzed this approach in a December 2006 publication, Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Potential Effects on Health Care and Spending Outcomes.

    Many people probably would obtain some health insurance even without the tax benefits. The cost of subsidizing people for what they would otherwise do is an inefficient use of public dollars. One important goal of the tax incentives is for insurance to be purchased only to the extent it results in better health care for society as a whole. But how the incentives could be revised to accomplish this goal is a difficult question given the different ways insurance is provided, the various ways it is regulated, and the voluntary nature of decisions to purchase it.



    Equity

    Questions might be raised about the distribution of the tax incentives. Because as a practical matter they are not available to everyone, problems of horizontal equity arise. 47 Workers without employment-based insurance generally cannot benefit from them, nor can many early retirees (people under 65, the age of Medicare eligibility). Even if these individuals itemize their deductions, they may deduct health insurance premiums only to the extent that they (and other health care expenditures) exceed 7.5% of AGI. In contrast, the exclusion for employer-paid insurance is unlimited.

    Even if everyone could benefit from the tax incentives, there would be questions of vertical equity. 48 Tax savings from the exclusions and deductions described above generally are determined by taxpayers' marginal tax rate. Thus, taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket would save $600 in income taxes from a $4,000 exclusion (i.e., $4,000 x 0.15) for an employer-paid premium, whereas taxpayers in the 35% bracket would save $1,400 (i.e., $4,000 x 0.35). If health insurance is considered a form of personal consumption like food or clothing, this pattern of benefits would strike many people as unfair. It is unlikely that a government grant program would be designed in this manner. However, to the extent that health insurance is considered a way of spreading an individual's catastrophic economic risk over multiple years, basing tax savings on marginal tax rates might be justified. Under a progressive income tax system, economic losses ought to be deducted at applicable marginal rates, just as economic gains are taxed at those rates.

    Assessing the equity of tax incentives for health insurance is complicated by uncertainty as to who pays for employer subsidies. In the long run, the cost of these subsidies presumably is passed on to the workers in the form of reductions to wages and other benefits. But whether these reductions are shared equally by all workers is unclear given differences in their preferences for insurance, their attachment to particular employers, and broader labor market forces.



    Current Proposals

    This section focuses on bills that have received committee or floor action or that otherwise are the subject of discussion. It identifies other relevant bills that have been introduced but may not include all of them. In a typical Congress, there may be several hundred tax measures pertaining to health insurance and expenses, not all of which are easily tracked. In addition, the Legislative Information System (LIS), the principal source of information for this section, sometimes does not include bills for a number of days after their introduction.

    A list of all bills on a particular topic (e.g., tax credits for health insurance) is available to congressional staff through the LIS. The Advanced Search link in the middle of the screen enables users to search for terms such as "'Internal Revenue Code' AND 'health insurance' AND 'credit.'" Often it is helpful to restrict searches to terms that are likely to be in close proximity to each other in the bills. For example, the previous search might be modified to "'Internal Revenue Code' AND 'health insurance' adj/7 'credit'." Whatever the search terms, it is not unusual to miss relevant bills and turn up others that are irrelevant. For assistance, call the CRS inquiry number at 7-5700.

    In considering bills on a particular topic, it is important to take account of whether the legislation would also make other changes to health care financing (e.g., by authorizing the sale of insurance across state lines) or to the tax system (e.g., by changing the definition of dependents or reducing tax rates). The effect of one provision could differ substantially depending on the scope of these other changes.

    Some changes might occur through legislation that ostensibly has little to do with a particular topic. For example, a tax credit for health insurance could increase the number of health savings accounts by enabling currently uninsured people to purchase qualifying high deductible insurance. Similarly, capping the exclusion for employer-paid insurance could increase the number of people who claim the medical expense deduction because they would have more unreimbursed expenses.



    Comprehensive Reform Proposals

    The 111 th Congress is considering comprehensive health care reform. A number of comprehensive reform bills have been introduced so far, some of which include significant tax provisions:


    ? H.R. 15 (Dingell) would establish national health insurance that is financed by a value added tax (a consumption tax levied at each stage of the production of a product or service).



    ? H.R. 193 (Stark) would establish nationally available insurance that is financed in part by employer contributions for their workers.



    ? H.R. 676 (Conyers) would establish a national system of health care that is financed in part by increasing income taxes on high income earners, a payroll tax on employers, and taxes on stock and bond transactions.



    ? H.R. 1200 (McDermott)/S. 703 (Sanders) would establish a state-based health system that is financed in part by a payroll tax on employers and an individual income tax surcharge.



    ? H.R. 1321 (Eshoo)/S. 391 (Wyden) would establish state-based private insurance that is financed in part by employer contributions, repeal on the tax exclusion on employer-paid coverage and the employer's deduction for that coverage (with some exceptions), and modifications of other tax benefit provisions. H.R. 1321 would also authorize a refundable tax credit for individuals' health insurance payments, while S. 391 would authorize a standard above-the-line deduction for those payments.



    ? H.R. 2399 (Langevin) would provide universal health insurance through a new program for everyone not eligible for employer coverage or certain public plans. The new program, for which there would be a refundable tax credit, would be financed in part by an excise tax on employers not offering coverage.



    ? H.R. 2520 (Ryan of Wisconsin)/S. 1099 (Coburn) would rely upon a less-restricted private market to make health insurance more affordable. It would repeal the tax exclusion for employer-provided coverage and authorize a new refundable tax credit.



    ? H.R. 3000 (Lee) would establish a national health insurance program for all individuals financed by a tax surcharge.



    ? S. 1240 (DeMint) would allow insurance regulated in a primary state to be sold elsewhere in the country and would authorize association health plans for small businesses. It would authorize a refundable individual tax credit.



    ? S. 1278 (Rockefeller) would establish a public health insurance plan available to all individuals.


    Some of these bills would eliminate existing tax subsidies for health insurance, such as the exclusion for employer provided coverage.

    The committees of principal jurisdiction for health care are working on comprehensive reform proposals. The Senate HELP Committee released a draft on June 9, while a coordinated measure by three House committees (Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means) was released on June 19. The Senate Finance Committee has not yet released a public draft. The HELP Committee draft did not include tax provisions related to health care aside from a penalty tax to enforce an individual mandate. 49 The House committees' draft also has a penalty tax for people without coverage, a requirement that employers either offer acceptable coverage or pay 8% of payroll into a health exchange trust fund, and a small business health insurance tax credit.

    Comprehensive reform is likely to be expensive, with initial 10-year estimates for the three committee proposals ranging from $1 trillion to more than $1.5 trillion, depending on their scope and details. More recent versions are said to be less expensive. Some of the cost may be offset by reductions in future Medicare and Medicaid spending, though unspecified tax increases are also being considered. The Senate Finance Committee released some policy options for tax changes on May 20. 50 For an analysis of some of these options, see CRS Report R40648, Tax Options for Financing Health Care Reform , by Jane G. Gravelle.



    Exclusion for Employer-Provided Insurance

    The federal income tax exclusion is criticized for several reasons. Since it reduces the after-tax cost of insurance, usually in ways that are not transparent, it likely encourages people to obtain more coverage than they otherwise would. Not being explicitly capped or limited, it does little to restrict the generosity of the insurance or annual premium increases. These attributes contribute to what some economists argue is a welfare (or efficiency) loss from excess health insurance for those with coverage; they also contribute to rising health care costs and spending. In addition, the exclusion often is criticized for giving greater tax savings to higher income individuals and families, an outcome that strikes many observers as wasteful and inequitable.

    However, these arguments involve complex issues, and other points and perspectives might be taken into account. The welfare loss may be difficult to gauge considering how consumers react to higher cost-sharing. Determining alternative tax benefits to replace the exclusion that would not share its faults or adversely affect people with high costs could be challenging. The larger tax savings to higher income people might not be inequitable but only a consequence of the proper treatment of losses under a progressive income tax. (For more discussion of these points, see CRS Report RL34767, The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Insurance: Policy Issues Regarding the Repeal Debate , by Bob Lyke.)

    In the 111 th Congress, the exclusion is being targeted as a way to finance health care reform. Completely eliminating the federal income tax exclusion would increase tax revenue by more than $130 billion a year, and more than $90 billion could be raised by eliminating the exclusion for employment taxes as well. 51 Bills that would eliminate the tax exclusion (with some exceptions) include H.R. 1321 (Eshoo), H.R. 2520 (Ryan of Wisconsin), H.R. 3000 (Lee), S. 391 (Wyden), S. 1099 (Coburn), and S. 1240 (DeMint), all of which are comprehensive reform proposals. Most of these bills would eliminate other health tax benefits as well.

    There are also proposals to cap the exclusion rather than eliminate it, though currently no bills have been introduced for this purpose. Capping the exclusion might be less controversial than elimination, though it would also raise less money for reform. Proposals to cap the exclusion often are aimed at coverage with generous or excessive benefits, thought these can be difficult to define. One complication in setting a cap is that the cost of insurance varies with geographic differences in the cost of health care and the health status and risk of the people who are insured. See CRS Report R40673, Limiting the Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Insurance: Background and Issues , by Bob Lyke and Chris L. Peterson.



    Definition of Medical Care

    H.R. 2105 (Kind) would allow up to $1,000 a year ($2,000 for married couples filing jointly) in qualified sports and fitness expenses to be considered medical care. This would affect deductions and credits for health care expenses, as well as the exclusion that applies to health insurance benefits.

    Expanding the definition of medical care would alter the line between what has generally been considered to be medical care under the Code (defined as amounts paid "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body") 52 and what simply contributes to healthy living. Some health care reform proposals include provisions to encourage better health, and there is something to be said for providing tax subsidies for activities that are generally thought to do this. However, it sometimes can be difficult to justify including certain expenditures (exercise in this instance) without including others (diet foods and nutritional supplements, for example).



    Expanded Tax Deduction

    In the 111 th Congress, several bills have been introduced that would expand the deduction allowed for health insurance and other unreimbursed expenses, which currently is available only to those who itemize and to the extent the expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income (AGI).

    H.R. 502 (Bachman) and H.R. 1495 (Paul) would remove the AGI floor from the itemized deduction for health insurance and unreimbursed medical care costs. H.R. 99 (Dreier) would remove the floor only for those ages 65 and over who are not covered by an employer plan.

    S. 207 (Boxer) and H.R. 198 (Stearns) would allow an above-the-line deduction (that is, one not limited to itemizers) for health insurance expenses. The Stearns bill would also allow this deduction for unreimbursed prescription drug costs.

    S. 391 (Wyden) would establish a standard above-the-line deduction for health insurance, that is, a set amount (depending on filing status) that all taxpayers could claim. The standard deduction is part of the Senator's comprehensive reform proposal.

    H.R. 1203 (Van Hollen) and S. 491 (Webb) would allow an above-the-line deduction of Tricare supplemental premiums.

    The principal argument for expanding the tax deduction for health insurance is equity; it would allow people who purchase individual market insurance to receive tax savings roughly equivalent (in the case of an above-the-line deduction) to those of workers who exclude employer-provided coverage. (The deduction would not offset employment taxes that people with individual market insurance must pay on the income they use to pay the premiums.) However, an expended deduction would provide little or no savings to lower income taxpayers since they either have no taxable income (due to the standard deduction and personal exemptions) or it is taxed at low marginal rates.



    Self-Employed Deduction

    H.R. 533 (Neuberger), H.R. 1470 (Kind), H.R. 1763 (Latta), and S. 725 (Bingaman) would allow self-employed taxpayers to subtract their health insurance costs in determining their selfemployment taxes. Under current law, self-employed taxpayers may deduct these costs on their income taxes, but not self-employment taxes for Social Security and Medicare. H.R. 1763 would also allow Health Savings Account contributions to be deducted in determining self-employment taxes.

    The principal argument for allowing this deduction is that taxpayers who have employer-provided coverage can exclude employer contributions from their Social Security and Medicare taxes. The different treatment seems inequitable. However, most self-employed taxpayers can choose health insurance plans that are to their advantage, which employees generally cannot, and self-employed taxpayers sometimes could be classified as employees (and thus eligible for the exclusion) if they organized their business under a different legal form.



    Cafeteria Plans

    S. 988 (Snowe) would make it easier for small businesses to establish cafeteria plans by modifying the nondiscrimination requirements for firms with 100 or fewer employees and allowing self-employed people to be considered employees for purposes of participating.



    Premium Conversion

    Several bills have been introduced in the 111 th Congress to allow federal retirees to pay for their share of Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) premiums on a pretax basis: H.R. 1203 (Van Hollen) and S. 491 (Webb).

    The principal argument for premium conversion for federal retirees is that it is allowed for active federal workers, who in addition generally have higher incomes. On the other hand, it would seem difficult to justify extending premium conversion to federal retirees and not retirees with private sector or state or local government retiree health insurance. Extending premium conversion to other retiree groups would greatly increase the revenue loss of this proposal.

    H.R. 1413 (Crowley) would allow retired public employees in general to pay up to $3,000 of qualified health insurance premiums from their pensions on a pretax basis each year, similar to what is now allowed for certain retired public safety officers. In addition, the bill would convert the exclusion that is available under current law to an above-the-line deduction and also index the allowable amount for inflation.



    Flexible Spending Accounts

    Several 111 th Congress bills allow limited unused amounts in FSAs to be carried over to the following year, contributed to an HSA, or contributed to a qualified retirement account (depending on the particular bill): H.R. 544 (Royce), H.R. 1495 (Paul), and S. 988 (Snowe). S. 988 would modify FSA rules in other respects as well, and it would impose a ceiling on the amount that individuals could put into the accounts (for example, $7,500 in the case of one individual).

    The principal argument for allowing carryovers and rollovers is that taxpayers might be more willing to participate in FSAs if unused balances at the end of the year were not lost. Allowing carryovers or rollovers might also discourage participants from spending remaining balances carelessly, just to use them up.
    California IOUs: Use It To Pay Taxes

    On July 7, 2009, the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) announced payment of current and past due personal and corporate taxes with California registered warrants (IOUs) is acceptable

    By law, FTB cannot deposit the IOU until it is payable, but FTB will credit your account on the date the IOU is received to stop the accrual of interest. If the IOU is not sufficient to pay the outstanding balance, you should send an additional payment for the difference.


    The Texas Supreme Court won't review two recent tax cases

    Today's Orders from the Texas Supreme Court denied taxpayer petitions for review in two tax cases. The first denial was in a sales tax case, Reynolds Metals Company v. Combs, et al., originally decided by the Third Court of Appeals on February 4th and discussed on this site in a post captioned "The legislative acceptance doctrine won't always defeat a Comptroller policy." The Court later withdrew its original opinion and substituted its April 8th Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing (reachable by the link above).

    The second denied petition for review was in an ad valorem (property) tax case, ICAN Enterprise Inc., et al., v. Williamson County Appraisal District, et al., also decided by the Third Court of Appeals. The Court's Opinion (reachable via the link) was issued on April 17th and was discussed in a prior post captioned "The lease of a city-owned hangar is taxable when the hangar is used to store aircraft."

    The Texas Supreme Court's denial of review is usually the last stop for state and local tax cases in Texas. Of course, there's always the possibility that the Texas Supreme Court will change its mind on a motion for rehearing, or that the United States Supreme Court will decide to take one or both cases. Those are extremely long shots, however, so businesses and their tax counsel with an interest in either of these cases should assume that they're now final.


    The Texas Supreme Court won't reveiew two recent tax cases

    Today's Orders from the Texas Supreme Court denied taxpayer petitions for review in two tax cases. The first denial was in a sales tax case, Reynolds Metals Company v. Combs, et al., originally decided by the Third Court of Appeals on February 4th and discussed on this site in a post captioned "The legislative acceptance doctrine won't always defeat a Comptroller policy." The Court later withdrew its original opinion and substituted its April 8th Memorandum Opinion on Rehearing (reachable by the link above).

    The second denied petition for review was in an ad valorem (property) tax case, ICAN Enterprise Inc., et al., v. Williamson County Appraisal District, et al., also decided by the Third Court of Appeals. The Court's Opinion (reachable via the link) was issued on April 17th and was discussed in a prior post captioned "The lease of a city-owned hangar is taxable when the hangar is used to store aircraft."

    The Texas Supreme Court's denial of review is usually the last stop for state and local tax cases in Texas. Of course, there's always the possibility that the Texas Supreme Court will change its mind on a motion for rehearing, or that the United States Supreme Court will decide to take one or both cases. Those are extremely long shots, however, so businesses and their tax counsel with an interest in either of these cases should assume that they're now final.


    UBS Offshore Accounts to Be Protected by Swiss Government from IRS Tax Evasion Investigation

    The Swiss government has threatened to seize UBS summons lawsuit pending in District Court in Miami, Florida.

    Does this mean that U.S. taxpayers who have tax fraud or John Doe summons case there are numerous other ways it can come to the attention of the IRS. For example, most offshore bank account records, which the Germans in turn handed over to the IRS.

    U.S. citizens and residents who have Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) penalties equal to 50% of the balance in their account.

    If you have an tax lawyer to understand your options, and see if the IRS tax litigation attorneys at Brager Tax Law Group, A P.C. please call us.


    Massachusetts Retailers Continue Push for Tax Law Change
    Retailers are making a push on Beacon Hill to nix tax regulations they say penalize big retail chains that are based in Massachusetts. Right now, retailers that are anchored in the state are taxed based on their Massachusetts-apportioned income, which takes into account sales, property, and payroll. But the Bay State-based corporations back a bill pushed [...]
    Louisiana Gov. Approves $4.9 Million in Tax Breaks
    Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal approved $4.9 million in tax breaks for ports, sportsmen and other groups for this year, though that figure will balloon to an estimated $30.3 million in 2010 when additional tax breaks take effect. In all, Jindal on Thursday signed nine tax-break bills, most of which don’t take effect until July 1, 2010: [...]
    Notice 2009-58 , I.R.B. 2009-30, July 10, 2009.


    The IRS has issued interim guidance on the procedures that manufacturers must use to certify a vehicle as eligible for the new specified qualified plug-in electric vehicle credit under Code Sec. 30. Guidance is also provided to purchasers of qualified vehicles regarding reliance on the manufacturer's certification in claiming the credit.


    SECTION 1. PURPOSE

    This notice sets forth interim guidance, pending the issuance of regulations, relating to the qualified plug-in electric vehicle credit under ? 30 of the Internal Revenue Code. Specifically, this notice provides procedures for a vehicle manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) to certify to the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") that a vehicle of a particular make, model, and model year meets the requirements that must be satisfied to claim the new specified plug-in electric vehicle credit under ? 30.

    This notice also provides guidance to taxpayers who purchase vehicles regarding the conditions under which they may rely on the vehicle manufacturer's (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor's) certification in determining whether a credit is allowable with respect to the vehicle. The Service and the Treasury Department expect that the regulations will incorporate the rules set forth in this notice.



    SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

    Section 30 provides for a credit for qualified plug-in electric vehicles. The credit is an amount equal to 10 percent of the cost of a qualified plug-in electric vehicle placed in service by the taxpayer during the taxable year. Section 30(b) limits the amount of the credit allowed for a vehicle to $2,500.



    SECTION. SCOPE OF NOTICE

    The qualified plug-in electric vehicle credit applies to new specified plug-in electric vehicles that are acquired after February 17, 2009, and before January 1, 2012, and that otherwise meet the requirements of ? 30. No credit is allowed under ? 30 for a vehicle that is acquired after February 17, 2009, and before January 1, 2010, if the credit for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles under ? 30D is allowable for that vehicle. The credit for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles applies for vehicles placed in service in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. Guidance regarding the credit under ? 30D for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles that are acquired before January 1, 2010, is provided in Notice 2009-54, I.R.B. 2009-26. Guidance regarding the credit under ? 30D for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles that are acquired after December 31, 2009 will be provided in a separate notice.



    SECTION 4. MEANING OF TERMS

    The following definitions apply for purposes of this notice:

    .01 In General. Terms used in this notice and not defined in this section 4 have the same meaning as when used in ? 30.

    .02 Battery Capacity. The term "battery capacity" means the quantity of electricity that the battery is capable of storing, expressed in kilowatt hours, as measured from a 100 percent state of charge to a zero percent state of charge.

    .03 Specified Vehicle. The term "specified vehicle" means any vehicle that:

    (a) Is a low-speed vehicle as defined in section 4.04 of this notice, or

    (b) Has two or three wheels.

    .04 Low Speed Vehicle. The term "low speed vehicle" means a vehicle:

    (1) That has at least four wheels;

    (2) That is manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads and highways (not including a vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails);

    (3) That is not manufactured primarily for off-road use, such as primarily for use on a golf course;

    (4) Whose speed attainable in one mile is more than 20 miles per hour and not more than 25 miles per hour on a paved level surface; and

    (5) Whose gross vehicle weight rating is less than 3,000 pounds.

    .05 Model Year. The term "model year" means the model year determined under the Clean Air Act regulations (see 40 CFR ? 86-082-2).



    Section 5. MANUFACTURER'S CERTIFICATION

    .01 When Certification Permitted. A vehicle manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) may certify to purchasers that a vehicle of a particular make, model, and (if applicable) model year meets all requirements (other than those listed in section 5.02 of this notice) that must be satisfied to claim the qualified plug-in electric vehicle credit allowable under ? 30 with respect to the vehicle, if the following requirements are met:

    (1) The manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) has submitted to the Service, in accordance with this section 5, a certification with respect to the vehicle and the certification satisfies the requirements of section 5.03 of this notice; and

    (2) The manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) has received an acknowledgment of the certification from the Service.

    .02 Purchaser's Reliance. Except as provided in section 5.05 of this notice, a purchaser of a vehicle may rely on the manufacturer's (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor's) certification concerning the vehicle (including cases in which the certification is received after the purchase of the vehicle). The purchaser may claim a credit with respect to a vehicle if the following requirements are satisfied:

    (1) The vehicle is acquired after February 17, 2009, and on or before December 31, 2011;

    (2) The original use of the vehicle commences with the taxpayer;

    (3) The vehicle is acquired for use or lease by the taxpayer, and not for resale;

    (4) The vehicle is used predominantly in the United States.

    .03 Content of Certification. The certification must contain the information required in section 5.03(1) of this notice and any applicable additional information required in section 5.03(2) of this notice.

    (1) All Vehicles. For all vehicles, the certification must contain the following information:


    (a) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the certifying entity;



    (b) The make, model and (if applicable) model year, and any other appropriate identifiers of the vehicle;



    (c) A statement that the vehicle is made by a manufacturer;



    (d) The gross vehicle weight rating of the vehicle;



    (e) A statement that the vehicle is propelled to a significant extent by an electric motor which draws electricity from a battery;



    (f) The number of wheels that the vehicle has;



    (g) The kilowatt hour capacity of the battery;



    (h) A statement that the battery is capable of being recharged from an external source of electricity;


    (i) A statement that the vehicle is manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, and is not manufactured primarily for off-road use;

    (j) A description of the motor vehicle safety provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part 571 applicable to the vehicle and a statement that the vehicle complies with those provisions; and

    (k) A declaration, applicable to the certification, statements, and any accompanying documents, signed by a person currently authorized to bind the manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) in these matters, in the following form: "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this certification, including accompanying documents, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented in support of this certification are true, correct, and complete."

    (2) Low Speed Vehicles. A certification with respect to a low speed vehicle as defined in section 4.04 of this notice must also contain the following:

    (a) A statement that the vehicle is a low speed vehicle within the meaning of section 571.3 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on February 17, 2009), and

    (b) A specific statement that the maximum speed attainable by the vehicle in 1 mile is more than 20 miles per hour but not more than 25 miles per hour on a paved level surface.

    .04 Acknowledgement of Certification. The Service will review the original signed certification and issue an acknowledgment letter to the vehicle manufacturer (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor) within 30 days of receipt of the request for certification. This acknowledgment letter will state whether purchasers may rely on the certification.

    .05 Effect of Erroneous Certification. The acknowledgment that the Service provides for a certification is not a determination that a vehicle qualifies for the credit. If the Service, upon examination (and after any appropriate consultation with the Department of Transportation or the Environmental Protection Agency), determines that the vehicle is not a qualified plug-in electric vehicle, the manufacturer's (or, in the case of a foreign vehicle manufacturer, its domestic distributor's) right to provide a certification to future purchasers of plug-in electric vehicles will be withdrawn. Purchasers who acquire vehicles after the date on which the Service publishes an announcement of the withdrawal may not rely on the certification. Purchasers may continue to rely on the certification for vehicles they acquired on or before the date on which the announcement of the withdrawal is published (including in cases in which the vehicle is not placed in service and the credit is not claimed until after that date), and the Service will not attempt to collect any understatement of tax liability attributable to such reliance. Manufacturers (or, in the case of foreign vehicle manufacturers, their domestic distributors) are reminded that an erroneous certification may result in the imposition of penalties, including, but not limited to, the following:

    (1) Under ? 7206 for fraud and making false statements; and

    (2) Under ? 6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability in the amount of $1,000 ($10,000 in the case of understatements by corporations) per return on which a credit is claimed in reliance on the certification.



    Section 6. TIME AND ADDRESS FOR FILING CERTIFICATION

    .01 Time for Filing Certification. In order for a certification under section 5 of this notice to be effective for qualified plug-in electric vehicles placed in service during a calendar year, the certification must be received by the Service not later than December 31 of that calendar year.

    .02 Address for Filing. Certifications under section 5 of this notice must be sent to:

    Internal Revenue Service

    Industry Director, LMSB, Heavy Manufacturing & Transportation

    Metro Park Office Complex - LMSB

    111 Wood Avenue, South

    Iselin, New Jersey 08830



    Section 7. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

    The collection of information contained in this notice has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under control number 1545-2150.

    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

    The collections of information in this notice are in sections 5 and 6. This information is required to be collected and retained in order to ensure that vehicles meet the requirements for the qualified plug-in electric vehicle credit under ? 30. This information will be used to determine whether the vehicle for which the credit is claimed by a taxpayer is property that qualifies for the credit. The collection of information is voluntary to obtain a benefit. The likely respondents are corporations and partnerships.

    The estimated total annual reporting burden is 250 hours.

    The estimated annual burden per respondent varies from 6 hours to 12 hours, depending on individual circumstances, with an estimated average burden of 10 hours to complete the certification required under this notice. The estimated number of respondents is 25.

    The estimated annual frequency of responses is on occasion.

    Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.



    SECTION 8. DRAFTING INFORMATION

    The principal author of this notice is Patrick S. Kirwan of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice contact Mr. Kirwan at (202) 622-3110 (not a toll-free call).
    Tips To Start A New Business

    Starting a new business? Be aware of your federal tax responsibilities. Here are the top six things the IRS wants you to know if you plan on opening a new business this year. Also be sure and look at the IRS website for more information.

    1. Decide the type of business entity you are going to establish either in California or some other state (such as Nevada or Delaware). The most common types of business are the sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation and S corporation.

    2. The type of business you operate in California determines which tax form you have to file, what taxes you must pay and how you pay them. The four general types of business taxes are income tax, self-employment tax, employment tax and excise tax.

    3. Generally, businesses need an EIN. An Employer Identification Number is used to identify a business entity. You can also apply for an EIN online at IRS.gov.

    4. Good records are necessary. Which recordkeeping system is suited to your business is up to you so long as it shows your income and expenses. Except in a few cases, the law does not require any special kind of records. However, the business you are in affects the type of records you need to keep for federal tax purposes.

    5. As a business taxpayer, you must figure taxable income on an annual accounting period called a tax year. The calendar year and the fiscal year are the most common tax years used.

    6. You must also use a consistent accounting method, which is a set of rules for determining when to report income and expenses. The most commonly used accounting methods are the cash method and an accrual method. Under the cash method, you generally report income in the tax year you receive it and deduct expenses in the tax year you pay them. Under an accrual method, you generally report income in the tax year you earn it and deduct expenses in the tax year you incur them.

    Want to incorporate? Create an LLC? Call a business attorney. Call Mitchell A. Port at (310) 559-5259.


    Time running out on federal estate-tax law
    Federal estate-tax laws are on a collision course with chaos in 2010, thanks to an old piece of legislation that’s on schedule to come to full fruition less than six months from now. Many estate-planning experts don’t believe Congress and the White House will let matters transpire as mandated by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief [...]
    Civil fraud case under section 6663

    [T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-107]
    Jerome Francis Schmitt v. Commissioner.

    Docket No. 7249-06S . Filed July 13, 2009.

    [ Code Sec. 6663]

    An individual who improperly claimed deductions for employee business expenses and submitted false documents at trial was liable for the fraud penalty. The false documents were ostensibly from the taxpayer's employer and stated that the employer did not have an expense reimbursement policy for employees. However, the IRS established that the employer did have a reimbursement policy and that the taxpayer had received reimbursement for his expenses. Thus, the IRS provided clear and convincing evidence that part of the taxpayer's underpayments for the years at issue was due to fraud and the taxpayer failed to establish that any portion of the underpayments was not due to fraud.

    DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.



    Respondent determined for 2001 a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax of $4,456, a fraud penalty under section 6663 of $2,815, and in the alternative an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 of $128. Respondent determined for 2002 a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax of $5,192, a fraud penalty under section 6663 of $2,714, and in the alternative an accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 of $315.



    Petitioner presented no argument or evidence with respect to any of the adjustments that result in the deficiencies for either year. He is deemed to have conceded those items. See Bradley v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 367, 370 (1993); Sundstrand Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, 344 (1991); Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988).



    The issue remaining for decision is whether petitioner is liable for the fraud penalty, or in the alternative the accuracy-related penalty, for 2001 or 2002.





    Background



    None of the facts have been stipulated. The exhibits received in evidence are incorporated herein by reference. When the petition was filed, petitioner was living in New York.



    Petitioner timely filed his Federal income tax returns for 2001 and 2002. Petitioner marketed telecommunication services in the New York City area during the years at issue. On his income tax returns petitioner itemized his deductions and filed Forms 2106, Employee Business Expenses, claiming, before the application of the 2-percent floor of section 67(a), employee business expenses of $15,008 for 2001 and $14,778 for 2002. On line 7 of the forms, "reimbursements received from your employer", petitioner indicated zero.



    Respondent selected petitioner's tax return for examination. Revenue Agent Richard Lebrando (Lebrando) sent an appointment letter to petitioner to begin the examination.



    Petitioner appeared for the initial examination meeting accompanied by his return preparer. Lebrando asked petitioner for substantiation of his employee business expenses and charitable contributions as shown on his Schedule A, Itemized Deductions. Petitioner provided to Lebrando a typewritten statement asserting that petitioner marketed telecommunications services and that "My company didn't have [sic] reimbursement policy." Upon receipt of petitioner's statement, Lebrando asked petitioner to supply him with a letter or other documentation from his employer to corroborate the written statement.



    Petitioner provided Lebrando with an undated document bearing an apparent letterhead with the name "Primus Telecommunications Group, Inc." (Primus), in response to the agent's document request. The document states that petitioner was employed as a "Senior Account Executive" with the company in 2001 1 and that Primus "had no stated reimbursement policy for their expenses at that time." The document is signed by a Steve Garcia, "Sales Manager". Lebrando thought the document appeared suspect because the letterhead looked just like the top of the Web site of Primus.



    Lebrando contacted Primus and solicited a copy of its reimbursement policy. Primus forwarded to Lebrando a copy of its "Financial Policy And Procedure Manual" dated February 1, 2001. The first paragraph of the manual states: "Employees will be reimbursed for actual and reasonable expenses incurred while traveling or conducting business on behalf of the Company or attending mandatory Company meetings." Primus's human resources (HR) department informed Lebrando by letter 2 that Steven Garcia was an account executive whose manager was Richard Cadiz. The HR department enclosed copies of petitioner's signed reimbursement requests for travel expenses for 2001.



    Lebrando expanded his examination to include 2002. Petitioner informed Lebrando that his employer in 2002 was not the same as in 2001. Petitioner provided Lebrando with a document indicating that it was from "Broadview Networks" (Broadview). 3 The undated document states that Broadview employed petitioner as an account executive in 2002 and that "Broadview Networks, Inc, had no stated reimbursement policy for their expenses at that time." The document bears the signature of a William Cory, "Sales Director".



    Lebrando contacted Broadview and obtained from the company's comptroller a copy of its 30-page expense reimbursement policy effective for 2002. The comptroller reported to Lebrando by letter that the statement in petitioner's document that Broadview had no reimbursement policy "is completely untrue." The comptroller also reported that Broadview "has never employed a Sales Director named William Cory."



    Petitioner attempted to substantiate his mileage with documents entitled "Log of Miles Driven" for 2001 and 2002. The document for 2001 purports to cover the period from January 4 through April 12, 2001. The document for 2002 lists dates from January 7 through October 28, 2002. The documents show the categories of "Contact Name & Address", miles driven "Per Mapquest", and "Tolls/Parking".



    Petitioner provided a similar document as substantiation for his entertainment and meals expenses for 2001. Lebrando attempted to match the dates and locations on the mileage log with those on the entertainment and meals expense log to no avail. No similar log was provided for 2002, but petitioner did submit copies of American Express card statements, with certain amounts circled for the period April 9 through December 6, 2002. He did not explain the significance of the circled items. There were charges on the statements for both petitioner and Alice E. Schmitt. For May 5, 2002, petitioner circled charges for food and beverages purchased in both Springfield, Virginia, and New York.



    At trial petitioner was disruptive and refused to cooperate with either respondent or the Court.





    Discussion




    Addition to Tax for Fraud


    The Commissioner has the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Sec. 7454(a); Rule 142(b); Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654 (1990).



    As part of his burden in the trial of a fraud case, the Commissioner must first prove an underpayment of some amount of tax. Sec. 6663(a); 4 Hebrank v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 640, 642 (1983). To do this, the Commissioner may not merely rely on a taxpayer's failure to disprove the deficiency determination. Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 660-661.



    Second, the Commissioner must show that at least some part of the underpayment of tax was due to fraud. Sec. 6663(a); Rule 142(b); DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 664; Hebrank v. Commissioner, supra. If the Commissioner establishes that some portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire underpayment shall be treated as attributable to fraud, except with respect to any portion of the underpayment that the taxpayer establishes is not attributable to fraud. Sec. 6663(b).



    The Commissioner will meet his burden of proof if it is shown that the taxpayer intended to evade a tax known to be due and owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent tax collection. Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d 1002, 1004-1005 (3d Cir. 1968); Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 661; Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123 (1983). The existence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration of the entire record. DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 874. The Commissioner may prove fraud by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of the taxpayer's intent is rarely available. Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995, 1005-1006 (1982), affd. per curiam 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984).



    Intent to mislead or conceal may be inferred from a pattern of conduct. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943). A pattern of consistent underreporting of income for several years, especially when accompanied by other circumstances showing intent to conceal, is strong evidence of fraud. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 664. An implausible explanation of behavior is also a "badge of fraud". Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-601.



    The Court, however, will not sustain a determination of fraud based only on circumstances that at most create only the suspicion of fraudulent intent. Katz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1130, 1144 (1988); Green v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 538, 550 (1976); Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 569, 608 (1973).



    Respondent has shown that petitioner failed to report the receipt of $2,639.73 of income reported on Form 1099-R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., in 2002 and claimed deductions for unreimbursed employee business for which he lacked proper substantiation for both 2001 and 2002. Respondent has shown that petitioner underpaid his taxes for both years.



    For both years petitioner deducted relatively large amounts of employee business expenses for which he failed to produce appropriate substantiation. Petitioner, on his tax returns, stated that he had received no reimbursements from his employers for his employee business expenses. Respondent, however, obtained records from one of his employers that show that petitioner in fact received reimbursement for expenses in 2001 pursuant to his employer's written reimbursement policy. During the examination of both his 2001 and 2002 returns, petitioner submitted false documents to Lebrando concerning his employers' reimbursement policies. Petitioner's submission of the false documents is evidence of guilty knowledge that he could have received or did receive expense reimbursements and falsified his tax returns to wrongfully obtain tax deductions.



    The Court holds that respondent has produced clear and convincing evidence that part of each underpayment of tax for 2001 and 2002 was due to fraud under section 6663. Since petitioner has not shown that any portion of the underpayment for each year is not due to fraud, the entire underpayment shall be treated as attributable to fraud. 5 Sec. 6663(b).



    To reflect the foregoing,



    Decision will be entered for respondent.


    1 Petitioner attached to his 2001 Federal income tax return a Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, from Primus showing wages of $31,337.54.

    2 The letterhead on the human resources letter differed from that of the document that petitioner had supplied to Lebrando.

    3 Petitioner attached to his 2002 Federal income tax return a Form W-2 from Broadview Network reporting wages of $61,359.93.

    4 Former sec. 6653 was repealed and replaced in part by sec. 6663. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, sec. 7721(a), (c)(1), 103 Stat. 2395, 2399.

    5 The accuracy-related penalty under sec. 6662(a) does not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which the fraud penalty under sec. 6663 applies. Sec. 6662(b).


    NON: TCS01 TCSO2009-107 http://tax.cchgroup.com/network&JA=LK&fNoSplash=Y&&LKQ=GUID:f328a007-efd6-3a84-9ecb-448cc6d008c1&KT=L&fNoLFN=TRUE& TCS01 #4 [TCS01 ]
    Los Angeles Times Discusses Estate Planning

    The LA Times ran an article on July 14 which in part discussed the risks and benefits of preparing a do-it-yourself Will in California or using cheap online sources for estate planning documents. It also discussed when using an estate planning attorney and paying a higher fee makes sense. Here's the full article.


    UBS Offshore Bank Account Hearing Delayed

    The hearing on the tax fraud through the use of tax fraud. Generally, under the terms of the existing treaty with Switzerland, the IRS must have evidence of tax evasion before the Swiss will turn over Swiss bank accounts at UBS. According to offshore financial account must report that TD F 90-22.1 Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR) form.

    The key question that remains is whether the announcement suggests that individuals with tax amnesty, or continue to hope that UBS will not be forced to turn over the names.

    Given the potential for tax fraud; not to mention an offshore bank account, this question can only be answered after consultation with a knowledgeable tax litigation attorney at the Brager Tax Law Group, please give us a call.


    Business expense deductions claimed by a married couple were denied for combination business and pleasure travel because the taxpayers failed to show how much time was spent on each trip for business and for pleasure and, therefore, did not establish that a trip's primary purpose was for business. The taxpayers also failed to show which expenses were properly allocable to business-related activities. The couple's business expense deductions for rent paid by the wife's business for office space in the couple's home were improper because there was no proof of a bona fide rental agreement and the purported rental was not at arm's length.


    A married couple was denied deductions for cash contributions made in amounts less than $250.00, because they provided no canceled checks or other reliable evidence of the amount paid or the recipient of the donations.



    A married couple was denied deductions for business expenses and charitable contributions, which resulted in a substantial underpayment of income tax. The accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662(a) was properly imposed because the IRS met its burden of production by showing there was a substantial understatement of income tax and the couple failed to show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. At trial, they admitted to incorrectly deducting personal items as business expenses, such as travel with relatives and personal use of business products, and they deducted rental expenses for a home office, even though there was no written rental agreement and the area was used to watch TV and relax.


    Leland B. and Brenda J. Bruns v. Commissioner.

    Dkt. No. 6881-07 , TC Memo. 2009-168, July 14, 2009.



    [ Code Sec. 162]



    MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION



    VASQUEZ, Judge: Respondent determined a $10,695 deficiency in and a $2,139 section 6662(a) 1 penalty on petitioners' 2003 Federal income tax. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioners are entitled to deductions claimed; and (2) whether petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).





    FINDINGS OF FACT



    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, the supplemental stipulation of facts, and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time they filed the petition, petitioners resided in South Dakota.



    Petitioner Brenda Bruns (Mrs. Bruns), Joetta Swanhorst (Mrs. Bruns's mother), and Heather Mitzel (petitioners' daughter) are the partners of ABS Associates (ABS). 2 Mrs. Bruns is entitled to 100 percent of the profits and losses of ABS. Petitioner Leland Bruns (Mr. Bruns) is not a partner of ABS.



    ABS is an independent distributor of Shaklee Corp. (Shaklee), which produces nutritional and cleaning products. The Shaklee business model allows distributors of products to earn income in three ways: (1) Distributors earn income from purchasing Shaklee products at a wholesale price and reselling them at a higher price; (2) distributors are paid commissions on the purchases of distributors in their group; 3 and (3) distributors receive bonuses on the purchases of leaders they develop. Leaders are distributors who generate sales of $2,000 per month or more. ABS is a leader, has developed 12 leaders, and has approximately 500 to 600 customers, not counting the customers of other distributors or leaders that ABS trained.



    ABS holds customer meetings to look for potential distributors. In the lower level of petitioners' personal residence, petitioners keep a small inventory of Shaklee products, equipment, and sales aides used in training and development. Customers and distributors come to the lower level of petitioners' home to get products and receive coaching.



    During 2003 ABS earned $77,547 from its activities related to the distribution of Shaklee products. 4 On Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, ABS reported gross income of $78,570 and net income of $60,570 after taking an $18,000 deduction for rent paid. All income from ABS was distributed to Mrs. Bruns, and she reported this income on petitioners' 2003 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return.




    Schedule C Expenses


    On petitioners' Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, attached to their 2003 Form 1040, petitioners claimed expenses of $44,975 paid during 2003, which resulted from Mrs. Bruns' work for ABS in the distribution and sale of Shaklee products. Petitioners were issued a notice of deficiency that disallowed some of the expenses claimed on that Schedule C. The following is a table of reported expenses, the amount of each expense allowed after examination, and the amount disallowed:





    Amount
    Item Claimed Allowed Disallowed

    Advertising $4,854 $1,361 $3,493

    Car and truck
    expenses 2,238 798 1,440

    Commissions and fees 495 495 --

    Contract labor 1,490 -- 1,490

    Depreciation 1,500 1,500 --

    Insurance 47 47 --

    Other interest 101 101 --

    Legal and
    professional services 679 679 --

    Business (office)
    expenses 9,545 1,331 8,214

    Rent or lease
    --vehicle, machinery,
    and equipment 5,968 3,647 2,321

    Taxes and licenses 635 635 --

    Travel 4,253 2,526 1,727

    Meals and
    entertainment 2,582 1,192 1,390

    Other expenses 1 10,588 8,588 2 2,000

    Total 44,975 22,900 22,075

    1 This amount is the total of the following claimed business
    expenses: Freight postage expenses of $988, business phone
    expenses of $4,684, cleaning expenses of $175, books/publications
    subscription expenses of $304, meeting expenses of $952, sales
    aids expenses of $1,390, bank charge expenses of $95, and image
    expense of $2,000.

    2 This disallowed amount is the complete disallowance of
    petitioners' claimed "image" expense of $2,000.






    1. Advertising Expenses


    Petitioners claimed deductions for advertising expenses of $4,854; respondent allowed $1,361 and disallowed $3,493. The $1,361 deduction allowed includes $500 respondent determined petitioners were entitled to for advertising-related gifts worth $25 apiece to 20 individuals.



    Shaklee leaves advertising up to distributors and does not advertise or market its products. ABS does not advertise in the phonebook or on the Internet; instead, Mrs. Bruns goes out and meets customers' families and friends to sell Shaklee products. She then rewards customers who go out and talk up the product, who have provided consistent business or increased their volume of products sold, and who have been willing to introduce her to their families and friends. As a reward Mrs. Bruns will give books, movies, cards, jewelry, flowers, and food. Mrs. Bruns' reward criteria are that the person be a good referral source, love the products, and be a consistent customer. Petitioners provided photocopies of receipts for gifts purchased by Mrs. Bruns and substantiated gifts to 26 individuals.



    Additionally, ABS paid to have newsletters, flyers, and pictures printed. Mrs. Bruns took pictures at Shaklee-related meetings and when she met with different groups of Shaklee customers, distributors, and leaders. She then sent the photos over the Internet and used them in presentations to show sales leaders' achievements with their group members. Petitioners submitted photocopies of receipts and invoices from Harold's Photo Centers, Office Max, Vista Print, and Express Copy & Printing for copies, a Nikon camera with accessories, photo development costs, and shipping labels. The receipts total $699.13. The camera purchased by ABS is used only for taking pictures of customers and has never been used by petitioners for personal purposes.




    2. Car and Truck Expenses


    Mrs. Bruns drove a passenger vehicle to and from activities related to the distribution and sale of Shaklee products. Petitioners claimed deductions for car-related expenses of $2,238; respondent allowed $798 and disallowed $1,440.



    Petitioners submitted photocopies of gasoline receipts, carwash receipts, and car repair/maintenance invoices and receipts. The gasoline receipts total $1,132.49, the carwash receipts total $115.20, and the car repair/maintenance invoices and receipts total $102.84.




    3. Contract Labor Expenses


    Petitioners claimed deductions for contract labor expenses of $1,490, and respondent disallowed the full amount. At trial petitioners conceded they are entitled only to a $910 deduction for contract labor.



    To substantiate the expenses for contract labor, petitioners submitted a Quicken printout that showed payments totaling $1,489.66 made to Robin Berg on numerous occasions, Cournie Gunderson on 1/14/03, Michelle Bruns on 2/1/03, Robin Ramsey on 3/21/03, Richie Clary on 4/16/03, and Brandon Carpet Cleaning on 11/15/03. Petitioners hired Robin Berg to clean their office and living space. No invoices or canceled checks were submitted to prove payment of contract labor expenses.




    4. Business Expenses


    Petitioners claimed deductions for business expenses of $9,545 incurred by Mrs. Bruns in distributing and selling Shaklee products; respondent allowed $1,331 and disallowed $8,214.



    Petitioners submitted photocopies of receipts totaling $7,619.17 to substantiate their claimed business expenses of $9,545. Petitioners submitted receipts for furniture, a portable CD player with speakers, supplies, refreshments, and decorations used by Mrs. Bruns in her role as a Shaklee salesperson. The furniture receipts were for display cases, storage and file cabinets, a table, a rubber floor cover, and a chair. There was a receipt for a portable CD player with speakers Mrs. Bruns used for training herself and others about Shaklee products when at home and when traveling. The supplies receipts were for pens, paper, tape, printing costs, and various other items. Petitioners also submitted receipts for refreshments, such as coffee and candy that Mrs. Bruns offered to customers, and receipts for seasonal decorations Mrs. Bruns put up in the space she devoted to meeting with customers and displaying Shaklee products.



    Although Mrs. Bruns often delivers Shaklee products to customers and meets with Shaklee distributors and leaders at restaurants, she does have customers, distributors, and leaders stop by her home. She maintains and displays a small inventory of Shaklee products in her home, and she receives and stores Shaklee products ordered by customers. Further, Mrs. Bruns keeps a desk and file cabinets which store Shaklee distribution and sales information. In another cabinet she stores Shaklee training tapes, CDs, and sales aids. Adjacent to that cabinet is a table used for customer appointments and business planning with distributors and leaders.




    5. Rent or Lease --Vehicle, Machinery, and Equipment


    Petitioners claimed and deducted vehicle leasing expenses of $5,968; respondent allowed $3,647 and disallowed $2,321. As a result of ABS' high volume of sales in 2003, ABS qualified for and participated in a car bonus program where ABS selected a car from Shaklee's lease program.



    Petitioners submitted monthly statements issued by Shaklee to ABS from December 2002 through November 2003. On each statement ABS earned a monthly $400 car bonus credit and incurred a monthly lease charge of $702.21 and a monthly insurance charge of $88.20. ABS paid these charges in advance (i.e., in December 2002, ABS made lease payments for January 2003).



    ABS' participation in the Shaklee bonus program resulted in a monthly car lease and insurance cost of $790.41 to ABS at a yearly cost of $9,484.92. This amount was subtracted from the direct deposit to ABS from Shaklee each month after the $400 car bonus was added as earnings. If ABS had not participated in Shaklee's car leasing program, ABS would have received $400 per month in cash.



    Petitioners drove two other vehicles in addition to the ABS car and reported having occasionally driven the ABS car for unrelated business matters. The ABS car was driven a total of 23,550 miles in 2003 and the total number of business miles petitioners claimed the car was driven in 2003 was 18,755. Mrs. Bruns calculated 79 percent business use for the car.



    Petitioners submitted a 2003 mileage log, a 2003 daily planner, and a list of abbreviations used in the mileage log and the daily planner. The mileage log lists the destination to which Mrs. Bruns drove, the person Mrs. Bruns met with, the miles driven to arrive at the location, and an abbreviation of the business purpose for the meeting. The business purposes stated included leaving information (such as literature or CDs), conducting a demonstration of products, delivering products, orienting new members, and conducting an overview of business with distributors and sales leaders. The mileage log reported 18,242 miles traveled for 2003 but failed to list the business purpose for 1,266 of the reported miles traveled.




    6. Travel Expenses


    Petitioners claimed deductions for travel expenses of $4,253; respondent allowed $2,526 and disallowed $1,727. Petitioners' Quicken printout reported travel expenses of $2,770.16. To substantiate the travel expenses, petitioners provided photocopies of receipts from hotel stays and a receipt from a travel agency. Because ABS has no territorial limitations, many of its customers are in States other than South Dakota. Petitioners wrote on the top of each photocopied receipt the purpose for the trip. The total of the photocopied receipts is $2,464.60. However, some of the receipts were missing a date, and one receipt was in Mr. Bruns' name.



    Respondent disallowed expense deductions for a trip for petitioners to see Kim and Mike Bruns, relatives and distributors for ABS. Respondent disallowed expense deductions for a trip to see Mrs. Bruns' mother, Joetta Swanhorst, a "bonus earner" for ABS who lives in a retirement community in Aberdeen, South Dakota. Petitioners seek to deduct the cost of a three-night hotel stay in Aberdeen, South Dakota. Respondent disallowed expense deductions for a trip to meet with Lori Kimball, a "bonus earner" for ABS who lives in Minnesota. Petitioners stayed in a hotel near her to spend time with her while they were in Minneapolis and provided a photocopy of a hotel receipt for $168.36 for two nights. Respondent disallowed expenses incurred in petitioners' overnight stay at the Radisson Encore Hotel on December 26, 2003. It was an "award bonus weekend" where petitioners stayed with six other persons, including petitioners' daughter, and shared with them the possible business opportunities in distributing Shaklee products. ABS paid for petitioners' and their daughter's rooms. Petitioners provided photocopies of their receipts for two rooms at the rate of $80.66 per night for staying overnight on December 26, 2003.



    Petitioners claimed a deduction of $144.15 for luggage used to carry Shaklee samples and supplies and submitted as substantiation a receipt that was missing the date of purchase and had no description of the item.



    Petitioners claimed a deduction of $201.40 for a handbag and a coin purse used to carry sales cards, name tags, and business cards. Petitioners provided photocopies of two receipts for $71.02 and $130.38; neither receipt contained a description of the items purchased.




    7. Meals and Entertainment Expenses


    Petitioners claimed a deduction of $2,582 5 for meals and entertainment expenses in 2003; respondent allowed $1,192 and disallowed $1,390. At trial Mrs. Bruns conceded that petitioners were entitled to a deduction of only $2,195 because she had realized her husband was not a partner of ABS and his meals were not deductible.



    To substantiate the meals and entertainment expense deductions, petitioners submitted photocopies of receipts from restaurants and grocery stores and a list of abbreviations used by Mrs. Bruns to reference the purpose of the meal. At the top of most of the receipts, Mrs. Bruns wrote a specific business purpose for incurring the expense. The business purposes included trips into Sioux Falls for Shaklee sales-related errands, nutrition talks, catalog presentations, leaving literature, business meetings with other Shaklee groups or leaders, product delivery or exchanges, bookkeeping, Shaklee products opportunity meetings (to attract new distributors), member orientations, appreciation of members, and delivering voice CDs about Shaklee products and about becoming a Shaklee distributor.



    The receipts petitioners submitted total $3,429.58. However, many of the receipts did not show proof of payment, lacked the date, or did not have a specific business purpose listed for the expense.



    Some of the receipts from restaurants were for meals costing less than $10. Mrs. Bruns admitted one of the receipts for a meal costing $9.60 was only for her meal although she did have the meal with a customer.




    8. Other Expenses


    Petitioners claimed deductions for other expenses of $10,588. Respondent disallowed an expense of $2,000 that petitioners incurred for "image". 6 Mrs. Bruns explained that the expense for product promotion reflected the cost of various products that she took from the inventory of ABS after it purchased them from Shaklee and that Mrs. Bruns personally tried, let others try, or gave away at gatherings. Mrs. Bruns personally tried new products to see whether she believed in the product and to figure out a way to promote it. Mrs. Bruns admitted some of the products were used for her personal care.



    In substantiating the claimed product promotion expense, petitioners submitted two invoices listing the product, the quantity, and the price of the item used for product promotion. The invoices showed that petitioners had used $6,822.24 in products. However, Mrs. Bruns asked the Court to disregard $1,124.76 worth of products listed on the invoice because they had been used for personal care. Petitioners claimed a deduction for product promotion after taking certain numbers from the two invoices and rounding the number to $2,000. In picking which items were used for personal care and which were used as demo products, Mrs. Bruns made an educated guess.




    Schedule E Expenses


    On Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, petitioners reported $18,000 of alleged rents received from ABS and related expenses of $3,471. The notice of deficiency disregarded the alleged rental agreement, decreased rents received by $18,000, and disallowed expenses claimed of $3,471. The notice of deficiency increased petitioners' other income by $18,000 to reflect the disregarded rental agreement. In disregarding the alleged rental of petitioners' home to ABS, the income of the partnership was increased by $18,000. Since Mrs. Bruns was entitled to 100 percent of the partnership's income and expenses, her income from the partnership was increased by $18,000 in 2003.



    ABS allegedly leased premises owned by petitioners for $1,500 a month. Petitioners and ABS had a month-to-month oral agreement in 2003, and ABS allegedly had leased space from petitioners for 13 or 14 years. ABS wrote monthly rent checks to Mr. Bruns. To substantiate this expense, petitioners submitted photocopies of checks written to Leland Bruns on or around the 15th of every month for the year 2003.



    On the Schedule E for 2003, petitioners claimed expenses of $3,471 arising from the leasing arrangement. The expenses were as follows: Insurance $358, taxes $1,092, utilities $1,150, and depreciation $871. The insurance, taxes, and utilities expenses were calculated by multiplying the annual amount for the house by 40 percent, the approximate percentage of the lease space ABS occupied in the house.



    Petitioners established the monthly rent charged to ABS by visiting spaces in the community that were smaller than the space ABS rented from petitioners. The rents of the smaller spaces were approximately $9 to $13 per square foot. Petitioners measured the area ABS leased to be approximately 1,400 square feet and charged a little over $1 per square foot.



    In the space ABS allegedly rented there is a meeting space and a working area. In the meeting area there is a TV for presentations, and it is connected to cable. There is no door or lock which separates the area used by ABS from the other part of the house. ABS allegedly uses the space for Mrs. Bruns to meet with clients, hold meetings, and sell products. However, Mr. Bruns and Mrs. Bruns occasionally watch entertainment shows, sports, and news on the television in the meeting area. Mr. Bruns has access to the meeting area.




    Schedule A Deductions


    On Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, petitioners claimed itemized deductions totaling $9,793 for taxes paid, gifts to charity, tax preparation fees, and safe deposit expenses. Petitioners claimed a deduction of $7,353 for alleged gifts to charity. The notice of deficiency disallowed $945 of the claimed gifts to charity. After a concession by petitioners of $51.02, $893.98 of claimed gifts to charity remains in dispute.



    The standard deduction for petitioners in 2003 was $9,500. The itemized deductions allowed in the notice of deficiency do not exceed the standard deduction to which petitioners are entitled. Accordingly, the notice of deficiency allowed the standard deduction.



    To substantiate the disallowed gifts to charity, petitioners submitted a letter from their church, Abiding Savior Free Lutheran Church, stating that they had donated a baking rack in November of 2003 and an invoice from Furniture Discounters stating they had paid $423.98 for a new baking rack to be delivered to their church.



    Petitioners also claimed cash gifts of $470 made in 2003. Petitioners allegedly made these donations in amounts of $20 or $30 at miscellaneous events that occurred throughout the year to various organizations that asked Mr. or Mrs. Bruns for a donation. Petitioners did not provide any substantiation for the additional $470 cash donations claimed.





    OPINION




    I. Burden of Proof


    In pertinent part, Rule 142(a)(1) provides, as a general rule: "The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner". However, section 7491(a) places the burden of proof on the Commissioner with regard to certain factual issues. Petitioners have alleged section 7491(a) applies, and respondent bears the burden of proof. However, the burden of proof is inconsequential to the outcome of this case.




    II. Deficiency


    The Commissioner's determinations are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving the determinations erroneous. Rule 142(a). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to the deduction claimed, and this includes the burden of substantiation. Id.; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976). A taxpayer must substantiate amounts claimed as deductions by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is entitled to the deductions. Sec. 6001.



    Section 162(a) provides a deduction for certain business-related expenses. In order to qualify for the deduction under section 162(a), "an item must (1) be 'paid or incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any trade or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary' expense, and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense." Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971); see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (the term "necessary" imposes "only the minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of the [taxpayer's] business" (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933))); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) (to qualify as "ordinary", the expense must relate to a transaction "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of the business involved"). Whether an expense is ordinary is determined by time, place, and circumstance. Welch v. Helvering, supra at 113-114. Respondent has not challenged the existence of ABS' Shaklee distributorship as a business and Mrs. Bruns' related activities in distributing and selling Shaklee products.



    If a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a deductible business expense but does not establish the amount of the expense, we may approximate the amount of the allowable deduction, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930). However, for the Cohan rule to apply, there must be sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis for the estimate. Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985). Certain expenses may not be estimated because of the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). See sec. 280F(d)(4)(A); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969).



    A. Schedule C Expenses



    1. Advertising Expenses



    In general, advertising expenses to promote a taxpayer's trade or business are deductible pursuant to section 162(a). Brallier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-42; sec. 1.162-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners claimed advertising expenses of purchasing gifts for selected customers, printing a newsletter, and the purchase of a camera.



    a. Gift Expenses



    The cost of gifts may be an ordinary and necessary business expense if the gifts are connected with the taxpayer's opportunity to generate business income. Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-120 (finding similarly gifts not connected with taxpayer's opportunity to generate business income where taxpayer, physician employed by hospital, gave out Parker pens as promotional gifts because physician did not depend upon referrals for business); cf. Eder v. Commissioner, a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated Feb. 10, 1950 (finding gifts were not connected with taxpayer's opportunity to generate business income where taxpayer gave cosmetic sets to office workers employed by someone else and to telephone operators employed by someone else and paid monthly by taxpayer to put through calls and deliver messages). Mrs. Bruns has the burden of proving to what extent the gift items contributed to her income. See Sutter v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 170, 173-174 (1953).



    Business gift deductions pursuant to section 162 are restricted to $25 per donee per taxable year. Sec. 274(b)(1).



    Further, section 274(d) requires adequate substantiation. A taxpayer claiming a deduction for a business gift is required to substantiate the gift with adequate records or sufficient evidence corroborating his own testimony as to (1) the cost of the gift; (2) the date and description of the gift; (3) the business purpose of the gift; and (4) the business relationship of the person receiving the gift. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(5), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). Respondent allowed petitioners to deduct $25 per donee for gifts to 20 individuals.



    Unlike the gifts in the situations in Eder and Brown, the gifts given were connected with opportunities for Mrs. Bruns to generate business. Gifts were given only to customers who were good referral sources, loved the products, and were consistent customers. The referrals and introductions Mrs. Bruns received from the gift recipients were to individuals who were not Shaklee customers. Because of the dependence Mrs. Bruns placed on personal connections and interactions in distributing Shaklee products, these introductions were an important part of building the Shaklee customer base. Accordingly, the gifts given were an ordinary and necessary advertising expense of Mrs. Bruns in selling Shaklee products.



    However, petitioners have failed to adequately substantiate every gift expense. Petitioners provided photocopies of receipts for items purchased for the purpose of making gifts, but many of the receipts were illegible as to the amount spent, the date of the purchase, or the item purchased. On the receipts which did contain such information, petitioners consistently failed to note the person to whom the gift was given, and many of the gifts exceeded the $25 restriction imposed by section 274(b). Petitioners have adequately substantiated advertising business gift expenses to 26 individuals and are entitled to a deduction of $650. This exceeds the amount allowed by respondent by $150 as we have allowed a deduction for gifts of $25 to 6 recipients in addition to the 20 recipients previously allowed by respondent.



    b. Newsletter and Camera Expenses



    Petitioners have not provided the content of the newsletters or information as to how the printing of the newsletters is an ordinary and necessary expense. Accordingly, we cannot allow a deduction for these printing expenses.



    Mrs. Bruns received income (as allocated by ABS) in 2003 from the sales of Shaklee distributors and leaders under ABS. Mrs. Bruns stated she was constantly looking for new distributors and coaching distributors on becoming leaders. The photos taken by Mrs. Bruns of Shaklee sales gatherings and distributed among distributors and leaders in her group were a part of this coaching. The camera purchased by Mrs. Bruns was used exclusively for this business purpose. However, the useful life of the camera is greater than 1 year. Accordingly, she must capitalize the cost. See Best Lock Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1217, 1234-1235 (1959) (cost of catalogs with useful life of more than 1 year must be capitalized); Ala. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-123 (cost of signs, clocks, and scoreboards with useful lives of more than 1 year must be capitalized). Petitioners are entitled to a $62.15 deduction for the substantiated costs of printing photos and an allowable camera depreciation deduction. These are in addition to the amount respondent allowed.



    2. Car and Truck Expenses



    Petitioners claimed a deduction for car and truck expenses incurred in 2003 for gasoline, car washes, repairs, and maintenance on the vehicle leased and used for business purposes. Petitioners claimed $2,238; respondent allowed $798 and disallowed $1,440.



    Section 162(a) allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Under that provision, an employee or a self-employed individual may deduct the cost of operating an automobile to the extent that it is used in a trade or business. However, under section 262 no portion of the cost of operating an automobile that is attributable to personal use is deductible.



    A passenger vehicle is listed property under section 280F(d)(4). Section 274(d) disallows any deduction with respect to listed property unless the taxpayer adequately substantiates: (1) The amount of the expense, (2) the time and place of the travel or the use of the property, (3) the business purpose of the expense, and (4) the business relationship of the persons using the property.



    Mrs. Bruns provided a mileage log that listed the date of travel, the length of the travel, and the business purpose of the travel in a majority of the entries. After totaling the miles recorded for 2003, Mrs. Bruns calculated that she used the car 79 percent of the time for business purposes. 7 Upon recalculation of the business percentage use, we conclude the business percentage use is 72 percent. 8



    Petitioners submitted gasoline receipts listing the amount of gasoline purchased, method of payment, and date. The dates on the receipts are consistent with the reported travel in the mileage log; i.e., there are increased gas purchases when the mileage log reports more miles traveled. The gasoline receipts total $1,132.49. Petitioners submitted carwash receipts of $115.20 listing the service provided, the amount, and the date rendered. The car washes are spaced throughout 2003 and are reasonable in amount and frequency. Petitioners submitted receipts of payment totaling $102.84 for repairs and maintenance on the passenger vehicle. The receipts, which are for oil changes, specify Mrs. Bruns' car and are spaced throughout 2003 as the car mileage increased. We conclude petitioners have met their burden of substantiating these actual expenses of operating a vehicle for business purposes and are entitled to a deduction of $972.38 9 in addition to the amount respondent allowed.



    3. Contract Labor Expenses



    In general, payments made or incurred by a trade or business for personal services rendered are ordinary and necessary business expenses and may be deducted under section 162. Sec. 1.162-7(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners failed to provide any proof of payment and did not provide sufficient substantiation to permit a reasonable estimate of contract labor expenses. Accordingly, respondent's complete disallowance of a deduction is sustained.



    4. Office Expenses



    The cost of materials and supplies consumed and used in operations during a taxable year is generally considered an ordinary and necessary expense of conducting a business or for-profit activity. Sec. 162; sec. 1.162-3, Income Tax Regs. Petitioners submitted photocopies of receipts for business furniture which total $5,106.83 and photocopies of receipts for business supplies, refreshments, and decorations which total $2,512.34.



    Petitioners introduced into the record photographs showing the use of the furniture whose costs are claimed as a business expense. The furniture stored business information and Shaklee products kept as inventory or orders and displayed Shaklee products. Although Mrs. Bruns delivered Shaklee products to customers, customers would also stop by her home to pick up products. This required her to devote an area to storing a small inventory of products for sale and those ordered by customers and to displaying Shaklee products for sales. Because leaders and distributors would also stop by her home, Mrs. Bruns had to provide a meeting place and store Shaklee informational tapes, CDs, and sales aids. An area for Mrs. Bruns to coach distributors and leaders was frequently used and helpful to increasing revenue. Further, sales aids and training materials to refer to was helpful to Mrs. Bruns in selling Shaklee products and coaching others on how to successfully sell Shaklee products. Accordingly, the business furniture was an ordinary and necessary business expense of Mrs. Bruns in selling Shaklee products.



    Petitioners also claimed an office expense deduction for the purchase of a portable CD player with speakers. Because much of the training Mrs. Bruns received as a Shaklee distributor was done through CDs that she could listen to on a portable CD player while at home or while traveling, the CD player was necessary to sell Shaklee products. However, the receipt petitioners submitted included the purchase of two radios unrelated to the business; we disallow a deduction for those radios.



    Mrs. Bruns used the supplies in her business of selling Shaklee products. The total amount spent on business supplies, decorations, and refreshments is not excessive in consideration of her business. The cost of pens, paper, and other office supplies to keep track of products, customer orders, and sales was an ordinary and necessary business expense she incurred selling Shaklee products. Further, offering coffee and candy to customers was helpful to Mrs. Bruns in promoting the sale of Shaklee products when customers visited her. Putting up seasonal decorations in the area of her home where Shaklee customers visited was also helpful to Mrs. Bruns in selling Shaklee products.



    Petitioners' business expense receipts for purchases of furniture, supplies, refreshments, and decorations adequately substantiated those purchases. Each receipt was dated and provided the amount spent, a description of the item purchased, and the reason for the purchase. However, because the furniture and the portable CD player with speakers have an expected useful life exceeding 1 year, petitioners may not deduct the full amounts paid as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The costs of the business furniture and the portable CD player with speakers are capital expenses, and petitioners must properly depreciate the property. They are entitled to an allowable depreciation deduction. See sec. 263(a)(1); sec. 1.263(a)-2(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners are entitled to an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction of $2,512.34 10 for business supplies, decorations, and refreshments purchased in 2003. The business supplies deduction and the depreciation deductions for the furniture and the CD player are allowed in addition to the amounts respondent already allowed.



    5. Rent or Lease --Vehicle, Machinery, and Equipment



    Petitioners claimed a deduction of $5,968 for leasing expenses associated with the business vehicle leased by ABS and used by Mrs. Bruns in 2003. Respondent allowed a deduction of $3,647, and $2,321 remains at issue. Car leasing expenses are subject to the section 274(d) strict substantiation requirements (explained supra) because a car is listed property. Sec. 280F(d)(4).



    We found that Mrs. Bruns used the leased passenger car 72 percent of the time for business purposes in 2003. The direct deposit reports issued to ABS from Shaklee show a monthly car charge of $790.41. Petitioners have substantiated ABS' car leasing expense of $6,829.14. 11 Accordingly, petitioners are entitled to a deduction for the full amount claimed on their 2003 tax return.



    6. Travel Expenses



    A deduction is allowed for ordinary and necessary traveling expenses incurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business. Sec. 162(a)(2). If a taxpayer travels to a destination at which he engages in both business and personal activities, the traveling expenses to and from the destination are deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business. Sec. 1.162-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. If the trip is primarily personal, the traveling expenses to and from the destination are not deductible; however, expenses at the location properly allocable to the taxpayer's trade or business are deductible. Id.



    Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. Sec. 1.162-2(b)(2), Income Tax Regs. An important factor is the amount of time during the trip spent on personal activity compared to the amount of time spent on activities directly relating to the taxpayer's trade or business. Id. If a member of the taxpayer's family accompanies him on a business trip, expenses attributable to the family member are not deductible unless it can be adequately shown that the presence of the family member on the trip has a bona fide business purpose. Sec. 1.162-2(c), Income Tax Regs.



    Of the $4,253 petitioners claimed as travel expenses, respondent allowed $2,526 and disallowed $1,727. Respondent disallowed deductions for expenses of trips to see relatives, to visit a friend in Minnesota, and to spend a weekend with petitioners' daughter and with others. Respondent also disallowed deductions for costs of luggage, a handbag, and a coin purse.



    Petitioners submitted photocopies of receipts for travel expenses incurred in 2003. The disallowed deductions are for trips having a mixed business and pleasure motivation. Petitioners saw friends and relatives who were customers and distributors of ABS and who earned bonuses for ABS in 2003. Updating these earners about the new Shaklee products and providing coaching on business leadership was business related. Visiting with friends and relatives about matters not related to ABS was for pleasure.



    Where a trip has mixed motivations of business and pleasure, the costs of traveling to and from the location are deductible only if the primary purpose of the trip is business. Sec. 1.162-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners have failed to prove how much time was spent on each trip for business and for pleasure. Without this information we cannot conclude that these trips were primarily for business and must disallow the costs of traveling to and from these locations. Petitioners would be entitled to a deduction for expenses incurred at the location properly allocable to business activities. However, petitioners have failed to provide sufficient information to allow any of the disallowed travel expenses. Petitioners have not shown which expenses are properly allocable to business-related activities.



    Petitioners also claimed travel expense deductions for amounts incurred to purchase business luggage. Petitioners failed to provide receipts adequately substantiating these expenses. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to a deduction for travel expenses above that allowed by respondent.



    7. Meals and Entertainment Expenses



    Section 162 permits the deduction of food and beverage expenses incurred by a taxpayer if they are ordinary, necessary, and reasonable expenses incurred by the taxpayer in his business. No deduction is allowed with respect to personal, living, or family expenses. Sec. 262. However, section 162(a) permits the deduction of amounts expended for meals (not lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) when away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business. In the context of section 162(a)(2), a taxpayer's home generally refers to the area of a taxpayer's principal place of employment, whether or not in the vicinity of the taxpayer's personal residence. Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981); Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 561-562 (1968). "[I]n the pursuit of a trade or business" has been read to mean: "The exigencies of business rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler must be the motivating factors." Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 474 (1946).



    Section 274(a) further restricts the deduction of business food and beverage expenses. Such expenditures must be directly related to the conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business, or associated with the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business, to be deductible. Id.



    An expenditure is considered associated with the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business if the taxpayer establishes that she had a clear business purpose in making the expenditure, such as to obtain new business or to encourage the continuation of an existing business relationship. Sec. 1.274-2(d)(2), Income Tax Regs.



    In order to establish a substantial and bona fide business discussion, the taxpayer must show that he actively engaged in a business meeting, negotiation discussion, or other bona fide business transaction, other than entertainment, for the purpose of obtaining income or other specific trade or business benefit. Sec. 1.274-2(d)(3)(i)(A), Income Tax Regs. Additionally, the taxpayer must establish that this business meeting, negotiation, discussion, or transaction was substantial in relation to the entertainment. Id. Entertainment which occurs on the same day as a substantial and bona fide business discussion will be considered to directly precede or follow the discussion. Sec. 1.274-2(d)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs.



    Food and beverage expense deductions are further limited by section 274(k) and (n). No deduction is permitted for food and beverage expenses unless the expense is not lavish or extravagant under the circumstances and the taxpayer is present at the furnishing of such food or beverages. Sec. 274(k). Further, the amount of the deduction that would otherwise be allowed for food and beverage expenses is generally reduced by 50 percent. Sec. 274(n)(1).



    Finally, in order to deduct food and beverage expenses, a taxpayer must meet the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d). To substantiate these expenditures the taxpayer must prove: (a) The amount; (b) the time and date; (c) the place; (d) the business purpose; and (e) the business relationship. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46015 (Nov. 6, 1985). The majority of the photocopied receipts and accompanying information petitioners submitted either did not have a sufficient business purpose, were for a personal expense, or otherwise failed to meet the strict substantiation requirements.



    Petitioners submitted numerous grocery store receipts as food and beverage expenses with a notation that they were for guests. Petitioners failed to specify the time and date of the entertainment of the guests, the place where they entertained the guests, the business purpose of buying the groceries for the guests, and the business relationship of the guests. Because petitioners have failed to meet the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d), we cannot allow a deduction for these expenses.



    Petitioners submitted receipts for personal meals of both Mr. and Mrs. Bruns. Mr. Bruns was not an employee or partner of ABS or a participant in Mrs. Bruns' activities in distributing Shaklee products. Mrs. Bruns conceded at trial that petitioners were not entitled to a deduction for these expenses.



    Many of the receipts for food and beverage expenses were for an amount under $10 and for a single serving of food. Mrs. Bruns admitted a particular receipt for a single serving of food in the amount of $9.60 was only for her meal, but she said she ate with a customer. Expenses for meals are personal and as such nondeductible unless a business purpose can be shown for incurring the expenses, as in the case of expenses incurred away from home in the pursuit of business and not lavish or extravagant under the circumstances. Secs. 262(a), 162(a)(2); Drill v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 902, 903 (1947); sec. 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax Regs.



    We conclude petitioners' home, for purposes of section 162(a)(2), was in the Sioux Falls area of South Dakota. Petitioners claimed multiple deductions under $10 in amount for meal expenses Mrs. Bruns incurred when she was not away from home. These are personal expenses and are not deductible. See Drill v. Commissioner, supra. The meal expenses Mrs. Bruns incurred while she was away from home were not lavish or extravagant under the circumstances, were incurred in the pursuit of business, and are deductible. At the top of each receipt submitted to substantiate meal expenses incurred while away from home was a notation explaining Mrs. Bruns' business purpose in being away from home. The majority of the notations referenced a Shaklee convention, and we are persuaded that the exigencies of business prompted Mrs. Bruns to travel away from home and incur these expenses.



    After eliminating the aforementioned nondeductible food and beverage expenses petitioners claimed, expenses totaling $1,409.83 remain. These expenses meet the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d) and are for meals where Mrs. Bruns met with a customer to conduct some form of business for ABS.



    A majority of these receipts are for amounts in the range of $15 to $30. Treating customers, distributors, and leaders to a meal is a strategy Mrs. Bruns employed to increase the sale of Shaklee products. Mrs. Bruns used the meals as an opportunity to deliver products to customers, spend time with customers to encourage them to buy more Shaklee products, and discuss potentially starting their own distributorships. She used the meals with distributors and leaders as opportunities to review business strategy in their Shaklee distributorships. These business meals occurred consistently throughout 2003 and were helpful in promoting the sale of Shaklee products by distributors and leaders Mrs. Bruns supervised. Accordingly, we conclude the costs of meals for specific customers, distributors, and leaders were incurred by Mrs. Bruns to increase the sale of Shaklee products by Mrs. Bruns, her distributors, and leaders and were ordinary and necessary business expenses of Mrs. Bruns in selling Shaklee products.



    Further, we conclude these meals were associated with the active conduct of Mrs. Bruns' business of distributing Shaklee products and the meals directly preceded or followed a substantial and bona fide business discussion. The meals purchased were associated with the active conduct of Mrs. Bruns in distributing and selling Shaklee products because there was a clear business purpose in purchasing the meals for customers, distributors, and leaders. Mrs. Bruns had an existing business relationship with these individuals, and meals were used to facilitate sales of Shaklee products to customers and to encourage and increase the distribution of Shaklee products by distributors and leaders. Further, at each meal, substantial and bona fide business discussions occurred. At the top of each receipt, petitioners listed what sort of business discussion and transactions occurred at the meal. Accordingly, petitioners are entitled to a deduction of $704.92 12 for the meals and entertainment expenses incurred in 2003. This is in addition to the $1,192 deduction respondent allowed.



    8. Other Expenses



    The products used by Mrs. Bruns and claimed as a product promotion expense of petitioners were not specified. Rather Mrs. Bruns admitted personal use of products and guessed at the amount of alleged non-personal-use products. Without more specificity as to which products Mrs. Bruns used for product promotion, we cannot conclude that any portion of the $2,000 product promotion expense she claimed as a deduction is allowable as an ordinary and necessary business expense.



    B. Schedule E Expenses



    Petitioners assert that ABS rented basement space in petitioners' residence during 2003. ABS subtracted $18,000 in rental expenses from its gross income on its Form 1065. The alleged rental was month to month, and there was no written rental agreement. There is lack of proof of a bona fide rental. The purported rental was not at arm's length, and we disregard it for lack of economic substance. Accordingly, we disallow deductions petitioners claimed on Schedule E of their return for insurance, taxes, utilities, and depreciation attributed to the rental.



    C. Schedule A Deductions: Charitable Contributions



    In general, a taxpayer is entitled to deduct charitable contributions made during the taxable year to or for the use of certain types of organizations. Sec. 170(a)(1), (c). A taxpayer is required to substantiate charitable contributions; records must be maintained. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners claim to have made charitable contributions of $893.98 in 2003: Approximately $470 in cash contributions of $20 to $30 increments to undisclosed charitable organizations and $423.98 by delivery of a new baking rack to their church.



    A contribution of cash in an amount less than $250 made in a tax year beginning before August 17, 2006, may be substantiated with a canceled check, a receipt, or other reliable evidence showing the name of the donee, the date of the contribution, and the amount of the contribution. Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. Petitioners have provided no substantiation of the cash contributions, nor have they adequately identified the recipients of these contributions. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to deduct these claimed cash charitable contributions.



    Contributions of cash or property in excess of $250 require the donor to obtain contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the donation from the donee. Sec. 170(f)(8). At a minimum, the contemporaneous written acknowledgment must contain a description of any property contributed, a statement as to whether any goods or services were provided in consideration, and a description and good-faith estimate of the value of any goods or services referred to. Sec. 170(f)(8)(B). Petitioners claim to have contributed a baking rack to their church. The receipt they provided establishes they paid $423.98 for a new baking rack to be delivered to their church. The invoice establishes the fair market value of the baking rack as $423.98. Petitioners have provided a letter of acknowledgment from their church which meets the statutory requirements of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment. Accordingly, petitioners are entitled to a $423.98 charitable contribution deduction.




    III. Section 6662(a) Penalty


    Section 7491(c) provides that the Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect to the liability of any individual for additions to tax and penalties. "The Commissioner's burden of production under section 7491(c) is to produce evidence that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount". Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 363 (2002); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). The Commissioner, however, does not have the obligation to introduce evidence regarding reasonable cause or substantial authority. Higbee v. Commissioner, supra at 446-447.



    Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a) penalty for 2003. Pursuant to section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2), a taxpayer may be liable for a penalty of 20 percent on the portion of an underpayment of tax due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations or a substantial understatement of income tax. An "understatement" is the difference between the amount of tax required to be shown on the return and the amount of tax actually shown on the return. Sec. 6662(d)(2)(A). A "substantial understatement" exists if the understatement exceeds the greater of (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for a taxable year or (2) $5,000. See sec. 6662(d)(1)(A). Respondent met his burden of production as there was a substantial understatement of income tax.



    The accuracy-related penalty is not imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayment as to which the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The decision as to whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith depends upon all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.



    Petitioners deducted as business expenses personal items such as travel with relatives and personal use of Shaklee products. At trial petitioners conceded some of these personal items and claimed inadvertent error. However, petitioners should have discovered these inadvertent errors well in advance of trial. Further, petitioners deducted rent when no written rental agreement existed and the alleged rent was for an area where petitioners watched TV and relaxed. Petitioners have failed to show they acted with reasonable care and in good faith. Accordingly, we sustain the section 6662(a) penalty.



    To reflect the foregoing,



    Decision will be entered under Rule 155.


    1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

    2 ABS is not subject to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) partnership audit and litigation rules. See sec. 6231(a)(1)(B) (the partnership ABS had 10 or fewer partners and all partners were natural persons and U.S. citizens).

    3 Each distributor has a group of customers. A customer may get discount buying privileges by paying a fee to become a member or distributor. Once the customer becomes a distributor, the customer-distributor is in the group of his original distributor and starts a group of his own.

    4 Respondent does not dispute the income to Mrs. Bruns from ABS.

    5 The $2,582 deduction is 50 percent of claimed meals and entertainment expenses of $5,164.

    6 We take "image" to mean product promotion and shall refer to it as such.

    7 Mrs. Bruns arrived at 79 percent by dividing business miles of 18,755 by total miles of 23,550.

    8 Some of the entries in petitioners' mileage log did not contain a purpose. The total of the entries containing the miles traveled, the date, and the purpose of the trip is 16,976 miles.

    9 The to
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    Mortgage Firms Struggle to Redo Hard-Hit Loans

    At a time when struggling homeowners need it most, new studies are showing that mortgage firms are struggling to negotiate loan modifications fast enough to keep up with demand. The change comes with new government pressure to negotiate more loans under their Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, where the Federal government encourages these firms to help keep families in their homes. Check out the following story on the issue courtesy of the Wall Street Journal.

    Morgan Stanley chief John Mack recently made a new friend, he told shareholders in April -- a Southern woman who had benefited from the big bank's stepped-up efforts to modify loans under a new federal program aimed at keeping borrowers in their homes.

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    New Types Of Business Entities

    Attention California business owners: A Restricted LLC (limited liability company) and a Restricted LP (limited partnership) are special entities that will be allowed under Nevada law starting October 1, 2009. Nevada is the first and only state to allow these types of entities.

    With a restricted LLC, the new statute imposes restrictions and limitations on the LLC's ability to make distributions. The statute provides, in part, that unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization, a restricted LLC shall not make any distributions to its members with respect to their membership interests until ten years after the date of formation of the LLC (or amendment of the articles of an existing LLC to become a restricted LLC), so long as the LLC has remained a restricted LLC.

    Why set up an LLC which by its charter may not make any distributions to members for up to ten years? The reason is Internal Revenue Code Section 2704(b), which provides that when valuing an interest in an entity for gift tax purposes, the liquidation restrictions contained within the LLC operating agreement have to be disregarded by the appraiser if the LLC is owned by family members both before and after the transfer. Code Section 2704(b)(3)(B) provides however that a restriction that is imposed by state law cannot be ignored.

    With these new entities, some appraisers provide a range of an additional 10% to 35% for the additional valuation discount. So, for example, if the valuation discount would have been 35% for a regular LLC, after adding the additional valuation discount, the valuation discount would instead be between 45% and 70%.

    Remember that the new Nevada Restricted LLC and LP statutes only create a new ceiling on valuation discounts that no other state allows. This doesn't mean that you must lock the underlying assets in for ten years. Maybe five years is more appropriate. Maybe three years.

    The Bill can be read online. The Restricted LLC language can be read in Sections 26 and 27 of the Bill. The Restricted LP language can be read in Sections 38, 39 and 49.2 of the Bill.


    This taxpayer would not go to gail if he voluntarily filed tax returns and will not make any false statements in his tax return. Unfortunately, this person did not seek competent tax advice.

    United States of America v. Leroy M. Bennett, Appellant.

    U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit; 08-1849, July 8, 2009.

    . --
    An individual was properly convicted and sentenced for willfully failing to file federal income tax returns. The government's calculation of the tax loss caused by his violations was consistent with the sentencing guidelines. Contrary to the individual's argument, forms containing withholding information that were submitted to the IRS by the individual's employers did not make filing income tax returns voluntary. The forms could not be considered to be returns since the information on the forms was insufficient for tax-computation purposes. The government was not required to prove that the individual had actual knowledge of the specific provision of the Tax Code he was violating. The individual was aware of his duty to pay taxes and file proper returns because he had paid taxes for nearly two decades before he stopped filing. The individual's contention that the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980 provides a good faith defense to a charge of willful failure to file tax returns was without merit. The PRA has no effect on the IRS's ability to penalize taxpayers for failing to provide a complete and transparent report of their income, and did not prevent the individual from being prosecuted for failure to file tax returns. s.


    OPINION


    AMBRO, Circuit Judge: Leroy M. Bennett appeals his conviction for five counts of willfully failing to file federal income tax returns for tax years 2000 through 2004, in violation of 26 U.S.C. ? 7203. 1 For the following reasons, we affirm the District Court's judgment.

    Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only the facts relevant to our analysis. In 1995, Bennett, a Pennsylvania resident, stopped filing federal income taxes on various grounds, including that taxes were voluntary, could not apply to his income, and could not be collected by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The IRS began calculating Bennett's tax liability using the withholding information reported on W-2 forms submitted by his employers (General Electric Company through 2002, and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. beginning in 2004). Despite the withholdings, Bennett owed the IRS money each year. The IRS told Bennett that it would begin levying against assets if he refused to pay his taxes. He responded by filing bankruptcy when the IRS tried to garnish his wages and, to reduce withholdings, claiming many more exemptions than applied to him. The IRS eventually threatened Bennett with criminal sanctions, and in 2006 and 2007 he finally filed 12 years of tax returns for tax years 1995 through 2006. In them, Bennett claimed that the IRS owed him almost $350,000, even though his employers withheld much less than that over those years.

    In August 2007, Bennett was indicted by a grand jury in the Western District of Pennsylvania on five counts of ? 7203 violations, and in December 2007 a jury found him guilty of all five counts. Bennett was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment and one year supervised release, which was the lower end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, U.S.S.G. ?? 2T1.1 & 2T4.1, calculated by taking into account Bennett's $80,000 owed in back taxes to the IRS.

    On appeal, Bennett argues that: (1) because his employers filed W-2 forms with the IRS on his behalf, his filing of income tax returns was voluntary and therefore the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges; (2) the Paper Reduction Act of 1995 ("PRA") provides a complete or "good faith" defense to a charge of willfully failing to file an income tax Form 1040; (3) the Government was required to show that he had knowledge of the specific provision he was alleged to have violated to meet its burden of proof; and (4) it was error to include tax years 2000 through 2004 in calculating the amount of tax loss caused by his crime for sentencing purposes. 2

    The crime charged here has three elements: (1) the duty or requirement to file a tax return; (2) failure to file the return; and (3) willfulness. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1986)). Bennett's first claim --that the W-4 forms he completed for his employers, and the W-2 forms that his employers submitted to the IRS, made filing income tax returns voluntary --goes to the "duty" element of the offense. This argument has been rejected by us and other courts of appeals. In Bachner v. Commissioner, 81 F.3d 1274, 1280 (3d Cir. 1996), we held that information on the W-2 form is not independently sufficient for tax-computation purposes, as it "fail[s] to provide facts addressed to or determinative of other potential liabilities and therefore [is] not sufficient to be considered a 'return.'" See also Kartrude v. Commissioner, 925 F.2d 1379, 1384 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Birkenstock, 823 F.2d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rickman, 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir.1980). Bennett cites United States v. Patridge, 507 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 2007), as support for this contention. However, the portion of the decision he cites relates to his PRA claim, not to whether he had an independent duty to file. We therefore turn to Bennett's PRA argument.

    The Court in Patridge stated that "the obligation to file a tax return stems from 26 U.S.C. ? 7203," and the PRA does not "change any substantive obligation" or repeal ? 7203. Id. at 1094-95. Bennett claims that, despite this, the PRA provides a complete or "good faith" defense to a charge of willfully failing to file income tax returns because Form 1040 does not comply with the PRA requirements. The Government points out that this argument was soundly rejected in Miller-Wagenknecht v. Commissioner, 285 F. App'x 956 (3d Cir. 2008), and in Barzeski v. Commissioner, 173 F. App'x 175 (3d Cir. 2006). Because these decisions are not precedential, we do not rely on them. That does not mean we come out any differently, however. The obligation to file federal income tax returns stems from a Congressional statute, while the PRA applies to agency regulations, and thus the PRA has no effect on the IRS's ability to penalize taxpayers for failing to provide a complete and candid report of their income. See Patridge, 507 F.3d at 1095; United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is well established that Form 1040 bears the necessary control number and expiration date to be in compliance with the PRA. See Patridge, 507 F.3d at 1095; United States v. Dawes, 951 F.2d 1189, 1193 (10th Cir. 1991).

    Bennett also contends that the Tenth Circuit's decisions in United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 2007), and Pond v. Commissioner, 211 F. App'x 749 (10th Cir. 2007), support his claim that the PRA provides a defense to failure to file income taxes. There the Court held that the PRA was not implicated where a taxpayer had filed false returns because it "protects a person only for failing to file information," Chisum, 502 F.3d at 1243-44, and that tax forms are collection requests within the meaning of the PRA, see Pond, 211 F. App'x at 752. The problem at the outset for Bennett is that the most recent Tenth Circuit decision on this issue is Lewis v. Commissioner, 523 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). It clarified Chisum and Pond; Chisum "should not be read to support an argument that the PRA ultimately protects individuals who fail to file tax information," and Pond simply "declined to address the argument that [Form 1040] violated the PRA because the defendant had not included any of the forms in the record," and "even affirmed the district court's dismissal of the PRA claims as frivolous." Id. at 1275 nn.4-5. After reviewing Lewis' arguments, which were comparable to those Bennett presents on appeal, the Tenth Circuit's decision confirmed that they lacked sufficient merit and held that Form 1040 satisfies the PRA requirements. Id. at 1277.

    Bennett next claims that, to satisfy its burden of proof regarding the "willfulness" element of his crime, the Government was required to prove that he had actual knowledge of the specific provision of the Tax Code he was violating. He cites Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), arguing that it requires the Government to prove he was aware of the "specific provision of the Tax Code he was charged with violating." Id. at 194. But Bennett fails to acknowledge that (1) Bryan involved a firearms violation, and thus the Court's statement regarding the Tax Code could not possibly have been its holding; 3 (2) the Bryan Court specifically noted that the reason for requiring actual knowledge was that certain tax cases involve "highly technical statutes that present ... the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct"; and (3) the Court further noted that, "[e]ven in tax cases, we have not always required this heightened mens rea." Id. at 194 & n.17. A heightened mens rea was not required here. Bennett paid taxes for at least 20 years before he stopped filing. That he did so makes plain he knew of his duty to pay taxes and file proper tax returns, and no technical "ensnaring" appears even remotely plausible.

    Finally, Bennett challenges the District Court's inclusion of tax years 2000 through 2004 in its calculation of the amount of tax loss caused by his violations. This argument is an extension of his first claim, as he asserts that because his employers timely and accurately filed W-2s on his behalf for these years, his income was therefore "reported" and should not be used to enhance his sentence under tax loss. Just as Bennett's underlying claim fails, so too does its sentencing corollary. The Government's calculation of the tax loss caused by Bennett's violations was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines set out in U.S.S.G. ?? 2T1.1 & 2T4.1. Indeed, its conclusion that Bennett owed approximately $80,000 in back taxes was actually a conservative estimate. 4 We note that Bennett was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment and one year supervised release, a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months for Bennett's offense level of 16 (his criminal history category is I). 5

    * * * * *

    For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

    1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. ? 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. ? 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. ? 1291.

    2 Our review of a district court's subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. See Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep't of the Treas., 285 F.3d 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1999)). We exercise plenary review over the legal findings of a district court, including its interpretation of federal income tax statutes, see In re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 101 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998)), and we apply a plain error standard to alleged sentencing errors raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 320 (3d Cir. 2006)).

    3 See United States v. Cavins, 543 F.3d 456, 458-59 (8th Cir. 2008) (characterizing the language from Bryan regarding the Tax Code as dictum).

    4 The Government gave Bennett the standard deductions he could have claimed had he actually filed his tax returns, but the majority of the courts of appeals do not require this. See, e.g., United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Government is not required to include a taxpayer's deductions in its calculation of the amount of tax loss under U.S.S.G. ? 2T1.1); United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the inclusion of deductions); United States v. Spencer, 178 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the interpretation of the statute as "giving taxpayers a second opportunity to claim deductions after having been convicted of tax fraud"). But see United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that ? 2T1.1(c)(1)(A) requires the calculation of deductions).

    5 We note that, while we agree with the Government that Bennett's arguments on appeal are unpersuasive, the language used in its brief to us is often too cute for cricket. Whatever the legal merit of his claims, Bennett takes them seriously enough to go to jail for nearly two years. The Government should be equally serious.
    Tax Tips for Teachers
    Summer break is?unfortunately?winding down for students and teachers alike. While teachers all over the country will soon start planning their lessons, this is also the prime time to get your tax files in order. Teachers are in a great position to reduce their tax burden, but it takes time, effort and some thought.

    Like anyone else, the best way for teachers to save money on their taxes is to get educated and get organized. If you know what tax breaks you are entitled to, you can actually claim them. And if you have all your tax documentation organized, you?ll be able to prove that you are entitled to each credit, deduction and exemption.

    Teachers in particular have a great way to save money on their taxes: the Educator Expenses Deduction. The IRS recognizes that teachers often spend their own money on classroom supplies. Therefore, this deduction is good for up to $250 every year ($500 if your spouse is also a teacher and you file jointly).

    While you do not have to itemize deductions to get this deduction, you do have to be organized. Too many teachers keep sloppy records, then can not find their receipts. To help you get organized, here is what I recommend. Create a file labeled ?Classroom Expenses?. Keep the file handy so it is easier to properly file receipts than to throw them on the counter. You can go a step further and attach your receipts to a piece of paper with the purpose of the expense written in. You probably will not remember that you spent $5.89 on pencils for your classroom 9 months from now and some receipts are a little difficult to read. This extra step can save you a lot of squinting at receipt tape come tax season.

    If you get your system in order now, you will be all set to file your receipts when you go shopping for supplies next month.

    Campaign to overturn Maine tax law struggling
    A people’s veto effort to overturn Maine’s newly enacted tax code changes is struggling financially. Reports show it’s just raised $50. The Republican-led effort targets changes in sales and income tax policy. Opponents are trying to collect more than 55,000 signatures to put the repeal question before voters in November. Maine Public Radio reports GOP leaders say [...]
    The government was enjoined from proceeding with a collection action against an individual during the pendency of the individual's refund proceeding and its request for a stay with repect to the refund proceedings was denied. The individual filed a refund action to recover trust fund recovery penalty taxes he had paid; subsequently, the government brought suit in a different district court to collect the unpaid portion of the trust fund recovery penalty from the individual and another responsible person. Code Sec. 6331(i)(4)(A) prohibits the government from filing a collection action against a refund claimant for any unpaid divisible tax while a refund suit is pending with respect to that individual and that tax. The government could not rely on the exception to Code Sec. 6331(i)(4)(A), which states that the statute does not apply to any "proceeding relating to" the refund proceeding. A collection action will always have some connection, relation and reference to a refund proceeding involving the same taxes and taxpayer; however, taking into consideration the language of the statute, its legislative history and subsequent decisions, the exception was not meant to apply in a collection action against the same taxpayer to recover the same tax at issue in the refund proceeding.

    Jerry D. Nickell, Sr., Plainitff v. United States of America, Defendant..

    U.S. District Court, East. Dist. Tex., Sherman Div.; 4:08CV319, June 5, 2009.

    [ Code Secs. 6331 and 6672]






    MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


    SCHELL, United States District Judge: Came on for consideration the report of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action, this matter having been heretofore referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ? 636. On April 2, 2009, the report of the Magistrate Judge was entered containing proposed findings of fact and recommendations that Jerry D. Nickell, Sr.'s Motion to Enjoin Proceedings in Collection Case Filed by Defendant in Western District of Texas, Midland Division (Dkt. 22) should be GRANTED and the United States of America's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 18) should be DENIED as MOOT.

    The court, having made a de novo review of the objections raised by the United States, is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct, and the objections of the United States are without merit as to the ultimate conclusion and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Therefore, the court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of this court, and Jerry D. Nickell, Sr.'s Motion to Enjoin Proceedings in Collection Case Filed by Defendant in Western District of Texas, Midland Division (Dkt. 22) is GRANTED and the United States of America's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 18) is DENIED as MOOT.

    IT IS SO ORDERED.

    SIGNED this 5th day of June, 2009.


    REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE


    BUSH, United States Magistrate Judge: On March 30, 2009, the Court conducted a hearing on the United States of America's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 18) and Jerry D. Nickell, Sr.'s Motion to Enjoin Proceedings in Collection Case Filed by Defendant in Western District of Texas, Midland Division (Dkt. 22). As stated on the record at the hearing, the Court finds that the Motion to Enjoin (Dkt. 22) should be GRANTED and the Motion to Stay (Dkt. 18) should be DENIED as MOOT.


    Background


    Nickell commenced the above captioned suit (the "First Suit") on August 26, 2008. At issue in the First Suit are trust fund recovery penalty taxes ("TFRP") assessed against Nickell in accordance with 26 U.S.C. ? 6672. On January 16, 2009, the United States filed suit against Nickell and another individual, Thomas Alvey, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas - Midland Division, Case No. MO-09-CV 005 (the "Second Suit"). In the Second Suit, the United States alleges Nickell and Alvey are responsible persons for the failure to pay withholding and employment taxes and seeks to collect from Nickell the unpaid portion of the same TFRP at issue in the First Suit.

    On January 20, 2009, the government filed a motion to stay seeking to stay the proceedings in the First Suit to allow the Second Suit to continue. Shortly thereafter, Nickell filed a motion to enjoin the proceedings against him in the Second Suit.

    Both parties agree that Nickell first filed a refund action to recover his TFRP payment in this District. The parties further agree that after Nickell filed suit here, the Government filed a separate action against Nickell and Alvey in the Western District of Texas to collect the unpaid portion of the TFRP.

    In his motion to enjoin, Nickell asserts that the plain language of Section 6331(i)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code prohibits the United States from bringing the Second Suit against him. The United States argues that the "related to" exception in Section 6331(i)(4)(A)(ii) permits it to pursue the Second Suit against Nickell because the Second Suit is "related to" the first and seeks a stay of these proceedings in the interests of judicial economy. As set forth below, the Court is not persuaded by the Government's argument.


    Analysis


    All parties agree that 26 U.S.C. ? 6331(i)(1) is applicable to this case and that the unpaid taxes at issue are divisible. Under Section 6331(i):

    (i) No levy during pendency of proceedings for refund of divisible tax. --
    (1) In general. --No levy may be made under subsection (a) on the property or rights to property of any person with respect to any unpaid divisible tax during the pendency of any proceeding brought by such person in a proper Federal trial court for the recovery of any portion of such divisible tax which was paid by such person if-

    (A) the decision in such proceeding would be res judicata with respect to such unpaid tax; or

    (B) such person would be collaterally estopped from contesting such unpaid tax by reason of such proceeding.... .

    Further, Section 6331(i)(4) states:

    (4) Limitation on collection activity; authority to enjoin collection. --
    (A) Limitation on collection. --No proceeding in court for the collection of any unpaid tax to which paragraph (1) applies shall be begun by the Secretary during the pendency of a proceeding under such paragraph. This subparagraph shall not apply to --

    (i) any counterclaim in a proceeding under such paragraph; or

    (ii) any proceeding relating to a proceeding under such paragraph.

    (B) Authority to enjoin. --Notwithstanding section 7421(a), a levy or collection proceeding prohibited by this subsection may be enjoined (during the period such prohibition is in force) by the court in which the proceeding under paragraph (1) is brought.

    As part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, Congress added I.R.C. ? 6331(i). As noted above, in accordance with that provision, the Secretary of the Treasury may not file a collection action against a taxpayer for any unpaid divisible tax during the pendency of a taxpayer refund proceeding for the recovery of any portion of such divisible tax if the decision in the collection action would be res judicata or the taxpayer would be collaterally estopped from contesting such unpaid tax by reason of the collection action. See 26 U.S.C. ? 6331(i)(4)(A).

    The United States contends that the Western District collection action is not prohibited under Section 6331(i)(4)(A) because the case falls within the exception outlined in the statute that states that Section ? 6331(i)(4)(A) does not apply to any "proceeding relating to" the refund proceeding. The United States argues that the refund action relates to Nickell's refund proceeding because both proceedings involve the same legal issues arising out of the same set of facts. The United States further argues that it cannot bring its claims against Alvey as counterclaims here because this Court has no personal jurisdiction over Alvey, a Texas resident who apparently resides in the Western, not Eastern, District of Texas. The United States has not provided the Court with any statutory authority in support of its personal jurisdiction argument.

    Not only is the Court presently unconvinced by the Government's jurisdictional arguments as to Alvey, the Court finds that the statute - as it is currently written - specifically prohibits the case from proceeding in the Western District as to the claims against Nickell. As this Court has recently found in another case pending before it, Congress did not define "proceeding related to" in the body of the statute, and it is therefore ambiguous. The United States seeks to define "proceeding related to" as any proceeding that has a connection, relation, or reference to the refund proceeding. As argued by the United States, any collection action that has a connection, relation, or reference to the refund proceeding is exempt from the rule.

    The Court agrees with Nickell that, using the United States' definition of related proceedings, the exception would swallow the rule. A subsequent collection action will always have some connection, relation, and reference to the preceding refund proceeding involving the same taxes and taxpayer. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts "should act under the assumption that Congress intended its enactment to have meaningful effect and must, accordingly, construe [the enactment] so as to give it such effect." Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court rejects the United States' definition and finds that the exception set out in Section ? 6331(i)(4)(A)(ii) does not apply to a collection action against the same taxpayer to recover the same tax at issue in the refund proceeding.

    This conclusion is consistent with the statute's congressional history and interpretation by other courts. See, e.g., Enax v. United States, 243 Fed. Appx. 449, 451 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that 26 U.S.C. ? 6331(i)(4)(B) "grants a district court overseeing a taxpayer's claim for recovery of a portion of taxes already paid the authority to enjoin a collection proceeding on the unpaid portion of those taxes until the taxpayer's recovery suit is resolved."); Rineer v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 765 (2007) (finding that 26 U.S.C. ? 6331(i)(4) prevents the government from filling a collection action against a refund claimant while the refund suit is still pending, even at the cost of judicial economy); Swinford v. United States, No. 5:05-cv-234, 2007 WL 496376 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2007), vacated as moot, No. 5:05-cv-234, 2008 WL 4682273 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 20, 2008) (holding that "an exception that would allow the Government to bring a collection action against the plaintiffs in a properly filed tax refund suit for the same unpaid taxes at issue in the refund suit...would be inconsistent with Congress's intent and contrary to the principle's of statutory construction."). Indeed, in the legislative history of the statute, the Committee notes that the change in the law was based on the belief that "taxpayers who are litigating a refund action over divisible taxes should be protected from collection of the full assessed amount, because the court considering the refund suit may ultimately determine that the taxpayer is not liable." S. Rep. No. 105-174, at 80 (1998). The Court finds that Nickell, in filing his refund action first, has sought and is entitled to such protection here.

    Therefore, having reviewed the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the authorities relying on it, the Court finds that the Western District collection action is not a "proceeding relating to" the refund proceeding, and that Section 6331(i)(4)(A) prohibited the Government from filing the Western District action against Nickell.

    Moreover, the Court finds that enjoining the Western District case is warranted. The I.R.C. provides that if the United States initiates a prohibited collection action, the collection action may be enjoined by the court in which the refund proceeding is pending. See 26 U.S.C. ? 6331(i)(4)(B). Because the United States filed a counterclaim in this action requesting the same relief against Nickell as in the Western District proceeding, this Court will ultimately determine the underlying issue in the Western District proceeding - whether Nickell is liable for the unpaid taxes. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy and to promote respect for the law, the Court finds that the Secretary of the Treasury should be enjoined from continuing to prosecute the Western District action against Nickell during the pendency of the refund proceeding.


    Recommendation


    For the reasons previously stated, the Court recommends that Jerry D. Nickell, Sr.'s Motion to Enjoin Proceedings in Collection Case Filed by Defendant in Western District of Texas, Midland Division (Dkt. 22) be GRANTED and the Secretary of the Treasury be enjoined from continuing to prosecute the Western District action against Nickell during the pendency of the refund proceeding. Further, the Court recommends that the United States of America's Motion to Stay (Dkt. 18) be DENIED as MOOT.

    Within ten (10) days after service of the magistrates judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. ? 636(b)(1)(c). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report within ten days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).

    SIGNED this 2nd day of April, 2009.

    Levy and Distraint: Levy prohibited during pendency of divisible tax refund suit

    The IRS may not assess a tax deficiency or take any collection action if the taxpayer has filed a timely petition with the Tax Court with respect to the deficiency ( Code Sec. 6213(a)). This rule is necessary because a taxpayer does not need to pay the deficiency in order to obtain Tax Court jurisdiction.

    The Tax Court generally has no jurisdiction over "divisible taxes" such as employment taxes and the trust fund penalty tax ( Code Sec. 6672). Although a taxpayer is generally required to pay the full amount of a deficiency in order to obtain Federal District Court or Claims Court jurisdiction in a refund suit, an exception applies in the case of a divisible tax. Under the exception, these courts have jurisdiction if a taxpayer pays only a portion of the divisible tax (usually the tax due for a single payment period). For example, in the case of trust fund penalty tax, an employer will commonly pay the amount of tax due for one employee for one period and then file a refund claim with a request for abatement of the remaining penalty. Although IRS Policy 5-16, which has been in effect since March 1, 1984, prohibits collection activities during the pendency of a divisible tax refund suit, the IRS occasionally disregarded this policy. The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-206), however, codified the policy by prohibiting the IRS from levying on the property or property rights of a taxpayer for the payment of an unpaid divisible tax during the pendency of a Federal trial court proceeding for the refund of a portion of the divisible tax which has been paid ( Code Sec. 6331(i)). The provision applies to unpaid tax attributable to tax periods beginning after December 31, 1998 (Act Sec. 3433(b) of P.L. 105-206).

    The prohibition against levy actions applies only if a decision in the proceeding will be res judicata (i.e., binding) with respect to the unpaid tax, or will collaterally estop the taxpayer from contesting the unpaid tax ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(1)).

    Pending suit defined. The IRS is prohibited from collecting by levy any unpaid divisible tax while a refund proceeding in a proper federal trial court for the paid portion of such tax is pending. A proceeding is considered pending until a final judgment or order from which an appeal may be taken is entered ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(6)).

    Divisible taxes. Divisible taxes are employment taxes imposed by subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code and the penalty imposed by Code Sec. 6672 with respect to any such employment tax for failure to collect and pay over tax or attempt to evade or defeat tax ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(2)).

    Exceptions to levy. The prohibition against IRS collection by levy does not apply if the taxpayer files a written waiver with the IRS (for example, because the taxpayer wants to stop the running of interest or penalties) or the IRS finds that collection of the unpaid tax is in jeopardy. This prohibition also does not apply to a levy that carries out an offset under Code Sec. 6402 or to a levy made before the proceeding began ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(3)).

    IRS prohibited from beginning collection proceedings in court during pendency of refund suit. The IRS may not begin a court proceeding to collect any unpaid divisible tax while a refund proceeding for the paid portion of such tax is pending. If the IRS does begin such a collection proceeding, the anti-injunction provisions of Code Sec. 7421 do not apply and the court with jurisdiction over the refund proceeding may enjoin the collection proceeding.

    This prohibition does not apply to a proceeding that is a counterclaim or to a proceeding related to the refund proceeding ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(4)). The Conference Report to P.L. 105-206 (see ?38,185.0172) states that a proceeding related to a refund proceeding includes, but is not limited to, civil actions brought by the United States or another person with respect to the same type of tax (or related taxes or penalties) for the same (or overlapping) tax periods. Thus, the IRS may counterclaim against the taxpayer for the balance of the unpaid tax or may initiate an action against other persons assessed for trust fund recovery penalties for the same employment taxes.

    Further, the levy prohibition only applies to tax periods that are the subject of the tax refund suit. In Unico Services, Inc., FedCl, 2006-1 USTC ?50,321, at ?38,187.221, a corporation was not entitled to an injunction to prevent collection for tax periods that were not the subject of the refund claim. The tax periods for which the corporation claimed a refund were different from the tax periods for which the IRS issued a notice of intent to levy. Since the tax liabilities of the non-suit tax periods were not the subject of the corporation's refund claim, the IRS was not prohibited under Code Sec. 6331(i)(1) from collecting by levy the corporation's unpaid employment tax liabilities for those periods.

    Statute of limitations on collections suspended. The 10-year period of limitations on collection of delinquent taxes after assessment ( Code Sec. 6502) is suspended during the pendency of a refund proceeding during which the IRS is prohibited from collecting by levy ( Code Sec. 6331(i)(5)).

    Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Code Sec. 6331(i) does not prevent the IRS from filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, according to the Conference Committee Report to P.L. 105-206 (see ?38,185.017

    Stay of collection. --Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax, or Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax: Stay of collection

    An individual's appeal of the stay of his refund claim was properly suspended pending the resolution of a later-filed action by the government. Although the taxpayer properly invoked the refund jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the court exercised its discretion to suspend the case in the interest of efficient case management because the later-filed action would resolve the entire matter for all parties. Furthermore, the taxpayer's motion to enjoin the IRS from its administrative collection proceeding was dismissed because he had failed to post a bond. Also, the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act that restricts IRS collection procedures did not apply.

    R. Klein, CA-FC (unpublished opinion), 95-2 USTC ?50,376.

    The bond and sureties requirements of Reg. ?301.7101-1 will apply to stay the collection of unpaid employment and excise taxes and relief is available from the 100% penalty if such a bond is furnished within 30 days after the date of notice and demand for payment of the penalty.

    Rev. Rul. 79-170, 1979-1 CB 437.

    An individual's motion for a stay on a levy imposed by the IRS on his wages to collect outstanding trust fund recovery penalties was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. He either failed to invoke any of the statutory exceptions to the Act or the exceptions did not cover the penalties at issue. Moreover, the IRS was not prohibited from imposing a levy to collect the penalties because the individual had not paid any amount and did not post any bond within thirty days of receiving the notice that penalties were assessed against him.

    Q. Bullard, DC Md., 2007-1 USTC ?50,245, 486 FSupp2d 512.

    An individual's action seeking refund of money paid in partial satisfaction of a trust fund recovery penalty was not suspended pending completion of a collection action subsequently filed by the government in the U.S. district court against the individual and another responsible person. The government's request to suspend the refund proceedings on the grounds of judicial efficiency was rejected in light of the individual's theory of non-liability and her right to choose the forum in which to litigate the refund claim. The nature of the individual's claim was such that if she succeeded, she would have demonstrated that the failure to pay the withheld taxes was not willful and arose at the firm level.

    J.A. Rineer, FedCl, 2008-1 USTC ?50,119.
    Lawyer Could Face Jail for Voir Dire Question

    From ABA Journal.com:

    A federal magistrate has found patent lawyer John van Loben Sels in contempt of court and threatened him with a 48-hour jail sentence for a question he asked during voir dire.

    Van Loben Sels asked potential jurors in a patent infringement suit whether they had "a problem with a company that puts its headquarters offshore on a Caribbean island in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes," the Recorder reports. He is a partner with Wang, Hartmann, Gibbs & Cauley of Mountain View, Calif.

    U.S. Magistrate Judge Charles Everingham IV of Marshall, Texas, had prohibited Van Loben Sels and other lawyers for Beyond Innovation Technology Co., a defendant in a patent suit, from saying anything about the tax motivation for the Cayman Islands home of the plaintiff, O2 Micro.

    Everingham said Van Loben Sels would not have to serve the sentence if he behaved for the rest of the case, according to the story. But he granted a mistrial and imposed other sanctions on Beyond Innovation Technology Co., known as BiTEK. It will have to foot the bill for new jury selection, will get half the voir dire time of its opponent and will get two peremptory challenges instead of four, according to the Recorder.

    Van Loben Sels had defended his question, saying it was hypothetical and he didn't refer to O2 Micro by name.


    CBPP: House Health Bill?s ?A Reasonable Approach?

    Last Friday, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities released a study examining the House of Representative?s much-discussed proposal for funding health care reform. They call the plan ?a reasonable approach? and assert that the ?impact on small businesses would be modest.? However, as the recession continues, even a small tax increase could delay recovery. Check out a snippet from their study below, but be sure to check out the full explanation of the study (including graphs) at CBPP.org.

    Reforming the health care system to provide universal health coverage is an urgent priority. But, facing huge projected budget deficits that have the nation on an unsustainable fiscal path, the White House and Congress must enact a health reform plan that is also fully financed and that reduces the growth rate of health care costs over the long term.

    Policymakers have been considering two major proposals to help finance health care reform that represent sound tax policy: (1) limiting the tax exclusion for employer-provided health benefits, and (2) capping the value of itemized deductions at 28 percent or a somewhat higher level. Capping the exclusion has the added benefit of helping slow the growth of health care costs. House Democrats have now advanced a third major proposal that also represents sound tax policy: imposing a graduated surcharge on high-income taxpayers.

    The House surcharge proposal is reasonable and well targeted. In recent decades, incomes have grown disproportionately for households at the top of the income scale, while their tax burden has fallen substantially. Moreover, despite charges to the contrary, the proposal would have only a small impact on small businesses. The congressional Joint Tax Committee estimates that it would have no impact at all on 96 percent of small business owners ? broadly defined as any taxpayer with as little as $1 of business income ? and that only half of the 4 percent of small business owners who would be affected derive more than a third of their income from a business. At the same time, the House plan would enhance the ability of small businesses to offer affordable, quality health insurance to their employees.

    High-Income Households Have Far Outpaced Others in Recent Decades

    The surcharge would affect only the highest-income 1.2 percent of taxpayers, according to the Joint Tax Committee. Very high-income households have benefited handsomely ? both absolutely and compared to the rest of the population ? from both recent trends in pre-tax incomes and recent changes in tax policy. Congressional Budget Office data show that between 1979 and 2006 (the most recent year for which these data are available): [3]

    The before-tax income of the top 1 percent of U.S. households increased by 226 percent, on average (after adjusting for inflation), compared to an increase of just 15 percent for families in the middle fifth of the income spectrum.

    Examples of How Tax Increases could Hit the Rich

    Over the weekend, I came across this informative article from the Associated Press explaining how families would be impacted if the House?s new tax increate were to become law. As you can see from the examples below, some taxpayers could face a huge tax bill next April.

  • A family of four making $450,000 a year would pay $103,600 in federal income taxes, an increase of $1,000.
  • A single filer making $450,000 a year would pay $112,200 in federal income taxes, an increase of $7,100.
  • A family of four making $800,000 a year would pay $220,800 in federal income taxes, an increase of $30,000.
  • A single filer making $800,000 a year would pay $231,300 in federal income taxes, an increase of $30,700.
  • A family of four making $5 million a year would pay $1.81 million in federal income taxes, an increase of $443,500.
  • A single filer making $5 million a year would pay $1.83 million in federal income taxes, an increase of $452,000.

  • Ask the Tax Lady: July 20th, 2009
    As I mentioned last Monday, I am now doing a weekly feature on my blog titled ?Ask the Tax Lady.? Throughout the week, I am going to gather questions from friends and followers of mine on Twitter, MySpace, and Facebook that I will answer in this new weekly feature. In addition to answered questions asked of me directly, I also found a few other users on Twitter who posted random tax questions. Check out the questions and answers from last week below, or click one of the links to ask me your own question!

    Question #1: How do I get an IRS levy released?

    The IRS must release your levy if ANY of the following occur:

    1. You pay the tax, penalty, and interest you owe (please see Full Pay Service).

    2. The IRS discovers that the time for collection (the statute of limitations) ended before the levy was served (please see Tax Account Review).

    3. You provide documentation proving that releasing the levy will help the IRS collect the ta owed.

    4. You have an Installment Agreement, or enter into one, unless the agreement says the levy does not have to be released (please see Installment Agreement).

    5. The IRS determines that the levy is creating a significant economic hardship for you (please see Currently Not Collectible).

    6. The fair market value of the property exceeds such liability and release of the levy on a part of such property could be made without hindering the collection of such liability.

    For more information check out this article on RoniDeutch.com.

    Question #2: What are the tax legalities of an eBay business?

    An eBay business should be treated just like any other home business. In fact, all income you make from eBay should be reported to the IRS, regardless of the amount you make. However, just like having a garage sale, you will only need to report the money you make if it is in fact income. Therefore, if you bought a computer for $1000 and sold it on eBay (or at a garage sale) for $100 then it is not income since you did not make any profit. However, if you make and sell products on eBay for a profit, then you should report the income to the IRS.

    Although many people fear that eBay is required to send the IRS data for its users, their spokesperson Chris Donlay says this is not the case. ?The IRS would need to provide us with a subpoena for a specific individual before we would provide any data. I don't believe this is something that would be typically done for a routine audit, though it theoretically could happen.?

    However, just because eBay is not reporting the income does not mean it is ok not include it on your tax return. Remember that the IRS now has the ability to monitor bank accounts and if you are making regular deposits then they might get suspicious. To learn more about eBay and tax issues, check out this interesting article I came across this weekend.

    Question #3: When did April 15 become tax day?

    According to Wikipedia:

    The {tax} filing deadline for individuals was March 1 in 1913 and was changed to March 15 in 1918 and again to April 15 in 1955. Today, the filing deadline for U.S. federal income tax returns for individuals remains April 15 or, in the event that the 15th falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the first succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

    Question #4: Is Schaumburg, IL Restaurant Sales Tax the Highest in the Nation at 12%?

    Yes, the 12% sales tax levied on foods and beverages in Schaumburg, IL make it the highest sales tax rate in the nation. In addition to the state?s general sales tax the small tourist town also levies a 2% Village of Schaumburg Home Rule Food & Beverage Tax.

    Schaumburg?s neighbor Chicago, IL has the highest sales tax rate of any major metropolitan city at 10.25%. However, these rates are based off of a relatively low state sales tax. California has the highest statewide sales tax at 8.25%, but nearly every city and town levies additional sales taxes. In fact, in the South Gate and Pico Rivera, CA the total sales tax is also 10.25%.

    Challenging California Wills In Any Probate Court, Including Los Angeles

    Want to contest a California Will? Do you believe the terms of the Will should not be enforced? A Will can be contested and invalidated for a variety of reasons, not all of which are included here.

    Undue Influence. Although there are several tests for undue influence, it boils down to a confidential relationship between the testator (will drafter) and the influencer and suspicious circumstances. Suspicious circumstances can be shown by procurement of a will, secrecy, no independent advice by the testator (person who executes the will), an unnatural or unjust gift, susceptibility to influence, haste in the signing of the will, or a change in attitude.

    Menace. Menace is essentially blackmail. Menace can be shown by threat of unlawful and violent injury to the person, property or character of any person and will invalidate a will if it was used to coerce a transfer or prevent someone from changing a testamentary document.

    The testator may lack capacity. In California, the person must be 18 years of age and of sound mind. The fact situations are often varied, but often the person does not understand the nature of the testamentary act sometimes because of dementia, or lacks the ability to recall the nature of the individual?s property.

    Fraud. Fraud may be actual or constructive. Actual fraud generally can be intentional if a person tells a lie, suppresses a fact, or makes a promise without intent to perform. Constructive fraud is a breach of a duty with fraudulent intent to gain advantage to another?s prejudice.

    Duress. Although the rule is stated differently in California, duress may invalidate a will if a transfer is obtained after the wrongdoer threatened to perform or did perform a wrongful act that coerced the donor into making a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made.

    Mistake. It is hard to show that a mistake will invalidate a will or part of a will, but under certain circumstances it may be possible to prove.

    Have other questions, call a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" probate lawyer; call Mitchell A. Port at (310) 559-5259.


    Tax Amnesty Requests Result in 30 Questions to Offshore Bank Account Owners

    When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released its foreign bank account holders who made a tax attorney has stated that his clients have been asked 30 standard questions. None of the questions are particularly surprising and are in line with questions our clients have been asked under the IRS? previous voluntary compliance initiative (VCI). Nevertheless no-one who is filing for the tax attorney present, and maybe not even then. The questions appear designed to probe for signs of tax fraud, as well assure the IRS that all tax preparer penalties, or even voluntary disclosure.

    According to the Wall Street Journal those questions were:

    ? Is it your statement that the tax payers are willing to comply with the IRS and make a good faith arrangement to pay all taxes, penalties, fees and interest?
    ? Where are the funds held regarding the disclosure?
    ? Do you have any records? If not, whom are you working with at the bank? (Note: If the taxpayer is a UBS client and if they don't have the records, IRS will attempt to assist them in record retrieval).
    ? When was the account opened?
    ? How was the account opened?
    ? Who assisted you with the account opening?
    ? Who told you about the bank and how to initiate opening of the account?
    ? Do you have a trust set up relating to the account or the funds?
    ? How did you deposit money into the account?
    ? How did you withdraw money from the account?
    ? Did you have any credit or debit cards associated with the account?
    ? How did you correspond with the bank? Do you have records relating to the correspondence?
    ? Who is your current point of contact at the bank?
    ? Did you ever meet face to face with anyone from the bank? If so, where? When?
    ? Did you travel outside of the U.S. to conduct business relating to your account and or tax activities?
    ? Where was your bank statements sent?
    ? Who has ownership of the account? Is it a joint account?
    ? What is the source of the funds?
    ? Do you have tax returns?
    ? Have you prepared amended tax returns? If so, have you submitted them to the IRS?
    ? Who prepared your returns?
    ? When were your returns prepared?
    ? Did they know about the issues discussed today?
    ? Did you file FBARs? If not, why not?
    ? (For those who inherited the account) when did you take control of this account? And, all the related questions a 'yes' answer makes us ask.
    ? Did you trade US and/or foreign securities with this account? If yes, describe the mechanism for doing that (buy/sell orders, etc.)?
    ? Did you file returns?
    ? Do your or have you directly or indirectly controlled any foreign entities? Did you file the required returns for them?
    ? For UBS clients in particular ? Have you been notified that the US requested information relating to your accounts?
    ? What countries do you have accounts in?

    If you have questions about the questions, feel free to contact the

    Congress wants to eliminate law that taxes company cell phones
    The company-issued cell phone you tote around could is actually a tax liability under a 2-decades-old tax provision Congress and the IRS would like to see scrapped. You probably don’t consider that electronic umbilical cord between you and your boss as a fringe benefit, but federal tax law does. Part of the tax code enacted in 1989 [...]
    Bailouts Could Cost U.S. $23 Trillion

    According to a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" new estimate from Politico.com the Federal bailouts from the past year could end up costing a staggering $23 Trillion. However, the author admits that this number is a ?worst-case scenario.? Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the government?s financial bailout programs, also asserts that this total is unlikely and that a number of problems would need to emerge forcing the government to spend more. According to Barofsky, the government has spent about $2 Trillion so far.

    Still, the enormity of the IG?s projection underscores the size of the economic disaster that hit the nation over the past year and the unprecedented sums mobilized by the federal government under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama to confront it.

    In fact, $23 trillion is more than the total cost of all the wars the United States has ever fought, put together. World War II, for example, cost $4.1 trillion in 2008 dollars, according to the Congressional Research Service.

    Even the Moon landings and the New Deal didn?t come close to $23 trillion: the Moon shot in 1969 cost an estimated $237 billion in current dollars, and the entire Depression-era Roosevelt relief program came in at $500 billion, according to Jim Bianco of Bianco Research.

    The annual gross domestic product of the United States is just over $14 trillion.

    Treasury spokesman Andrew Williams downplayed the total amount could ever reach Barofsky?s number.

    ?The $23.7 trillion estimate generally includes programs at the hypothetical maximum size envisioned when they were established,? Williams said. ?It was never likely that all these programs would be ?maxed out? at the same time.?


    US State Budgets Hit by Shrinking Tax Take

    From FT.com:

    Sharply falling tax revenues across the US have left states facing fresh budget shortfalls and threatening further painful spending and service cuts following previous multiple rounds of belt-tightening.

    In the first quarter of the calendar year, tax collections dropped by 11.7 per cent, the largest fall on record, according to the Rockefeller Institute of Government. Of 50 states, some 45 reported declines.

    Early figures for April and May show an overall decline of nearly 20 per cent for total taxes, ?a further dramatic worsening of fiscal conditions nationwide?, says the institute.

    Billions of dollars of federal stimulus funds, combined with cuts to state employee jobs, school districts, healthcare and even the US prison system, have so far failed to close the budget gaps.

    ?The states are constantly trying to recalibrate their budgets to deal with a shrinking revenue base,? said Susan Urahn, managing director of state policy initiative at the Pew Center on the States.

    It raises questions about how deep the decline in services may go, the direction of tax rates, and whether the federal stimulus measures are working.

    Converting an IRA into a Roth? How's Your Crystal Ball?

    Ron Lieber of the New York Times recently published an article discussing the unpredictable future of Roth IRAs. At one point, Lieber even proposes the possibility of taxes on withdrawals from Roth IRAs. Lieber predicts that ?at the most extreme end, the federal government might try to tax the earnings on a Roth after all, say through the capital gains tax, which is currently at 15 percent for long-term gains but could go up in the next few years.?

    You?ll be hearing a lot in the next six months about Roth Individual Retirement Accounts ? but not as much as you should about a long-term threat that hangs over them.

    Starting Jan. 1, you?ll be able to take a regular IRA, say, one that you have in a brokerage account after having rolled an old 401(k) into it, and turn it into a Roth. You?ll be able to do this no matter how much money you make, though you?ll have to pay income taxes at your current rate on whatever you move. Currently, you can?t make the conversion at all if your household has more than $100,000 in modified adjusted gross income. (That?s a technical Internal Revenue Service term, which it defines in Publication 590, available on its Web site).

    Why would you want to make such a swap? Because you think you or your heirs could end up with more money over the long haul by investing in a Roth instead of a regular IRA.

    With a Roth IRA, you pay no taxes on your earnings in most instances when you take money out; distributions from regular IRA?s are taxable the same way that income is, though the basic IRA does offer a tax deduction when you first deposit money into the account. The Roth offers no such deduction when you contribute money to it.

    So if you think your tax rate will be higher during retirement than it is now, say if you?re fairly young for instance, making the conversion early in 2010 looks sensible.

    Continue reading here?

    California Budget Deal Closes $26 Billion Gap

    California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the California legislature announced yesterday that they had finally put together a budget deal that settles the states whopping $26 billion deficit. Reactions to the budget are mixed, but at least the state is finally taking responsibility for their budget. According to the LA Times, the following changes will be made to the stat budget. However, as the author points out the reductions do not add up to $26 billion, and are pretty general to say the least.

    Cuts
  • K-12 and community college education -- $4.3 billion
  • Higher education -- $3 billion
  • Medi-Cal -- $1.3 billion
  • State worker pay -- $1.3 billion
  • Corrections -- $1.2 billion
  • CalWorks/welfare -- $528 million
  • Home health aides -- $226 million
  • Healthy Families children?s insurance -- $124 million
  • Local transportation -- $1 billion
  • Redevelopment agencies -- $1.7 billion
  • Additional Revenues
  • Accelerate income tax withholding -- $1.7 billion
  • Increase estimated tax payments for businesses and the self-employed -- $610 million
  • New Funds
  • Sale of State Compensation Insurance Fund -- $1 billion
  • Assumed federal funds for Medi-Cal program -- $1 billion
  • Accounts Shift / Borrowing
  • Local government borrowing -- $2 billion
  • Education deferrals -- $1.7 billion
  • June 2010 state worker paycheck deferral -- $1.2 billion

  • The Wall Street Journal also published a piece with strong opinions on some of the cuts. Check out a clip of their article below, or find the entire full here.

    Under the budget plan, state lawmakers would cut $15 billion in spending. The rest of the gap would be filled by taking funds from local governments and through one-time fixes and accounting maneuvers. The deal must still be approved by rank-and-file legislators, who are expected to vote on it Thursday.

    "We have accomplished a lot in this budget," Mr. Schwarzenegger told reporters after lawmakers struck the deal Monday evening. "We dealt with the entire $26 billion deficit," he said.

    The nation's most populous state faces a $26 billion gap in a $92 billion general-fund budget through June 2010. Mr. Schwarzenegger and legislators have been wrestling over the budget for weeks, forcing the state's chief accountant to issue IOUs to many creditors, including some welfare recipients.

    As of Friday, the state had issued 153,711 IOUs, worth a total of $682 million. The office of Controller John Chiang said it would need to evaluate the budget proposal before determining when it could stop issuing the warrants.

    Economists said the spending cuts would bruise a California economy already slammed by rising unemployment and foreclosure rates. "It will certainly offset a fraction of the federal-stimulus effect this fall," said Roger Noll, a professor emeritus of economics at Stanford University. "That will mean the depth and duration of the recession [in California] will both be bigger than otherwise would've been the case," he said.

    The leaders of the Democratic-controlled state legislature said that of the $15 billion in cuts, $9 billion would come from education, $1.3 billion from state-worker furloughs and $1.2 billion from the prison system.

    "For Democrats, I have to tell you that many of cuts we had to make, at another time, we would've thought unthinkable," said Assembly Speaker Karen Bass.

    Ms. Bass also said that local governments "will have to share the pain." The state will take away $4.3 billion from local governments by borrowing from them or redirecting funds that had been earmarked for them.

    Pelosi Explains Tax Proposal In Health Care Bill

    With all the concern over the House?s health care bill, and Obama?s recent omission that he was not familiar with all the provisions in it, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi tried her best to defend the proposed tax increases. She asserted that only very wealthy Americans will be paying more taxes, and that the Middle Class would not be affected. Check out the following story on Pelosi?s arguments below courtesy of USA Today.

    Ensuring that the middle class doesn't have to pay the $1 trillion-plus price for overhauling the nation's health care system could mean that the wealthiest Americans will pay a higher rate than the House originally proposed, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., told USA Today?s editorial board Tuesday.

    "I wanted to remove all doubt that we were not touching the middle class on this," Pelosi said, explaining why she has advocated in recent days for a higher income threshold for taxes proposed in the House version of the health care bill. "When you go there you get less money because there are fewer people so you have to adjust the fee, but you can't adjust it endlessly. It has to be responsible."

    President Obama continued to push for quick legislation Tuesday and had harsh words Tuesday for those who want to "block" health care legislation.

    "Time and again we've heard excuses to delay" health care reform, Obama said in brief remarks from the White House Rose Garden. But he also stressed the "common ground" that has already been forged on Capitol Hill.

    "We have traveled long and hard to reach this point," Obama said adding that "we are closer than ever before to the reform that the American people need, and we're going to get the job done."

    Lawmakers in Congress are debating ways to pay for Obama's pledge to provide health insurance to the 50 million people in the country who do not have it.

    Foxy Brown Owes the IRS Too

    It seems like nearly every week I come across a new story about a celebrity or professional athlete who some how forgot to pay their full tax bill. Well it seems like the latest addition to the list is pop music artist Foxy Brown, who has been charged with evading taxes for over 6 years. According to Contact Music Brown owes the IRS over $640,000. Check out a clip of their story below.

    Rapper Foxy Brown has been hit with a lawsuit from U.S. tax officials after running up debts of $641,558 (?427,705). The star is accused of failing to keep up with her taxes since 2003, and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents have taken their case to a court in New York to try to recoup the cash. IRS officials have filed tax lien documents against Brown for allegedly missing payments between 2003 and 2006, reports AllHipHop.com.